Ex parte City of Birmingham

• Decision Date: 09 June 1897
• Parties: EX PARTE MAYOR, ETC., OF BIRMINGHAM ET AL. IN RE POWELL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

22 So. 454

116 Ala. 186

EX PARTE MAYOR, ETC., OF BIRMINGHAM ET AL. IN RE POWELL. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 9, 1897

Petition by John H. Powell for writ of habeas corpus. On the hearing the prisoner was discharged, and the mayor and adermen of the city of Birmingham petition for certiorari. Reversed.

Tillman & Campbell, B. M. Allen, and Robt. J. Lowe, for petitioners.

Frank S. White, S. L. Weaver, J. L. Cole, and J. M. McMaster, for respondent.

COLEMAN J.

On the 14th day of April, 1897, John H. Powell, having been arrested on a charge of disorderly conduct in violation of section 599 of the by-laws and ordinances of the city of Birmingham entered a plea of guilty in the inferior court of criminal jurisdiction in the city of Birmingham. The judgment entry is as follows: "Defendant pleads guilty. On hearing the evidence, the court is of the opinion that defendant is guilty, and it is ordered and adjudged by the court that the defendant is guilty, and is fined $15 and costs, and thirty days extra at hard labor. If fine and costs are not paid defendant is sentenced to hard labor for the mayor and aldermen of Birmingham." Under and by virtue of a contract made and entered into between the mayor and aldermen of the city of Birmingham and the Sloss Iron & Steel Company the said Powell was delivered to the latter as a convict to perform the sentence to hard labor imposed by the court. The said defendant, Powell, thereupon filed his petition before the Honorable James J. Banks, judge of the circuit court, in which he alleged the fact of his conviction and sentence, and his imprisonment by the Sloss Iron & Steel Company under and by virtue of said agreement, and prayed for the writ of habeas corpus. The writ issued according to the prayer of the petition, and at the hearing the prisoner was discharged. Upon the order of the judge on habeas corpus discharging the prisoner, the mayor and aldermen petitioned this court for a certiorari. It contains a full statement of all the proceedings in the inferior criminal court, and before the judge on the hearing of the habeas corpus, and the evidence adduced on the latter trial. The material question presented by the record is whether the mayor and aldermen of the city of Birmingham were authorized to make the contract with the Sloss Iron & Steel Company. In considering this question, we must consider the constitutionality of section 11 of the act establishing the inferior court which adjudged the defendant guilty, and imposed upon him the sentence to hard labor. Acts 1894-95, p. 527.

Article 4, § 2, of the constitution provides that "each law shall contain but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed" in its title (with certain specified exceptions, none of which include the act under consideration); "and no law shall be revived, amended or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived amended, extended or conferred, shall be re-enacted and published at length." The title of the act in which said section 11 is contained is as follows: "An act to establish an inferior court of criminal jurisdiction in the city of Birmingham, to define its powers and provide for the election of a judge and appointment of a clerk therefor." Section 11 of said act is as follows: "Sec. 11. Be it further enacted, that the mayor and aldermen of Birmingham shall establish a system of hard labor, or may contract to have all persons sentenced to hard labor for said city, worked and confined anywhere in Jefferson county, under the same rules, regulations and conditions as are prescribed by law for confining and working county convicts," etc. The purpose of the act, as manifested by its title, was to establish and define the powers of an inferior court of criminal jurisdiction, and provide for the election of a judge and appointment of a clerk therefor. A mere cursory reading of section 11 of the act in connection with section 2, art. 4, of the constitution, would lead to the conclusion that it was in violation of the constitution, and null and void; but, when well-established principles of construction are applied to it, we are of opinion its constitutionality can be maintained. In the first place, no law should be declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly so. Again, in construing the constitutional provision under consideration, this court has said that its requirements are not to be exactingly enforced, or in such manner as to cripple legislation, and adopted the following language: "'The exigencies of legislation require that this provision should not be so strictly [literally?] construed as to cripple the legislature by prohibiting the insertion into laws of those matters which, though they may not be specifically expressed in the title, are proper to the full accomplishment of the object so expressed. Such is presumed to have been the intention of its authors. Courts therefore give it a liberal construction. The insertion in a law of matters which may not...