Ex parte City of Guntersville

Decision Date22 May 1998
PartiesEx parte CITY OF GUNTERSVILLE and the Municipal Workers' Compensation Fund, Inc. (Re City of Guntersville and the Municipal Workers' Compensation Fund, Inc. v. Maylond T. Bishop).
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Tom Burgess and Murray H. Gibson, Jr., of Burgess & Hale, L.L.C., Birmingham, for petitioners.

Robert W. Lee, Jr., and Ashley P. Norton of Robert W. Lee & Associates, P.C., Birmingham; and Wayne Wolfe of Wolfe, Jones & Boswell, Huntsvillle, for respondent.

John J. Coleman III, Gregory C. Cook, and Tom S. Roper of Balch & Bingham, L.L.P., Birmingham, for amicus curiae Alabama Self-Insured Workers' Compensation Fund.

Rhonda Pitts Chambers of Rives & Peterson, P.C., Birmingham, for amicus curiae Alabama Council of Association Workers Compensation Self Insurers Funds.

MADDOX, Justice.

The central issue presented in this case is whether § 25-5-77(a), Ala.Code 1975, requires an employer and/or its workers' compensation insurance carrier to furnish a disabled claimant with a motor vehicle. That section provides, in part:

"In addition to the compensation provided in this article and Article 4 of this chapter, the employer ... shall pay an amount not to exceed the prevailing rate or maximum schedule of fees as established herein of reasonably necessary medical and surgical treatment and attention, physical rehabilitation, medicine, medical and surgical supplies, crutches, artificial members, and other apparatus as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, as may be obtained by the injured employee...."

§ 25-5-77(a), Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added). The central issue, therefore, may be broken down into two principal subparts:

(1) Does a motor vehicle come within the term "other apparatus" as that term is used in § 25-5-77(a)? and, if so,
(2) Is the purchase of a motor vehicle in this case a "reasonably necessary" expense within the meaning of that Code section?

We conclude that a motor vehicle does not come within the term "other apparatus" as that term is used in this statute. Because of this conclusion, we do not address whether the purchase of a motor vehicle would be "reasonably necessary" in this case.

Facts and Procedural History

Maylond T. Bishop was a policeman employed by the City of Guntersville. On July 16, 1993, Bishop was shot in the back while he was on duty. As a result, he was rendered paraplegic, and he is now confined to a wheelchair. He sued for workers' compensation benefits, and on June 16, 1995, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment in Bishop's lawsuit against the City and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Municipal Workers' Compensation Fund, Inc. (collectively, the "City"). Bishop and the City had stipulated, and the trial court found: (1) that Bishop was an employee of the City of Guntersville when he sustained his injury; (2) that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment; (3) that Bishop is permanently and totally disabled as a result of the injury; (4) that the City received prompt and immediate notice of the injury; and (5) that all Bishop's medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits have been, or will be, paid. As a result, the trial court entered a final judgment setting Bishop's weekly lifetime benefit payments at $328.87.

Before the trial court entered its judgment, Bishop had purchased a Chevrolet van for approximately $24,500. After the trial court entered its judgment, Bishop requested that the City reimburse him for the full purchase price of the van. The City agreed to pay for the cost of installing a wheelchair lift in the van, but denied that it was responsible for the full purchase price of the vehicle. The City subsequently sued Bishop in the Marshall Circuit Court, seeking a judgment declaring that § 25-5-77(a) did not require the City to reimburse Bishop for the purchase price of the van.

The circuit court entered a judgment declaring that the City was responsible for the full purchase price of the van. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. City of Guntersville, Municipal Workers' Compensation Fund v. Bishop, 728 So.2d 605 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). We granted certiorari review.

In support of his contention that he should be reimbursed for the price of the van, Bishop presented letters from two physicians, both of whom are associated with the Department of Rehabilitative Medicine at the University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB") School of Medicine. Both physicians wrote, in essence, that it was necessary for Bishop to have a van with a wheelchair lift to facilitate transportation. Specifically, Dr. Laura Kezar1 wrote, in part:

"I am currently following [Mr. Bishop] for chronic pain syndrome following spinal cord injury. His case has been complicated by the development of severe overuse syndromes involving the bilateral upper extremities, right worse than left. He has recently undergone carpal tunnel release at the right wrist. Because of these problems which are a direct result of his spinal cord injury, I feel it is medically necessary that he obtain a van with a wheelchair lift in order to restore his mobility to the highest possible level of independent functioning."

(Emphasis added.) Dr. C.T. Huang2 wrote:

"Mr. Bishop was injured in 1993 resulting in T11 paraplegia, complete. As a result of this permanent injury, the patient needs a van for transportation."

(Emphasis added.)

At the trial of this case, the parties entered into the following joint stipulation of facts:

"1. On July 16, 1993, [Bishop] was employed as a police officer with the City of Guntersville. On that day, [Bishop] was shot in the back by an assailant while [Bishop was] performing his duties as a police officer. As a result of the gunshot wound, [Bishop] was rendered paraplegic and is wheelchair bound.
"2. On June 16, 1995, [the Marshall Circuit Court] entered a final judgment in Civil Action No. CV-94-374 entitling [Bishop] to receive lifetime [workers'] compensation benefits from [the City] in the sum of $328.87 per week. The Court also ordered [the City] to pay all reasonable and necessary medical expenses in connection with [Bishop's] injuries as required by § 25-5-77.
"3. In order to facilitate his transportation in a wheelchair, [Bishop] on or about March 29, 1995, purchased a 1994 Chevrolet van for approximately $24,500.00.
"4. [Bishop] asserts that the van is a `reasonable and necessary' medical expense, and has requested that the [City] reimburse him for the full purchase price of the van.
"5. The [City] has paid to have a wheelchair lift installed in the van, but denies any obligation pursuant to the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act to pay for the van itself.
"6. [Bishop] has supported his request with letters from his two physicians stating that the van is medically necessary for `transportation,' including regularly scheduled visits to his doctors for the purpose of monitoring his medical condition, and for restoring [Bishop's] mobility `to the highest possible level of independent functioning.' Other than as stated, there are no... medical purposes for the van.
"7. The parties agree that the van has made it much more convenient to transport [Bishop] from place to place, and that it has significantly increased [Bishop's] mobility and sense of independence.
"8. The parties disagree [as to whether] the van is medically necessary or constitutes a medical `apparatus' within the meaning of § 25-5-77(a), [Ala.Code 1975]."

(Emphasis added). The trial court entered a judgment declaring that the City was responsible for the full purchase price of the van.

In affirming, the Court of Civil Appeals, noting that it was bound to "liberally construe the Act," 728 So.2d at 610, determined that the van came within the statutory term "other apparatus" and that it was "reasonably necessary" under the facts of this case. 728 So.2d at 606.

The two dissenting judges wrote, however, that, while they "agree[d] that a wheelchair lift would be an `other apparatus' under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-77(a), [they did not] agree that the Legislature intended that the entire cost of a wheelchair-accessible van be included in that term." 728 So.2d at 611. Consequently, they would have adopted the reasoning of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Crouch v. West Virginia Workers' Compensation Comm'r, 184 W.Va. 730, 403 S.E.2d 747 (1991). In that case, the West Virginia court held that because the injured employee testified that he would have owned an automobile had he not been injured, the value of a mid-priced automobile of the same model year as the van the employee purchased should have been deducted from the amount awarded by the court as compensation for the purchase price of the van.

Discussion

This case presents a question of first impression: Does a motor vehicle come within the meaning of the term "other apparatus" as that term is used in § 25-5-77(a)? The authors of a workers' compensation treatise have written the following regarding the subject:

"[T]he employer is liable for medical supplies and any artificial apparatus incident to the effective treatment of the injury. Typically, this liability has included, but is not limited to, the following: new or replacement artificial members, crutches, medication, general medical and surgical supplies, and like materials."

Jack B. Hood, Benjamin A. Hardy, Jr., and E.J. Saad, Alabama Workers' Compensation § 10-3 (3d ed.1993) (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Whether a motor vehicle may be included in the same category as crutches, artificial limbs, or a wheelchair lift is not a question one would intuitively answer in the affirmative. However, the question here is what the Legislature intended the term "other apparatus" to mean. To determine what the Legislature intended, we must examine both the history of the workers' compensation statute and the policies underpinning it.

Although this...

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  • Griffiths v. W.C.A.B.
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • March 19, 2008
    ...year as purchased van). Other states seem to be less flexible in their interpretation and response. For example, in Ex parte City of Guntersville, 728 So.2d 611 (Ala.1998), the claimant, a city police officer, suffered a bullet wound to his back in the line of duty rendering him a paraplegi......
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