Ex parte Buck, DUFFIE--P
Decision Date | 06 December 1973 |
Docket Number | DUFFIE--P |
Citation | 287 So.2d 441,291 Ala. 689 |
Parties | Ex parte The Honorable James D. BUCK, as Judge of the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. In re Ex parte Barbara S. Mcetition for Writ of Mandamus to the Honorable James D. Buck, as Judge of the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. SC 538. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Perry Hubbard, McDuffie & Holcombe, Tuscaloosa, for petitioner.
Zeanah, Donald, Lee & Williams and Wilbor J. Hust, Jr., Tuscaloosa, for respondent.
Does a divorce-child custody action pending in one state abate a like suit in another state? 1 We answer in the negative and reverse and remand this cause to the Court of Civil Appeals. We agree with the trial court in overruling the respondent-wife's motion to dismiss (Plea in Abatement).
The Court of Civil Appeals in issuing the writ of mandamus stated:
The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals then concluded:
We disagree that the Burch and Clements 'concurrent jurisdiction-abatement' doctrine is determinative of this case. Nor is the 'full faith and credit' 2 principle of Stallworth here applicable.
In Ex parte Burch, supra, this Court was confronted with a conflict between the Circuit Court of Walker County, Alabama, and the County Court of Walker County. The prior pendency of the wife's divorce suit in the Circuit Court was considered sufficient basis to prohibit the County Court of Walker County from proceeding with the trial of a subsequent suit for divorce filed in that court by the husband. The conflict in that case was Intrastate.
Likewise, in the case of Clements v. Barber, supra, the Court of Civil Appeals was confronted with an Intrastate conflict. The prior pendency of an action to fix custody of a minor in the Family Court of Jefferson County was considered sufficient to prohibit the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, from acting upon an action to determine the custody of such child.
This Court has long been committed to the proposition that the pendency of a suit upon the same cause of action in Another state is no cause of abatement of a suit instituted in this state. In Humphries v. Dawson, 38 Ala. 199, this Court stated:
'If there be any reason which renders this principle (concurrent jurisdiction) inapplicable in the present case, a fatal objection to the plea is found in the other principle, that the pendency of a suit in another State is no cause of abatement of a suit instituted in this State.'
This holding is in accord with the weight of authority and is equally applicable to actions for divorce. See 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 188; 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 99; Cox v. Cox, 234 Miss. 885, 108 So.2d 422.
The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals takes note of the fact that the question of jurisdiction of that court was argued and resolved in California on July 27, 1973. The California Court determined that it did have jurisdiction of the cause and such determination was made after the husband (respondent there) had filed a Motion to Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction and had personally appeared before that court to so argue. The Court of Civil Appeals then concludes that the California determination as to jurisdiction is Res judicata and entitled to Full Faith and Credit by the Alabama Court, citing our case of Ex parte Aufill, supra, and Stallworth v. Stallworth, supra. This conclusion does not militate against the result which we reach here. The fact that the California court has jurisdiction does not preclude an Alabama court from also having jurisdiction where one of the parties to the marriage is domiciled within this state and the children are physically present here.
We should perhaps note that in both Ex parte Aufill, supra, and in Stallworth v. Stallworth, supra, this Court concluded that Alabama was precluded from exercising jurisdiction. Such determination was not made upon the ground that some other state had jurisdiction of an action for divorce between the same parties, but rather upon the ground that the court of a sister state having jurisdiction of the action had exercised that jurisdiction by entering a binding judgment or decree.
Where there is no dispute about the facts, we may examine the record for a more complete understanding and amplification of those features of the record which have been treated in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. Johnson v. State, 277 Ala. 655, 173 So.2d 824; Helms v. State, 270 Ala. 603, 121 So.2d 106; Southern Railway Company v. Terry, 268 Ala. 510, 109 So.2d 919; Vardaman v. Benefit Association of Railway Employees, 263 Ala. 236, 82 So.2d 272; Cranford v. National Surety Corporation, 231 Ala. 636, 166 So. 721; Hood v. State, 230 Ala. 343, 162 So. 543.
Pursuant to this authority, we have examined the certified copy of the mentioned California decree of July 27, 1973. Although the hearing precipitating this decree appears to have been held on July 27, 1973, the decree does not appear to have been signed until August 6, 1973, and does not appear to have been filed with the Clerk of the California Court until August 8, 1973. This decree finds that the wife, Barbara McDuffie, is domiciled in California, but further finds that the husband is domiciled in Alabama. The court finds jurisdiction of the action by the California court by virtue of the wife's domicile and residency in the state.
The Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County also finds that the husband was a bona fide resident and citizen of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, and was domiciled in Alabama, having been born there and never having abandoned such domicile of origin. From the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, it is evident that the children were physically present with their father within the State of Alabama at the time the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County awarded the temporary custody to their grandparents. It further appears from this opinion that the husband violated no order of the California court in bringing the children to Alabama, since no order, temporary or otherwise, had been entered by the California court prior to June 13, 1973, with regard to custody or any other aspect of the case.
In the case of Billingsley v. Billingsley, 285 Ala. 239, 231 So.2d 111, Mr. Justice Harwood, speaking for the Court, states:
.
In the case of Cox v. Cox, supra, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the Chancery Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi, had the right to determine the custody of the child of the marriage despite a prior pending Pennsylvania divorce action where the husband's domicile was Mississippi and the child was physically present there. In so holding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated:
Professor Leflar sums up the 'prior pendency' rule: ...
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