Ex parte Cater
Decision Date | 10 March 2000 |
Parties | Ex parte Lula Dell CATER. (Re Lula Dell Cater v. Etoile Nichols.) |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Edward T. Hines of Thompson, Garrett & Hines, L.L.P., Brewton, for petitioner. J. Milton Coxwell, Jr., of Coxwell & Coxwell, Monroeville, for respondent.
This is a private-condemnation case. The circuit court, acting pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 18-3-1, granted Etoile Nichols a nonexclusive, private easement for ingress and egress over the property of Lula Dell Cater. Cater was awarded $500 in compensation for the condemnation of the private easement. Cater appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, on October 9, 1998, affirmed, without an opinion. Cater v. Nichols (No. 2970710), 771 So.2d 511 (Ala.Civ.App.1998) (table). We granted Cater's petition for the writ of certiorari to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that two other possible routes to and from Nichols's property were not reasonably adequate means of access. We conclude that Nichols failed to satisfy her burden of proving the necessity for the easement and that the trial court incorrectly applied the law to the facts of this case. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
Nichols owns a 191-acre tract of land in Monroe County. No one lives on the property, and it is used primarily as timberland. The property is divided into western and eastern parcels by a creek, known as Flat Creek, which runs in a generally southeasterly direction across the property. Flat Creek is deep enough to prevent fording, but it is only 12 to 15 feet wide. The western part of Nichols's property contains 33 acres, and the eastern part contains 158 acres. The eastern part of Nichols's property is accessible by a private road that connects to a public road; the western part, Nichols claims, is landlocked. The easement granted by the trial court is 12 feet wide and 500 yards long; it follows an existing gravel road, which was used for several years as a county road but has since been abandoned. Cater uses this road to access her property, and Nichols also used this road to access her property until Cater erected a gate across it.
Nichols's property was once part of an approximately 622-acre tract of land, owned by Nichols's father, that fronted Alabama Highway 21. She acquired her property from her father. While Nichols's father owned the larger tract, he accessed the western part of what Nichols now owns by a private road. That road, which runs from that western portion southward, still exists, but is in disrepair and is impassable during the winter. Cater's property is located to the west of Nichols's property and is separated from Nichols's property by another parcel. The owner of the parcel separating Cater's property from Nichols's property is not a party to this action. Cater's property fronts a public road.
Nichols petitioned the Probate Court of Monroe County to condemn a right-of-way over Cater's property to provide Nichols with an outlet to the public road that is adjacent to Cater's property. See Ala. Code 1975, §§ 18-3-1 and 18-3-3. The probate court granted Nichols a right-of-way, and Cater appealed to the Circuit Court of Monroe County.
After conducting an ore tenus hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Nichols, making, in pertinent part, the following findings of facts and conclusions of law:
Cater appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals, without opinion, affirmed the circuit court's judgment.
Ala.Code 1975, § 18-3-1, provides:
"The owner of any tract or body of land, no part of which tract or body of land is adjacent or contiguous to any public road or highway, shall have and may acquire a convenient right-of-way, not exceeding in width 30 feet, over the lands intervening and lying between such tract or body of land and the public road nearest or most convenient thereto...."
Under the ore tenus rule, a trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and its judgment will be reversed only if plainly or palpably wrong or against the preponderance of the evidence. See DeWitt v. Stevens, 598 So.2d 849, 850 (Ala.1992); Brothers v. Holloway, 692 So.2d 845, 848 (Ala.Civ.App.1997); Tate v. Loper, 459 So.2d 892, 894 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). The ore tenus rule is especially applicable in private condemnation cases under § 18-3-1. See Tate, 459 So.2d at 894; see also Brothers, 692 So.2d at 847-48 ().
However, § 18-3-1 "`is not a favored statute,'" Southern Ry. v. Hall, 267 Ala. 143, 147, 100 So.2d 722, 725 (1957) (quoting State ex rel. Carlson v. Superior Court, 107 Wash. 228, 232, 181 P. 689, 691), and the ore tenus presumption of correctness "does not apply where the trial court has incorrectly applied the law to [the] facts," DeWitt, 598 So.2d at 850. The law applicable to private-condemnation proceedings under the statute is well established. As this Court has stated:
Oyler v. Gilliland, 382 So.2d 517, 519 (Ala. 1980) (citations omitted). Cater, relying mainly on Southern Railway Co., argues that the trial court erred in granting Nichols a right-of-way over Cater's property because, she says, Nichols had two other reasonably adequate means of access: she says that at a minimal cost Nichols could either 1) build a bridge over Flat Creek and thereby gain access across the eastern portion of her land to the private road that connects to the public road; or 2) repair the private road formerly used by Nichols's father and thereby have access southward to Highway 21. In Southern Railway Co., this Court held that the trial court erred in granting the petitioner a right-of-way because the petitioner already had an existing means of access to his lands—the "clay pit crossing." In that case, the petitioner had sought a right-of-way over the lands of the defendant railroad company, a right-of-way that would have been more convenient than the clay pit crossing. This Court, construing § 18-3-1 ( ), stated:
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Cater v. Nichols
...(Ala.Civ.App.1998) (table). This court's judgment has been reversed and the cause remanded by the Supreme Court of Alabama. Ex parte Cater, 772 So.2d 1117 (Ala.2000). On remand to this court, and in compliance with the Supreme Court's opinion, the judgment of the trial court is hereby rever......