EX PARTE CSX TRANSP., INC.
Decision Date | 19 February 1999 |
Citation | 735 So.2d 476 |
Parties | Ex parte CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. (In re Judith P. Sweeney, as administratrix of the estate of Charles Kenneth Sweeney, deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc.) |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Stephen A. Rowe, David W. Spurlock, and John B. Tally, Jr., of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, L.L.P., Birmingham, for petitioner.
Frank O. Burge, Jr., of Burge & Wettermark, P.C., Birmingham; and William W. Tally of Tally & Tally, Scottsboro, for respondent.
The Jackson Circuit Court entered a summary judgment for the defendant CSX Transportation, Inc., in the plaintiff Judith Sweeney's action filed under the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"). The action was based on the death of Ms. Sweeney's husband, and it alleged negligence, negligent assignment, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the summary judgment as to two of those claims. Sweeney v. CSX Transp., Inc., 735 So.2d 472 (Ala.Civ.App.1998). We granted CSX's petition for certiorari review. We affirm.
The pertinent facts were set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals:
Sweeney v. CSX Transp., Inc., 735 So.2d at 474. The trial court entered a summary judgment against all of Ms. Sweeney's claims. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the summary judgment in part and reversed it in part. It agreed with CSX that, under Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994), the summary judgment was appropriate on the claim alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress. Sweeney, 735 So.2d at 475. However, the court reversed with respect to the negligence and negligent-assignment claims, holding that Gottshall was inapplicable to those claims and that on those claims CSX was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 So.2d at 475-476. We deal only with Ms. Sweeney's claim of negligent assignment, because we see her allegation of negligence (which was, in her complaint, stated in terms of a failure to determine whether Mr. Sweeney was qualified to be reassigned as a locomotive engineer) as being encompassed by her negligent-assignment claim.
When reviewing a summary judgment, we review the record de novo and examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hightower & Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 527 So.2d 698, 701 (Ala.1988). Here, there is no material factual dispute between the parties; therefore, the summary judgment was appropriate as to the negligent-assignment claim if CSX was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on that claim. Ala. R. Civ. P. 56(c). CSX argues here, as it did in the circuit court and the Court of Civil Appeals, that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on that claim because Gottshall precludes any recovery under the claims advanced by Ms. Sweeney. In Gottshall, the Supreme Court adopted the "zone of danger" test for recovery, under FELA, for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 512 U.S. at 555,114 S.Ct. 2396. The Court stated:
Id. at 556, 114 S.Ct. 2396. Using this "zone of danger of physical impact" analysis, the Court held that a train dispatcher who became ill after he was forced to work long hours under poor conditions did not have a valid claim under FELA for negligent infliction of emotional distress.1 512 U.S. at 558, 114 S.Ct. 2396. According to the Court, the dispatcher's "work-stressrelated claim plainly does not fall within the common law's conception of the zone of danger" and his "complaint was that he `had been given too much—not too dangerous—work to do.'" Id. (citing Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 813 (7th Cir.1985)). Based on this language, CSX concludes that any claim of negligence under FELA that involves work-related stress is inseparably intertwined with a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress and must necessarily engage the "zone of danger" test. Such an interpretation, however, goes well beyond Gottshall's reach.
From the very first sentence of the Gottshall opinion, it is clear that the Supreme Court was limiting its discussion to determining "the proper standard for evaluating claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress." 512 U.S. at 535, 114 S.Ct. 2396. The Court indicated that it was restricting its consideration to just one tort theory of liability:
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