Ex parte Brewington

• Decision Date: 16 December 1983
• Citation: 445 So.2d 294
• Parties: Ex parte Faye T. Blair BREWINGTON. (Re James Mitchell BLAIR v. Faye T. Blair BREWINGTON). 82-923.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 294

445 So.2d 294

Ex parte Faye T. Blair BREWINGTON (Re James Mitchell BLAIR v. Faye T. Blair BREWINGTON).

82-923.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 16, 1983.

Stephen V. Hammond of Chenault, Chenault & Hammond, Decatur, for petitioner.

Bingham D. Edwards, Decatur, for respondent.

BEATTY, Justice.

The trial court in this case ordered respondent, the father of a permanently disabled child, to support the child past the age of majority, and further, increased the amount of support payments the father was already making. The Court of Civil Appeals, 445 So.2d 292, reversed the order of the trial court because it felt compelled to follow the decision of this Court in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 274 Ala. 477, 149 So.2d 770 (1963), which held that, because the Alabama statute providing for child support (Code of 1975, § 30-3-3) had been held to apply only to minor children, the trial court was without jurisdiction to order a parent to support an adult child. We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's request that this Court overrule Reynolds, supra.

The facts as set out in the opinion rendered by the Court of Civil Appeals are as follows:

"The parties were divorced in 1967. At that time there were four minor children including the disabled child who is the youngest. The original decree required the father to pay $12 per child per month for support. Child support was to continue for the children until they reached the age of eighteen or became self-supporting.

"In 1970, the decree was modified to require the father to pay $50 per month for the disabled child's support as well as all medical expenses.

"In July, 1982, the mother filed a petition for modification seeking an increase in child support. The trial court found that the disabled child was permanently disabled and would continue to be dependent upon his parents. At the time of the hearing, the child was seventeen years old. He suffers from spinal epifida causing him to be paralyzed from the waist down and confined to a wheelchair. He currently lives with his mother who has custody by virtue of the divorce decree.

"Both parents have remarried and their spouses both work. The father's income has increased substantially--from $4.39 to $10.05 per hour--since the 1970 modification.

"The trial court ordered the father to pay $150 per month for six months beginning September, 1982, thereafter increasing to $300 per month for support for the disabled child. In addition, the father is required to pay all medical expenses and maintain a life insurance policy with the disabled child as beneficiary. The trial court ordered that the support payments continue 'as long as the child is dependent upon the parties for his support.' In denying the father's motion for new trial, the trial court stated that the 'support of a dependent child is the obligation of parents as a matter of public policy.' "

Although we appreciate the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals which follows the general rule announced in Reynolds, supra, this Court concludes that the decision of the trial court is the result which accords with the legislature's intent in this instance. To the extent that Reynolds, supra, is inconsistent with this holding, it is specifically overruled.

An analysis of the Alabama cases reveals that Reynolds -type decisions were based on the position that, absent a statute or agreement, no common-law authority existed to impose upon a non-custodial parent the obligation to support his adult child. However, the majority trend is to recognize an exception to this rule when the adult child is so mentally and/or physically disabled as to be unable to support himself. See e.g. Kruvant v. Kruvant, 100 N.J.Super. 107, 241 A.2d 259 (1968); Fincham v. Levin, 155 So.2d 883 (Fla.App.1963); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947); O'Malley v. O'Malley, 105 Pa.Super. 232, 161 A. 883 (1932).

The Court in Reynolds based part of its decision on Murrah v. Bailes, 255 Ala. 178, 50 So.2d 735 (1951), which held that the term "children" as used in § 30-3-1 was clearly meant to apply only to minor children. The statute, however, does not express such a limitation, and such a narrow interpretation is unacceptable. In the frame of reference of the present case, we believe the legislature intended that support be provided for dependent children, regardless of whether that dependency results from minority, or from physical and/or mental disabilities that continue to render them incapable of self-support beyond minority.

Thus, we adopt the reasoning of the New Jersey Superior Court in the case of Kruvant v. Kruvant, supra, where the facts were similar to those of the case at bar. The case involved an appeal by a divorced husband from orders of the lower court reopening and modifying provisions for support of his son contained in a divorce decree. The husband argued that the New Jersey court did not have the jurisdiction under New Jersey's divorce statutes to order support for an adult child. The New Jersey court, however, said of its divorce statute:

"[It] contemplates support for the children of divorced parents who, but for the divorce, would have continued to be entitled to the support of their father. It stems from the presumed inability of such children, by reason of...