Ex parte Blackey

Decision Date16 March 1926
Docket NumberNo. 5107.,5107.
Citation208 N.W. 238,53 N.D. 852
PartiesEx Parte BLACKEY.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court.

The district court, acting under the Juvenile Court Act (chapter 23, Code of Criminal Procedure, Compiled Laws 1913), has only such power as is given to it by that statute.

The Juvenile Court Act (Comp. Laws 1913, § 11402), which provides “that all dependent, neglected and delinquent children under the age of 18 years, shall, for the purpose of this act only, be considered wards of this state and their persons shall be subject to the care, guardianship and control of the court as hereinafter provided,” clearly makes delinquent, neglected, and dependent children wards of the state and subjects them to the care, guardianship, and control of the juvenile court until they are 18 years of age.

A juvenile court has no authority in law to revive a sentence to the reform school that has been suspended for nearly 4 years, and to commit the delinquent child who is now more than 20 years old to the reform school. Such action is without jurisdiction and void, and a writ of habeas corpus will issue, but without prejudice to the right of the state to prosecute the defendant before a tribunal of competent jurisdiction for any criminal offense with which he may be charged.

Nuessle, J., dissenting in part.

Original application by H. B. Blackey for a writ of habeas corpus for and in behalf of his minor son, Lawrence Blackey. Writ granted without prejudice to the right of the State to prosecute Lawrence Blackey before a tribunal of competent jurisdiction for any criminal offense with which he may be charged.Cuthbert & Adamson, of Devils Lake, for petitioners.

S. W. Thompson, of Devils Lake, for the State.

BURKE, J.

In the juvenile court in and for Ramsey county, in September, 1922, Lawrence Blackey was adjudged to be a delinquent child under 18 years of age and was committed to the State Industrial School at Mandan, N. D. The order of commitment was suspended. Blackey was paroled and placed in the custody of County Judge Swenson, a juvenile officer, who allowed Blackey to remain at home.

On February 18, 1926, the judge of said court made another order, and, after giving reasons therefor, stated:

“I therefore revoke the suspension of sentence passed in this court in September, 1922, and that sentence is going into effect from this time on; in other words, I commit him to the State Training School in Morton county, and I appoint the superintendent of the institution his guardian while he remains an inmate of that institution.”

An application was made to the judge of the district court in and for Morton county for a writ of habeas corpus, and, writ being denied, the defendant applies to this court for such writ, claiming that he is being illegally deprived of his liberty, and that the action of the judge of the juvenile court in committing him to the training school, when he was no longer a ward of the state, was without jurisdiction and void. This brings up the question of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (section 11402, C. L. 1913):

Children Wards of the State. That all dependent, neglected and delinquent children under the age of eighteen years, shall, for the purpose of this act only, be considered wards of this state and their persons shall be subject to the care, guardianship and control of the court as hereinafter provided.”

This section limits the jurisdiction of juvenile court to children under the age of 18 years; that is, only children under 18 years of age are wards of this state, and their persons are subject to care, guardianship, and control of the court.

Section 11403 defines “dependent child” as one under 18 years of age.

Section 11409 provides that, if the court shall find any child under the age of 18 to be dependent, or neglected, and if the parents, guardian, or custodian of such child are unfit or unwilling to care for, protect, or discipline such child, and that it is for the best interest of the child, the court may make an order appointing as guardian a reputable citizen and order such guardian to place such child in some family home, or the court may enter an order committing such child to some suitable institution, training school, or industrial school, or the reform school of the state of North Dakota.

Under section 11402 the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the child only while it is a ward of the state, and it is a ward of the state until it is 18 years of age.

Section 11411, relating to delinquent children, provides that, if the court shall find any child under 18 years to be delinquent within the meaning of the act, among other things the court may appoint a juvenile officer guardian, and permit the child to remain at home, or place in a suitable family home, or boarded out in some suitable home, or the court may commit such child to any institution incorporated under the laws of this state to care for delinquent children, or any institution that has been or may be provided by the state, county, town, or village.

Section 11410 provides that the court shall appoint the president or secretary or superintendent of such institution or association guardian over the person of such child, and shall order such guardian to place such child in such institution or with such association whereof he is such officer, and to hold such child, care for, train, educate it, subject to the rules and laws that may be in force and to the supervision and further orders of said juvenile court. This applies to any institution or home in which the child might be placed and is subject to the supervision and further orders of the court. The supervision and further orders cannot go beyond the term of the stewardship of the state which terminates when the child reaches the age of 18 years.

[1] The district court, acting under the Juvenile Court Act (chapter 23, Code of Criminal Procedure, Compiled Laws 1913), has only such power as is given to it by that statute. Ex parte Songer, 177 P. 141, 65 Colo. 460;Colias v. People, 153 P. 224, 60 Colo. 230;United States v. West, 34 App. D. C. 12;Zinkham v. Linaweaver, 34 App. D. C. 19;State v. Jacobs, 57 So. 905, 130 La. 245;State v. Rose, 52 So. 165, 125 La. 1080;Juvenile Court of Shelby Co. v. State, 201 S. W. 771,139 Tenn. 549, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 752; Ogden v. State, 156 N. W. 476, 162 Wis. 500;Brown v. Sellers, 292 F. 655, 53 App. D. C. 378.

[2] A careful examination of the act discloses no provision authorizing the court to commit a child to the reform school until it is 21 years of age. The word “minority” appears only in section 11425 which reads as follows:

“Nothing in this act shall be construed to give the guardian appointed under this act the guardianship of the estate of the child or to change the age of minority for any other purpose except the custody of the child.”

“Minority” is defined by section 4335, under which a minor is a male under 21 years of age and a female under 18 years of age. It follows that if there is a change of the age of minority for the purpose of custody only, it is from 21 years to 18 years in the case of males, and no change in case of females. If it was the intention of the Legislature to give the court jurisdiction over...

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7 cases
  • In re Application of Blackey
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • March 16, 1926
    ... ... sentence therefor; the sole basis for his detention is that ... he is held as a delinquent child under the juvenile court ... act. Moreover the record affirmatively shows an absence of ... jurisdictional facts held necessary, in the case of Ex parte ... Solberg, 52 N.D. 518, 203 N.W. 898 ...          Revoking ... parole and committing the defendant to the training school at ... Mandan, North Dakota, was without jurisdiction and void. The ... writ of habeas corpus is granted without prejudice to the ... right of the state to ... ...
  • Schwabel v. First National Bank of Montpelier, North Dakota, a Corp.
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1926
  • Schwabel v. First Nat. Bank of Montpelier
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1926
  • State ex rel. Stensby v. McClelland
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • July 29, 1929
    ...will continue during the entire time of such commitment. It is contended by the petitioner that the decision of this court in Re Blackey, 53 N.D. 852, 208 N.W. 238, contrary to the rule which we now announce. There is some language in the decision in that case which may appear to be of some......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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