Ex parte Bland
Decision Date | 23 September 1983 |
Citation | 441 So.2d 122 |
Parties | Ex parte Chester BLAND. (In re Chester BLAND v. STATE of Alabama). 82-666. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John I. Cottle, III of Cottle & Cottle, Tallassee, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Gerrilyn V. Grant, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Petitioner/Appellant Chester Bland, an inmate of the Alabama prison system, filed a petition in circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his "good time" credits had been revoked at a hearing which failed to afford him due process of law. The circuit court dismissed the petition without a hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals, 428 So.2d 1373, affirmed without an opinion. After Petitioner's application for rehearing was overruled, we granted his petition for certiorari, which utilized ARAP 39(k). We reverse and remand.
Petitioner Chester Bland is now, and at all relevant times has been, an inmate of the Alabama prison system. On October 13, 1982, Bland was charged with a violation of prison regulations: assaulting a prison officer. Bland allegedly engaged in physical contact with Henry DeJarnett, scratching his forehead. A disciplinary proceeding was instigated against Bland, and on October 17, 1982, Bland received notice that the charge against him would be heard by a disciplinary committee on October 19.
Upon notification of the hearing date, Petitioner requested that Officer Barnes and an inmate, Jeffery Jackson, be called to testify at the disciplinary proceedings. The record indicates that Officer Barnes was not present because the hearing was scheduled on a day when he was not on duty at the prison. As for inmate Jackson, Petitioner alleges that the record fails to indicate why he was not in attendance at the hearing, while the State claims only that the record is "unclear" on this point.
The only testimony taken at the hearing was Petitioner's sworn statement, denying his guilt of the alleged infraction. Subsequently, the disciplinary committee found Petitioner to have violated the prison regulations, and revoked more than 13 years of "good time" credits which he had accumulated during his incarceration.
In Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala.1980), this Court observed:
After quoting at some length from Wolff, Williams continues:
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Owens v. State, 7 Div. 781
...being accorded to him at his disciplinary hearing. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Bland v. State, 441 So.2d 122 (Ala.1983); Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala.1980). To comport with due process, a state disciplinary board's decision must not have ......
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Coslett v. State
...does actually earn "good time," it may not be taken away without due process. Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d 489 (Ala.1985); Ex parte Bland, 441 So.2d 122 (Ala.1983); Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala.1980); Keenan v. Bennett, 613 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.1980); Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F.Supp. 6......
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Williams v. State, 7 Div. 798
...or correctional goals, in accordance with our supreme court's mandate in Williams v. Davis, 386 So.2d 415 (Ala.1980), and Ex parte Bland, 441 So.2d 122 (Ala.1983). Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d at 491. See particularly Bland, 441 So.2d at 125 (wherein the court held that "[d]enying the presen......
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Jackson v. State, 7 Div. 725
...So.2d 964 (Ala.Cr.App.1981), cited by the district attorney in his motion to dismiss, supports the granting of the petition. Ex parte Bland, 441 So.2d 122 (Ala.1983), and Barker v. State, 437 So.2d 1375 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), also support the appellant's arguments. The motion to dismiss is not ......