Ex Parte Amos
| Decision Date | 11 January 1927 |
| Citation | 93 Fla. 5,112 So. 289 |
| Parties | Ex parte AMOS. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Original application by Ernest Amos for habeas corpus. Petitioner discharged from custody.
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
Syllabus by the Court
One is entitled to discharge on habeas corpus, if alleged act charged as a crime is not crime. When a person is held under color of criminal process, he is entitled to his discharge from custody upon a writ of habeas corpus, if the act with which he stands charged or of which he has been convicted is not in law a crime.
'Habeas corpus' is writ of right; habeas corpus may be issued upon informal application; neither right to habeas corpus nor right to discharge from custody in proper case depends upon meticulous observance of rules of pleading. The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right. It may be issued upon informal application. Neither the right to the writ nor the right to be discharged from custody in a proper case is made to depend upon meticulous observance of the rules of pleading.
On habeas corpus, guilt or innocence of petitioner will not be considered, although indictment is defective or inartificially drawn. Upon the writ of habeas corpus the question of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner although the indictment is defective as a sufficient pleading or inartificially drawn, will not be considered by the court.
'Habeas corpus' is designed to test solely legality of petitioner's imprisonment. A writ of habeas corpus is designed to test solely the question of the legality of the petitioner's imprisonment.
On habeas corpus, legality of detention may be presented by exceptions to return raising law questions, denial of facts alleged therein, allegation of any other material fact, or petitioner may adopt petition as traverse of return. The question of the legality of the petitioner's detention in habeas corpus proceedings may be presented by exceptions to the return raising questions of law, a denial of the facts set forth in the return, the allegation of any other fact that may be material, or the petitioner may adopt his petition as a traverse of the return.
Section 5354, Revised General Statutes, denounces the crimes of willfully charging, receiving, or collecting greater fees by any officer of the state than he is entitled to charge receive, or collect by law, and 'malpractice in office not otherwise especially provided for.'
Indictment of state comptroller for neglecting to take possession of bank and retain it until its affairs were in sound condition although he had reason to believe bank was in unsound condition, charges no crime (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 5354). An indictment charging the comptroller of the state with failure and neglect to perform his duty as comptroller in not taking possession of the property and business of a certain bank and retaining the same in his possession until the affairs of the bank were placed in a safe and sound condition, although as comptroller he had reason to believe that the bank was in an unsound condition, charges no crime under the law of the state.
Statute contravening or changing common law must be strictly construed; statute supplementary to common law does not displace it more than clearly necessary. When a statute contravenes or alters a principle of the common law, it must be strictly construed, and a statute which is supplementary to the common law does not displace that law any further than is clearly necessary.
Any doubt in penal statute should be resolved against state. In the construction of a penal statute, if there is doubt as to its meaning, the court should resolve such doubt in favor of the citizen and against the state.
Doctrine of ejusdem generis held to apply to statute relating to malpractice in state office; general words, any 'malpractice in office' not otherwise especially provided for, mean malpractice by state officers charging greater fees than law provides (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 5354). The doctrine of ejusdem generis applies to section 5354 Revised General Statutes, which requires that the meaning to be given to the general words, 'any malpractice in office not otherwise especially provided for,' is influenced by the words of limited meaning used in denouncing the offense committed by officers of the state who willfully charge, receive, or collect greater fees for any service than the law provides for such service.
'Malpractice' by state officers under statute means misbehavior, not necessarily willful, but constituting breach of fiduciary duties, for monetary or other unlawful consideration (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 5354). The word 'malpractice' as used in section 5354, Revised General Statutes, is limited in its meaning to the particular species of misconduct or misbehavior enumerated in the first part of the section, not necessarily willful in character, but constituting a breach of fiduciary duties, for a monetary or other unlawful consideration or purpose.
Statute denouncing malpractice by state officers denounces two classes of offenses in which bad faith or breach of fiduciary duty exists (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 5354). Section 5354, Revised General Statutes, denounces two classes of offenses in which the element of bad faith or breach of a fiduciary duty exists.
State comptroller has discretionary power to take control of bank's affairs for inefficient management (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 4151-4154, 4162, 4167). The comptroller of the state is vested with a discretionary power to interfere and take control of a banking company's affairs when he deems the bank's management to be inefficient and violative of the rules prescribed for efficient service.
Power of state comptroller to remove bank officers and to take possession of insolvent bank's property is discretionary (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 4151-4154, 4162, 4167). Sections 4154, 4162, and 4167, Revised General Statutes, vest in the comptroller of the state the power to remove bank officers under certain conditions and to take possession of the property of a bank found to be in an unsound condition or insolvent and to appoint a receiver to take charge of the assets and affairs of such bank. The power vested is discretionary.
State comptroller's exercise or nonexercise of discretionary powers under state banking law does not render him subject to criminal prosecution for error in judgment not involving moral turpitude or corrupt breach of fiduciary duty (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 4151-4154, 4162, 4167). The action or nonaction of the comptroller, a constitutional administrative officer of the executive department, in discharging duties or exercising his discretionary powers under the banking law of the state, is not subject to criminal prosecution for error in judgment not involving moral turpitude or a corrupt breach of an official fiduciary duty.
That a constitutional officer who is subject to impeachment may not also be subject to indictment for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office not decided.
Common-law offense of malpractice in office must be charged as having been willfully or corruptly done or omitted, when official discretion is involved. The common-law offense of malpractice in office must be charged as having been willfully or corruptly done or omitted, when official discretion is involved.
Indictment failing to allege state officer corruptly did or omitted to do act within his discretion charges no offense; indictment failing to charge state comptroller with corruptly omitting to take charge of insolvent bank is not sufficient ground for holding defendant, who will be released on habeas corpus (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 4154, 4162, 4167, 5354). An indictment which fails to allege that a state officer corruptly did or omitted to do some act the doing or omission to do which lay within his discretion under the law charges no offense under the provisions of section 5354, Revised General Statutes.
Fred H. Davis, of Tallahassee, for petitioner.
J. B. Johnson, Atty. Gen., and L. R. Baker, State's Atty., and Harris Berlack, Asst. State's Atty., both of West Palm Beach, opposed.
Ernest Amos, who is comptroller of the state, was arrested and taken into custody of the sheriff of Leon county under a warrant issuing out of the circuit court for Palm Beach county. The warrant commanded all and singular the sheriffs of the state of Florida to take 'Ernest Amos if he be found in your county, arrest and safely keep so that you have his body before the judge of our criminal court of the Fifteenth judicial circuit of the state of Florida, at the courthouse in West Palm Beach, to answer unto the state of Florida on an indictment against him by the grand jurors for the county of Palm Beach for malpractice in office,' etc.
He applied for and obtained from this court a writ of habeas corpus, alleging in his petition that he was arrested and restrained of his liberty by virtue of a capias issuing out of the circuit court for Palm Beach county upon an indictment against him returned by the grand jury of that county--a copy of the indictment was attached to the petition as a part of it--that he was not committed or detained by virtue of any process issued by any court of the United States or any judge thereof or decree of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction. It was alleged that his imprisonment was illegal because:
First, the indictment charged no criminal offense against the laws of the state of Florida.
There were other grounds which in the view we have of the case it is unnecessary to mention in detail. In substance they were That as one holding the constitutional office of comptroller, an...
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State v. Williamson
...prescribed by the written law or by the unwritten.' 1 Bishop, Criminal Law, (8th ed. 1892), sec. 468 al. See also Ex parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289, 294 (Sup.Ct.1927), where it was "The common-law offense, however, must be charged as having been willfully or corruptly done or omitted. I......
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...Legislature, is to be considered as included within its terms.' " State v. Wershow, 343 So.2d 605, 608 (Fla.1977), quoting Ex Parte Amos, 93 Fla. 5, 112 So. 289 (1927). Palmer v. State, 438 So.2d 1, 3 We move now to consider the interrelationship of these rules of construction. We begin wit......
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