Ex parte Brown
Decision Date | 29 May 1906 |
Docket Number | 20,771 |
Parties | Ex Parte Robert A. Brown, Clerk of the Supreme Court |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Original Petition by Robert A. Brown, as Clerk of the Supreme Court.
Petition sustained.
Robert A. Brown, pro se, and George H. Batchelor, for petitioner.
Charles W. Miller, Attorney-General, C. C. Hadley, H. M. Dowling and William C. Geake, contra.
The petitioner, Robert A. Brown, Clerk of the Supreme Court and ex officio Clerk of the Appellate Court, comes in person and by counsel and presents a petition for our consideration, whereby he invokes our judgment as a court relative to his control over the opinions and decisions of said court after the same have been handed down and filed in his office. He also requests to be advised whether, under the existing law, he is at liberty, in his discretion, to continue to furnish in the future, as he has been doing in the past, uncertified copies of said opinions and decisions to the West Publishing Company for advance publication in what is known as the Northeastern Reporter. He alleges and shows in his petition that he is the duly elected, qualified and acting clerk of this court, and an officer thereof and to an extent subject to the control of the court. The petition alleges that § 6423 Burns 1901, Acts 1895, p. 319, § 19, provides that "it shall be the duty of the Clerk of the Supreme Court to tax and keep an accurate account on proper fee books, of all fees and charges of his office as is required by this act or any other laws of the State for any and all services performed by him or his deputies, clerks or assistants, and on the first Monday in January and the first Monday in July of each year, he shall make and file in the office of the Treasurer of State a statement and report, subscribed and sworn to, showing the amount of such fees and charges collected and uncollected and the names of parties liable therefor, and from whom received, and the balance due, and the whole amount of fees and charges collected by him shall be paid into the state treasury;" that said section is a part of the general fee and salary law of 1895, and that said law of 1895 provided no schedule of fees to be charged by said clerk, and made no provision requiring him to collect fees, other than what might be contained in laws in force at the time of the passage of said act; that the only law at the time of the enactment by the legislature of the provisions embraced in § 6423, supra, aside from the statute relative to docket fees, was § 7798 Burns 1901, § 5831 R. S 1881, which is a part of the fee and salary act of 1879 and provides that the fees of the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be as follows: [here the petition sets out in full the schedule of fees as set forth in said section]. It is further alleged that said fee and salary act of 1879 provided no salary or compensation for the Clerk of the Supreme Court other than the fees therein prescribed, which were to compensate him for official services rendered; "that nothing in said act prohibited said clerk from charging a less amount than the sums therein designated, for any services rendered, or prevented him from performing said service without any compensation whatever, if he so desired to do; that the act of 1895 above mentioned, fixing a stated salary for said clerk, contained no provision requiring or compelling the clerk to collect the fees designated in said act of 1879, other than might be contained in said act of 1879 itself; but, on the other hand, said act of 1895 does contain provisions requiring the Secretary of State, the Auditor of State, and county officers to collect and account for the fees allowed by law; that relying upon his belief that under said acts of 1879 and 1895 he was not required to make any specified charge for the service, and that such charge was a subject which could be properly agreed upon and determined by private arrangement, subject to the requirement that any amount so received should be covered into the state treasury; and the further belief that such service could not have been contemplated by said act of 1879, he did, on or about November 22, 1898, begin furnishing to the West Publishing Company, of St. Paul, Minnesota, for publication in the Northeastern Reporter, copies of all the opinions rendered by the Supreme and Appellate Courts, and continued to furnish said copies until January 1, 1906, at a less rate than ten cents per one hundred words, accounting to the Treasurer of State for the amounts received therefor under §§ 6406a, 6423 Burns 1901, Acts 1901, p. 399, Acts 1895, p. 319, § 19; that said Northeastern Reporter was not in existence at the time of the passage of the act of 1879; that the West Publishing Company was unknown, and that at said time there was no practice in vogue of furnishing copies of opinion for commercial purposes or to legal publications; that by law it is made one of the duties of said clerk to certify a copy of every opinion to the clerk of the lower court from which the appeal was taken; that the copies furnished the West Publishing Company, as aforesaid, are not original copies, but are uncertified carbon copies, made upon a typewriting machine at the time the opinion is copied for certification, without any additional labor or expense to the office, except for the paper upon which they are made, and the carbon necessary to make them; that at the time of the passage of said act of 1879 typewriting machines were not in use, and carbon copies were unknown; that all copies were at that time made in longhand, and that a charge of ten cents per one hundred words was not unreasonable therefor; but he does say that such a charge for an uncertified carbon copy is unreasonable, not only because it is out of proportion to the labor and expense required to make it, but also because it is uncertified, and the copy from which the carbon copy is made is taxed to the losing party at the rate of ten cents per hundred words, as part of the costs in the case.
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