Ex Parte Brunner, 1070931.
Decision Date | 21 November 2008 |
Docket Number | 1070931. |
Citation | 10 So.3d 24 |
Parties | Ex parte Harry Franklin BRUNNER. (In re Harry Franklin Brunner v. Beverly T. Brunner Ormsby). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
WRIT DENIED. NO OPINION.
On July 15, 2003, Harry Franklin Brunner ("the former husband") and Beverly T. Brunner Ormsby ("the former wife") were divorced by a judgment of the Cullman Circuit Court. The judgment, based on an agreement between the parties, provided, in part as follows:
The issue in this case is whether the above-described payments constitute a distribution of marital property and, specifically, constitute alimony in gross, or whether instead they must be considered periodic alimony. The resolution of this issue in turn controls the disposition of the former husband's petition to terminate those payments in light of the former wife's remarriage.2
In finding the payments to be alimony in gross, the trial court first stated that the parties "clearly designated the award as alimony in gross." Labels applied by the parties or by the trial court, however, are not dispositive; it is the true nature of the obligation that matters. "The substance of the award takes precedence over the form or label." Kenchel v. Kenchel, 440 So.2d 567, 569 (Ala.Civ.App.1983). "[T]he labels provided in a judgment are not controlling on the question of the true nature of the obligation." Anderson v. Anderson, 686 So.2d 320, 324 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). It is "the effect of the [judgment]" that determines what it is that has been prescribed by that judgment:
""
DuBoise v. DuBoise, 275 Ala. 220, 228, 153 So.2d 778, 785 (1963) (quoting Sullivan v. Sullivan, 215 Ala. 627, 629, 111 So. 911, 912 (1927) (emphasis added)).
The trial court also relied upon its finding that it was "the intent of the parties ... to establish alimony in gross." As to this finding, I first would note that it is the legal effect of the judgment of divorce that is at issue. The parties' agreement was merged into that judgment and thereupon lost its contractual nature. Ex parte Owens, 668 So.2d 545 (Ala.1995); see generally Bass v. Bass, 434 So.2d 280, 281 (Ala. Civ.App.1983) ( ).
Second, it may be true that the trial court intended to effect a property division; that, however, does not mean that it succeeded in doing so. It may be that, because of error or misunderstanding as to the fundamental characteristics of alimony in gross, or for whatever reason, the divorce judgment simply creates a payment obligation that by its nature is not a division of the parties' property. If so, that obligation cannot be made into something it is not. As noted, an allowance must be "considered and construed in accordance with its substance"; what matters is whether "the effect of the decree rendered" was of an award of periodic alimony for maintenance and support or an allocation of the property of the marital estate. What must be assessed is the fundamental character of that which is created in the divorce judgment.
In LeMaistre v. Baker, 268 Ala. 295, 105 So.2d 867 (1958), a case cited in the petition before us, we find the following exposition, which begins with a quotation from Justice Somerville's opinion in Smith v. Rogers, 215 Ala. 581, 583, 112 So. 190, 192 (1927):
LeMaistre, 268 Ala. at 296-98, 105 So.2d at 868-69 (emphasis added).
In Zinnerman v. Zinnerman, 803 So.2d 569, 574 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
Hager v. Hager, 293 Ala. 47, 54, 299 So.2d 743, 749 (1974) (emphasis added).
The payments here hardly can be considered a division of the existing property of the former husband's estate or of the marital estate. The continuation of their payment by the former husband is tied to the former husband's continuation of his employment and thus to income he has yet to earn.
In contrast, the law provides that the continuation of periodic alimony for the support and maintenance of the payee may be tied to the payor's future income. See, e.g., Sharp v. Sharp, 230 Ala. 539, 161 So. 709 (1935). Here, by tying the former husband's obligation to continue paying the alimony to his continued employment and earning a current income, the judgment did not, despite whatever intention the parties or the trial court might have had, succeed in dividing currently owned assets of the marital estate; instead, it succeeded in fashioning something that bears an essential earmark of periodic alimony.
In addition to not having the fundamental character of division of property, the payments at issue simply fail to meet the specific legal requirements that must be met to qualify as that subspecies of property division known as "alimony in gross." Time and again our decisions have affirmed that to be considered alimony in gross, an award "must meet and satisfy two requirements, i.e., (1) the time of payment and the amount must be certain; [and] (2) the right to alimony must be vested." Trammell v. Trammell, 523 So.2d 437, 439 (Ala.Civ.App.1988) (quoting Montgomery v. Montgomery, 275 Ala. 364, 366, 155 So.2d 317, 319 (1963)). In Ten-Eyck v. TenEyck, 885 So.2d 146, 151-52 (Ala.Civ.App....
To continue reading
Request your trial