Ex Parte Csx Transp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 March 2006
• Docket Number: 1050016.,1041971.
• Parties: Ex parte CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. (In re Shamalita Franklin et al. v. City of Athens and CSX Transportation, Inc.) Ex parte City of Athens. (In re Shamalita Franklin et al. v. City of Athens and CSX Transportation, Inc.)
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

938 So.2d 959

Ex parte CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

(In re Shamalita Franklin et al. v. City of Athens and CSX Transportation, Inc.)

Ex parte City of Athens.

(In re Shamalita Franklin et al. v. City of Athens and CSX Transportation, Inc.)

1041971.

1050016.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 10, 2006.

Morris Wade Richardson and Elizabeth Redding Floyd of Adams & Reese LLP/Lange Simpson, Birmingham, for petitioner CSX Transportation, Inc.

Benjamin R. Rice of Spurrier, Rice & Hall, Huntsville, for petitioner City of Athens.

William D. Davis III of Davis & Associates, P.C., Huntsville, for respondent.

Kenneth Smith, league counsel, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Alabama League of Municipalities, in support of the City of Athens.

George W. Royer, Jr., and Scott W. Faulkner of Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for amicus curiae City of Huntsville, in support of the City of Athens.

Craig S. Dillard and Bart Harmon of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for amicus curiae Association of County Commissions of Alabama, in support of the City of Athens.

LYONS, Justice.

Shamalita Franklin, Daphne Johnson, Genny Ervin, and Florene Hanserd-Yarbrough¹ appealed to this Court from a summary judgment entered in favor of CSX Transportation, Inc., and the City of Athens. We transferred the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment. Franklin v. City of Athens, 938 So.2d 950 (Ala.Civ. App.2005). We granted certiorari review; we now affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The Court of Civil Appeals stated the facts and procedural history as follows:

"On June 13, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the trial court naming as defendants the City [of Athens] and CSX. The complaint asserted claims of negligence and wantonness based upon an alleged breach of duties to provide proper warning to the plaintiffs of a `dangerous condition,' i.e., a `ditch' dug across Pryor Street in the City in front of a railroad crossing where the plaintiffs were involved in an incident while occupying a moving automobile that resulted in injury to them. The complaint also asserted claims of negligence and wantonness against CSX and the City based upon alleged breaches of a duty to maintain the roadway. The City and CSX filed answers asserting that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, denying the pertinent allegations of the complaint, and asserting various affirmative defenses. In September and October 2003, the City and CSX filed summary-judgment motions; the plaintiffs then filed a response to both motions. On March 2, 2004, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of both the City and CSX. On April 1, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

"The record reveals that during the first week of June 2000, CSX began upgrading crossings and replacing rails at certain railroad crossings located within the City, including a crossing located on Pryor Street. CSX coordinated street closings with the City and borrowed certain traffic-control devices from the City to block motorized progress across the streets that were to be affected by the railroad crossing maintenance. As repair work began at the Pryor Street crossing, CSX employees placed a row of orange and white traffic `barrels' and an `A-frame' or `sawhorse' painted barricade with an attached `ROAD CLOSED' sign at the intersection of Pryor Street and Marion Street; that intersection was located one block west of the railroad crossing. CSX also posted a second row of orange and white traffic `barrels' immediately in front of the actual crossing.

"On the night of June 13, 2000, Franklin was operating an automobile and conveying Ervin to her home after they had visited one of Franklin's relatives in a Huntsville hospital; Johnson and Hanserd-Yarborough were also passengers in Franklin's automobile. Franklin, who was unfamiliar with the area, became lost while driving to Ervin's home. Franklin subsequently turned the automobile onto Pryor Street, proceeding eastbound, and attempted to cross the railroad tracks while slowing down to approximately 10 to 15 miles per hour. As she did so, Franklin drove her vehicle off the asphalt and onto the ballast of the railroad bed. Franklin and her three passengers suffered injuries in the incident and were subsequently taken to a hospital emergency room; they were treated for soreness and bruising and were released."

938 So.2d at 951-52.

After reviewing the parties' arguments, as well as those of amici curiae appearing on behalf of the City,² we conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals correctly reversed the summary judgment as to both the City and CSX.

II. Standard of Review

"The standard by which this Court will review a motion for summary judgment is well established:

"`The principles of law applicable to a motion for summary judgment are well settled. To grant such a motion, the trial court must determine that the evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that those two conditions are satisfied, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present "substantial evidence" creating a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989); § 12-21-12(d)[,] Ala.Code 1975. Evidence is "substantial" if it is of "such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989).

"`In our review of a summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court. Ex parte Lumpkin, 702 So.2d 462, 465 (Ala.1997). Our review is subject to the caveat that we must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412 (Ala. 1990).'"

Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So.2d 829, 832-33 (Ala.2001) (quoting Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742 So.2d 182, 184 (Ala.1999)).

III. The City of Athens

In reversing the summary judgment in favor of the City, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:

"In its motion for a summary judgment and its submissions in support thereof, the City essentially argues that it owed no duty to the plaintiffs and, therefore, that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The City asserts that it owed no duty because § 11-49-3, Ala.Code 1975, places a duty on CSX to maintain the railroad crossing. The City also argued that if it owed a duty it did not breach that duty because it was not involved in the repair of the intersection.

"Merely because CSX owed a duty with respect to the safety of the motoring public does not mean that the City was relieved of its similar, coexisting duty. The negligence of two or more tortfeasors may combine to result in a single, indivisible injury for which both tortfeasors are liable. See Springer v. Jefferson County, 595 So.2d 1381 (Ala. 1992). The City failed to explain why the fact that CSX owed a duty operated to relieve the City of its duty. In this case, if there is substantial evidence indicating that CSX left a hazard in a public roadway overnight without adequate barriers or other warning devices, and that the City knew or should have known that that hazard was left in place by CSX without adequate barriers or other warning devices, the City owed a duty to warn the motoring public of that hazard. This duty is no different from that which the City would have had under § 11-47-190 to warn the public upon learning of a hazard created by any private citizen or other party in a public right-of-way after the hazard became known or should have became known to the City....

"The City's motion for a summary judgment was based on its position that it did not owe a duty to warn the motoring public of any hazard created by CSX's performance of repairs. That position does not reflect Alabama law. Therefore, the City's motion for a summary judgment is due to be denied."

938 So.2d at 953-54.

The City and the amici curiae maintain that the Court of Civil Appeals has erroneously imposed upon the City both a duty to maintain a railroad crossing and a duty to warn of a dangerous condition at a railroad crossing. The City argues to this Court, as it did to the Court of Civil Appeals, that because § 11-49-3, Ala. Code 1975, imposes upon a railroad the duty to maintain a railroad crossing and the "the streets between their rails and for 18 inches on each side," the City had no duty whatsoever in this situation. The City and the amici curiae argue that the Court of Civil Appeals has created a theory of dual liability that will impose a significant burden upon the cities and counties of this State, and that this Court rejected the concept of dual liability in Yates v. Town of Vincent, 611 So.2d 1040 (Ala. 1992).

We do not read the main opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals as broadly as do the City and the amici curiae. We agree with the views of Judge Murdock, expressed in his special concurrence, that the opinion does not impose upon the City the duty to maintain a railroad crossing and the adjacent portion of roadway the railroad is charged with maintaining; rather the opinion merely recognizes that if CSX had allowed a hazard to exist upon a public street without adequately warning the public of that hazard, the City had a duty to warn the public of that hazard if it knew or should have known that the hazard existed. Judge Murdock stated:

"I do not read the main opinion as taking the position that the City breached a duty to repair or maintain that crossing. Rather, I read the main opinion as merely stating that...