Ex Parte City of Tuskegee

• Decision Date: 30 December 2005
• Docket Number: 1040062.
• Citation: 932 So.2d 895
• Parties: Ex parte CITY OF TUSKEGEE, John Moon, Theodore Moon, Willie Dean Ware, and Adrienne Baker. (In re Patricia Arnold v. City of Tuskegee, John Moon, Theodore Moon, Willie Dean Ware, and Adrienne Baker).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

932 So.2d 895

Ex parte CITY OF TUSKEGEE, John Moon, Theodore Moon, Willie Dean Ware, and Adrienne Baker (In re Patricia Arnold v. City of Tuskegee, John Moon, Theodore Moon, Willie Dean Ware, and Adrienne Baker).

1040062.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

December 30, 2005.

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N. Gunter Guy, Jr., and Emily C. Marks of Ball, Ball, Matthews & Novak, P.A., Montgomery, for petitioners.

Phillip D. Segrest, Jr., of Segrest, Segrest & Weldon, Tallassee, for respondent.

SMITH, Justice.¹

The City of Tuskegee, John Moon, Theodore Moon, Willie Dean Ware, and Adrienne Baker (collectively "the petitioners"), the defendants below petition for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Howard F. Bryan of the Macon Circuit Court to grant their motion to stay discovery and their motion for a summary judgment on the basis that they are entitled to immunity. We grant the petition in part and deny it in part.

Facts and Procedural History

Patricia Arnold was arrested by the City of Tuskegee Police on October 17, 1995. She was charged with harassment and released on her personal recognizance. Arnold made an appearance before the Tuskegee municipal court on October 26, 1995. After Arnold appeared before the municipal court, records show that Judge Robert Thompson of the Tuskegee Municipal Court placed the case against Arnold "on hold." The municipal court did not make a final determination as to the merits of the harassment charge and did not issue a final order in the case. The harassment case against Arnold remained "on hold," and the municipal court never placed the case back on the court's docket. Arnold did not receive any further notice or a summons in relation to the harassment case.

The petitioners claim that in 1998 Michael Ricks, the chief of police for the City of Tuskegee, asked the municipal court clerk's office to update the "writ" files. Willie Dean Ware, the clerk of the municipal court, testified that when he realized that the municipal court had many pending or unresolved "writ" files, he instructed municipal court personnel to "clean up" those files. Adrienne Baker, a municipal magistrate for the City of Tuskegee, stated that in the process of "cleaning up" the files, she issued a capias warrant for Arnold's arrest for "fail[ure] to appear before the court as ordered" on the harassment charge that had been pending against Arnold since 1995. Although it appears from the record that Arnold never "failed to appear before the court as ordered," Baker stated in an affidavit that she decided to issue the warrant to resolve the pending charge against Arnold because she believed that she could not "resolve a pending criminal case until a Judge has made and issued a final order in the matter."

On May 3, 2001, Arnold was present in the Tuskegee Municipal Court to serve as a witness in a case unrelated to the harassment case. John Moon, a police officer for the City of Tuskegee, stated in an affidavit in Arnold's case that he was at the municipal court complex on May 3 and that a municipal court employee notified him that Arnold had an outstanding warrant for her arrest. John Moon also stated in the affidavit that after he was notified of the existence of the warrant, he called the Tuskegee Police Department and spoke with his brother, Theodore Moon, to verify the existence of an outstanding warrant for Arnold's arrest. Theodore Moon, a police officer for the City of Tuskegee and the patrol commander on duty at that time, testified in an affidavit that he told John Moon that a warrant for Arnold had been located. John Moon also stated that he left the courthouse, picked up the warrant from police department headquarters, returned to the municipal courthouse, and arrested Arnold.

After Arnold was arrested, she signed a statement indicating that she had appeared in court in 1995 on the harassment charge but that the charges against her had been dropped. Arnold was released on bond later that day. On May 17, 2001, Judge Albert Bulls of the municipal court dismissed the harassment charge against Arnold and ordered that her cash bond be returned.

On September 20, 2001, Arnold sued the City of Tuskegee and other fictitiously named parties in the Macon Circuit Court. After some preliminary written discovery, Arnold amended her complaint to add a federal § 1983 claim.² The action was then removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

On October 24, 2002, Arnold filed a notice of dismissal without prejudice of her federal claim under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On December 5, 2002, Arnold refiled her complaint in the Macon Circuit Court alleging only state-law claims against the petitioners. The individual defendants were sued in both their individual and official capacities. Arnold alleges that she was falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned, and she seeks recovery based upon two theories. First, Arnold alleges that the false imprisonment and false arrest were the result of the carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness of the petitioners. In the alternative, Arnold alleges that she suffered damages from false imprisonment and false arrest as a result of the bad faith, malice, or willfulness of the petitioners. More specifically, Arnold alleges that the outstanding warrant on which her arrest was based may have actually been "fabricated" or "concocted" subsequent to her arrest.

Arnold filed and served interrogatories and requests for document production with her complaint. However, the petitioners never responded to these discovery requests. In February 2003, Arnold moved to compel discovery, and she noticed the depositions of the individual defendants. On February 27, 2003, the petitioners filed a motion to stay discovery pending the trial court's ruling on a motion for a summary judgment. The petitioners ultimately filed a motion for a summary judgment on May 6, 2003. On June 24, 2003, a hearing was held on the motion to stay discovery, and on September 1, 2004, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to stay discovery. The trial court found that "there are substantial issues concerning immunity" that "cannot be adequately addressed pending the completion of a substantial amount of discovery." The trial court did not rule on the summary-judgment motion. The petitioners then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus asking this Court to direct the trial court to grant their motion to stay discovery and their motion for a summary judgment.

Standard of Review

"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary form of relief." Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 810 (Ala.2002). "[A] writ [of mandamus] will issue only upon a showing of `(a) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought, (b) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so, (c) the lack of another adequate remedy, and (d) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'" Ex parte Puccio, 923 So.2d 1069, 1072 (Ala.2005) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).

Discussion

"While the general rule is that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable, the exception is that the denial of a motion for summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus." Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912 (Ala.2000). The petitioners argue that because they are entitled to absolute immunity this Court can properly review whether a summary judgment is proper. However, Arnold alleges that this petition is "premature" because the trial court has not yet ruled on the petitioners' summary-judgment motion.

In Ex parte Alabama Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, the plaintiff sued the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation ("the department"), its commissioner, and certain employees, alleging negligence. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. They then petitioned for a writ of mandamus, asking this Court to direct the trial court to dismiss the action on the ground of immunity.

We held that the motion to dismiss was due to be granted as to the claims brought against the department because, as an agent of the State of Alabama, the department was immune from suit under Ala. Const.1901, § 14.³ Department of Mental Health, 837 So.2d at 810-11. The Court also held that the motion to dismiss was due to be granted as to the claims brought against the commissioner in her official capacity because she was entitled to immunity from suit under Ala. Const. 1901, § 14. Department of Mental Health, 837 So.2d at 811. However, the Court held that the petition for the writ of mandamus was not due to be granted as to the claims brought against the commissioner in her individual capacity. 837 So.2d at 814. The Court stated:

"[The respondent] notes that no discovery has been conducted in this case, and she argues that the Department's petition for the writ of mandamus is premature . . . . [N]ormally the determination as to the existence of [an immunity-based] defense should be reserved until the summary-judgment stage, following appropriate discovery. . . .

". . . .

"The claims against [the petitioner] that we have determined are made against her in her individual capacity are fact intensive . . . . After the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery, [the petitioner] will have the opportunity to seek a summary judgment on the ground that she is entitled to State-agent immunity."

Department of Mental Health, 837 So.2d at 813-14.

As discussed below, some of Arnold's claims in the instant case, like the claims brought against the commissioner in her individual capacity in Department of Mental Health, are "fact intensive." Only limited discovery was conducted in the action originally filed by Arnold, and no discovery has been conducted in this case because the...