Ex parte Beasley

• Citation: 712 So.2d 338
• Parties: 135 Lab.Cas. P 58,417 Ex parte Antoinette J. BEASLEY. (Re Antoinette J. BEASLEY v. BROOKWOOD MEDICAL CENTER). 1961623.
• Decision Date: 20 March 1998
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 338

712 So.2d 338

135 Lab.Cas. P 58,417

Ex parte Antoinette J. BEASLEY.

(Re Antoinette J. BEASLEY v. BROOKWOOD MEDICAL CENTER).

1961623.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 20, 1998.

K. David Sawyer and Richard J. Stockham III of Stockham & Stockham, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner.

Elmer E. White and Charles M. Elmer of The Kullman Firm, Birmingham, for respondent.

SEE, Justice.

Antoinette J. Beasley petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order compelling her to arbitrate her claims against Brookwood Medical Center ("Brookwood"). Beasley maintains that arbitration is inappropriate because the arbitration clause contained in her employee handbook and relied upon by the trial court is not supported by a binding contract. We grant the petition.

I.

In March 1995, Brookwood adopted a new employment policy. The policy required all employees, as a condition of employment, to agree to submit employment claims against Brookwood to final and binding arbitration. Brookwood provided notice of the arbitration policy by issuing each employee an employee handbook that included the arbitration agreement, and it required each employee to acknowledge, by signature, receipt of the employee handbook. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., the corporate parent of Brookwood, has used this standard employee handbook and acknowledgment form at many of its facilities across the country. After an employee signed an acknowledgment form, Brookwood placed the form in the employee's file.

Although Beasley was already employed by Brookwood when this new policy was implemented, her continued employment was conditioned on her acknowledging the receipt of the new standard employee handbook. Less than two months after Beasley signed an acknowledgment form, she was notified that her employment with Brookwood as a registered nurse had been terminated. When Beasley could not find other employment, she sued Brookwood, alleging, among other things, fraud, slander, libel, and blacklisting. The trial court granted Brookwood's motion to stay the proceeding and to compel arbitration. Beasley filed this mandamus petition.

II.

A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, requiring the showing of: (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty on the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989). Mandamus is the appropriate procedure when a party has been compelled to arbitrate a claim that he did not agree to arbitrate. ¹

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, provides that an arbitration clause contained in a contract involving interstate commerce will be enforceable. The arbitration clause will generally be enforceable against those parties who signed the contract. Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 108 (Ala.1995).

The standard employee handbook issued to Brookwood's employees contains an arbitration provision designated as the final step in the "Fair Treatment Process." Under the Fair Treatment Process, if an employee fails to resolve a complaint with officers of Brookwood, the employee "will use binding, independent arbitration as the final step in [his] complaint process."

In addition, the unsigned acknowledgment form in the standard employee handbook submitted by Brookwood with its mandamus petition contains the following pertinent language:

" I have received my copy of the ... Employee Handbook which outlines my privileges and obligations ....

"....

"I understand also that this handbook highlights company policies .... No written agreement concerning employment terms or conditions is valid unless signed by a facility executive director ... and no written statement or agreement in this handbook concerning employment is binding, since provisions are subject to change, and as all ... employees are employed on an 'at will' basis. ...

"I understand [Brookwood] makes available arbitration for resolution of grievances. I also understand that as a condition of employment and continued employment I agree to submit any complaints to the [Fair Treatment Process] and agree to abide by and accept the final decision of the arbitration panel as ultimate resolution of my complaint(s) for any and all events that arise out of employment or termination of employment."

(Emphasis added.) Beasley argues that the emphasized language, in the second quoted paragraph, stating that "no written statement or agreement in this handbook ... is binding," precludes the existence of a contract. Otherwise, Beasley contends, Brookwood would be allowed to pick and choose which provisions of the handbook it desired to enforce.

We agree with Beasley that the statement in the acknowledgment form signed by her that "no written statement or agreement in this handbook ... is binding" vitiates the operative effect of the arbitration provision contained in the standard employee handbook. The plain meaning of the phrase "no written statement" would include the statement in the standard employee handbook that the employee "will use binding, independent arbitration as the final step in [his] complaint process." See Shepherd Realty Co. v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 418 So.2d 871, 874 (Ala.1982) (stating that courts should construe contractual language as written); McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc., 484 So.2d 398, 400 (Ala.1986) (holding that an employee handbook containing a statement disclaiming the binding effect of the...