Ex parte Central Iron & Coal Co., 6 Div. 244.

• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: SAYRE, J.
• Citation: 212 Ala. 130,101 So. 824
• Parties: EX PARTE CENTRAL IRON & COAL CO. v. WRIGHT. CENTRAL IRON & COAL CO.
• Decision Date: 16 October 1924
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 244.

101 So. 824

212 Ala. 130

EX PARTE CENTRAL IRON & COAL CO.

CENTRAL IRON & COAL CO.
v.
WRIGHT.

6 Div. 244.

Supreme Court of Alabama

October 16, 1924

Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1924.

Certiorari to Court of Appeals.

Petition of the Central Iron & Coal Company for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision of that court in the case of Central Iron & Coal Co. v. Wright, 101 So. 815. Writ denied.

Jones, Jones & Van de Graaff and A. Van de Graaff, all of Tuscaloosa, for petitioner.

Edward de Graffenried, of Tuscaloosa, opposed.

SAYRE, J.

Unless the decision in City Delivery Co. v. Henry, 139 Ala. 161, 34 So. 389, be overruled, we must hold that the third count of the complaint here charges direct corporate action, and that, in the absence of evidence going to show direct corporate authorization or ratification of the act of its agent in arresting plaintiff, defendant was entitled to the general affirmative charge as to that count. There has been much dissatisfaction with that case, but its rule has been too long followed now to admit of the course hypothesized. Ex parte Louisville & Nashville R. Co. 203 Ala. 328, 83 So. 52, and cases there cited. The decision in Epperson v. First Nat. Bank, 209 Ala. 12, 95 So. 343, holds nothing to the contrary. The question there was whether the complaint stated a cause of action; defendant's (appellant's) contention being that, since every action for false imprisonment is in trespass, it is necessary in every such action against a corporation to allege that the corporation affirmatively, that is, by direct corporate action, authorized, or subsequently ratified, the wrongful act complained of. But that contention was denied, and in effect it was held that, since a corporation is answerable for the wrongs done by its agents in the line and scope of their authority, the complaint there stated a good cause of action. Underlying that decision was the concept that, in the absence of direct corporate authorization or ratification, the liability of a corporation for the wrongful act of its agent, done in the line and scope of his authority, is to be enforced by an action on the case-that the declaration there under consideration was in case, not trespass vi et armis, and this in no wise contravened City Delivery Co. v. Henry, supra, nor any case in consonance therewith.

Nor can the result in question be justified on the ground that the agent of defendant who...