Ex parte Cregler, Cr. 6893

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Writing for the Court: SCHAUER; GIBSON; McCOMB; PETERS; McCOMB
• Citation: 14 Cal.Rptr. 289,363 P.2d 305,56 Cal.2d 308
• Parties: , 363 P.2d 305 In re Holland CREGLER, on Habeas Corpus.
• Docket Number: Cr. 6893
• Decision Date: 20 July 1961

Page 289

14 Cal.Rptr. 289 56 Cal.2d 308, 363 P.2d 305 In re Holland CREGLER, on Habeas Corpus. Cr. 6893. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. July 20, 1961.

[56 Cal.2d 309] Benjamin M. Davis and John H. Sutter, San Francisco, for petitioner.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Arlo E. Smith, Deputy Atty. Gen., Thomas C. Lynch, Dist. Atty., and Francis Mayer, Chief Asst. Dist. Atty., San Francisco, for respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

In this proceeding begun by a petition for prohibition but by stipulation to be considered as an application for the writ of habeas corpus, petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the provisions of subdivision 4 of section 647 of the Penal Code ¹ as that section read before it was

Page 290

[363 P.2d 306] repealed ² and a new section 647 enacted in 1961. (Stats.1961, ch. 560.) [56 Cal.2d 310] An alternative writ issued, which by stipulation is deemed an order to show cause on petition for habeas corpus. On the record which is before us we have concluded that petitioner's contentions (that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite in its language and its meaning) are without merit, and that the application should be denied.

On January 31, 1961, while petitioner was standing in the Greyhound Bus Station in San Francisco allegedly waiting for a friend, he was arrested by an officer of the San Francisco Police Department. Thereafter a complaint was filed in the municipal court in San Francisco by the district attorney of the City and County of San Francisco charging petitioner with a violation of subdivision 4 of former section 647 of the Penal Code, in that he 'being a known thief by his having been convicted of such offense and having no visible and lawful means of support, did loiter about a place of public gathering and was then and there a vagrant.'

On February 15, 1961, petitioner demurred to the complaint on the specified ground that the statute is unconstitutional as being in conflict with article I, sections 11 and 13, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA³ and the Fourteenth Amendment ('due process' and 'equal protection' clauses) to the Constitution of the United States. He also moved to dismiss the complaint upon the same grounds.

The demurrer was overruled and the motion to dismiss denied. Petitioner then entered a plea of not guilty, and the case was set for trial. The present petition followed.

In support of the ground specified petitioner contends that the word 'loitering' is so vague and indefinite as to 'leave the defendant to the vagaries of individual judges' and, further, that the statute 'unduly restricts a person's liberty.' These contentions, in any application of the statute relevant to the facts of this case as they now appear, are without merit.

The statute with which we are here concerned (Pen.Code, § 647, subd. 4) by its own terms is limited in application to the classification of 'pickpocket, thief, burglar or confidence operator * * * having no visible or lawful means of support,' and makes it unlawful for a person in that class to loiter 'around any steamboat landing, railroad depot, banking institution, broker's office, place of amusement, auction room, store, [56 Cal.2d 311] shop or crowded thoroughfare, cars, or omnibus, or any public gathering or assembly.' The pertinent facts of this case on which (in this proceeding and in the present state of the record) the constitutionality of applying the subject statute must be tested are as above indicated; i. e., petitioner, 'being a known thief by his having been convicted of such offense and having no visible and lawful means of support' was observed standing in the Greyhound Bus Station in San Francisco and was arrested while so waiting there.

The reasonableness of such a statute appears to be plain. The public has an obvious interest in preventing professional pickpockets and thieves from loitering about places in which they may most conveniently and lucratively ply their trade.

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[363 P.2d 307] As pointed out in People v. Superior Court (1937), 10 Cal.2d 288 298(4), 73 P.2d 1221, 'judicial decisions abound with declarations to the effect that all presumptions and intendments favor the validity of statutes; that mere doubt by the judicial branch of the government as to the validity of a statute will not afford a sufficient reason for a judicial declaration of its invalidity * * *.' (See also Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club (1961), 55 Cal.2d 736, 13 Cal.Rptr. 201; Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1959), 53 Cal.2d 141, 146(3), 346 P.2d 737; State of California, Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1957), 48 Cal.2d 365, 371-372(1-7), 310 P.2d 7; Lundberg v. County of Alameda (1956), 46 Cal.2d 644, 652(10), 298 P.2d 1; In re Herrera (1943), 23 Cal.2d 206, 212(2), 143 P.2d 345.) Thus in the Flores case the ejection from a race track of one who had previously been convicted of violating section 337a of the Penal Code (bookmaking) was upheld under legislation and regulations which required the exclusion or ejection from such tracks of 'known bookmakers, known touts, persons who have been convicted of violations of * * * (this chapter, including section 19561.5 of the Business and Professions Code) or of the laws prohibiting bookmaking or other illegal forms of wagering on horse races, and other persons or classes of persons whose presence in such enclosure would, in the opinion of the (Horse Racing) board, be inimical to the interests of the State or of legitimate horse racing, or both.'

Further, the word 'loiter' as used in the subject statute (and in many other police power regulations ⁴) in our [56 Cal.2d 312] view has a sinister or wrongful as well as a reasonable definite implication. As proscribed by the statute the word 'loiter' obviously connotes lingering in the designated places for the purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be discovered. Section 4 of the Penal Code declares that the provisions of that code 'are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.' (See People v. Carskaddon (1957), 49 Cal.2d 423, 425(1), 318 P.2d 4.) Manifestly one who goes to a bus station or railroad depot and waits for the purpose of buying a ticket, boarding the conveyance, meeting a relative or friend actually expected to arrive, or with any other legitimate objective, is not loitering within the sense of the statute. Loitering as forbidden includes waiting, but mere waiting for any lawful purpose does not constitute such loitering. (Cf. Phillips v. Municipal...