Ex parte D.J.
Citation | 645 So.2d 303 |
Parties | Ex parte D.J. (Re W.B.Z. v. D.J. (In the Matter of B.W.J., a minor)). 1921141. |
Decision Date | 05 August 1994 |
Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Sarah S. Frierson, Mobile, for petitioner.
Jay M. Ross of Reid, Friedman, Perloff & Ross, Mobile, for respondent.
D.J., the maternal grandmother of B.W.J., a minor, sought custody of B.W.J. The Mobile County Juvenile Court awarded her custody, and W.B.Z., the child's father, appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. 1 We granted D.J.'s petition for certiorari review, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
B.W.J. was born in 1983 to V.J. and W.B.Z., who never married. From the date of his birth until April 27, 1991, he and his mother, V.J., lived intermittently with D.J. On April 27, 1991, however, V.J. died. Thereafter, but before July 19, 1991, W.B.Z. petitioned the probate court for a judgment of legitimation of B.W.J. His petition was granted on September 5, 1991.
On July 19, 1991, D.J. petitioned the juvenile court for temporary custody of B.W.J., and a hearing was convened in the juvenile court on November 18, 1991, to consider her petition. Subsequently, the court granted the petition, but awarded W.B.Z. visitation privileges at W.B.Z.'s home in Arlington, Texas, for 10 weeks during the summer, for one week during Christmas vacation, for the duration of spring vacation, and for "such other visitation as may be arranged by the father and the grandmother." Also, the court scheduled a second hearing in order to review "whether or not the child [had so] progressed in his relationship with the father ... that it would be appropriate for the child to be placed in the home of the father."
After the second hearing, which convened on August 19, 1992, the court entered an order in which it found, inter alia, that W.B.Z. and the "stepmother [were] able and anxious to provide for the child." However, it further stated: "[T]he court does find that it is in the best interest of [B.W.J.] that custody remain with [D.J.] ... and that a change in custody to [W.B.Z.] would not materially promote the child's welfare so as to overcome the inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child." (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Civil Appeals, in a judgment joined by a majority of the court, reversed. It held that the trial court erred in failing to afford W.B.Z. the benefit of a parental "presumption," that is, a presumption that the interests of B.W.J. would best be served by placing the child in his custody absent a finding that he was unfit.
D.J. petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, contending that the parental presumption is inapplicable to cases involving children born out of wedlock. Alternatively, she contends that the presumption is inapplicable under the facts of this case. We granted D.J.'s petition in order to consider these questions.
The courts of this state, in accord with the common law, have long presumed that the entrustment of children to the care and custody of their natural parents serves the best interests of the children. For example, in Striplin v. Ware, 36 Ala. 87, 89-90 (1860), this Court explained:
See also Ex parte Mathews, 428 So.2d 58, 59 (Ala.1983) ( ); Ex parte Berryhill, 410 So.2d 416 (Ala.1982); Ex parte Sullivan, 407 So.2d 559, 563-64 (Ala.1981) (); Harris v. Harris, 251 Ala. 687, 39 So.2d 232 (1949); Chandler v. Whatley, 238 Ala. 206, 189 So. 751 (1939) (); Stoddard v. Bruner, 217 Ala. 207, 115 So. 252 (1928). These cases thus reveal not only the antiquity of the rule followed in this state but also the policy and rationale underlying the parental presumption.
In this connection, we are compelled to reject D.J.'s argument that a natural father seeking custody of his illegitimate child after the mother's death should not be afforded the benefit of the parental presumption. For this proposition, D.J. has cited no authority, and, in our view, the law and policy of this state are to the contrary. For example, this Court recognized long ago that the "putative father of [children born out of wedlock], desiring the custody and control of them, is entitled to it against all but the mother, if competent to care for and suitable to take charge of them." Lewis v. Crowell, 210 Ala. 199, 200, 97 So. 691, 692 (1923) ( ). More recently, this Court explained that in a custody contest " 'between a parent [of illegitimate children] and a stranger the custody cannot be awarded to the latter unless the parent is found to be unfit and improper as custodian.' " Griggs v. Barnes, 262 Ala. 357, 78 So.2d 910 (1955).
Moreover, no reason appears why a natural father in the position of W.B.Z. should not be presumed susceptible of the same paternal affections and nurturing tendencies as fathers of children born within the bonds of marriage. Indeed, the application of the parental presumption in such cases promotes the sound policy of encouraging fathers to fulfill their paternal roles. We hold, therefore, that in a custody contest between a nonparent and one who has been adjudicated to be the natural father of a child born out of wedlock, the father is entitled to the presumption that the child's interests will best be served by an award of custody to him, subject to the absence of a finding that he is unfit and subject to the exceptions discussed infra.
D.J. contends that the judgment of the trial court was proper under either of two well-established exceptions to the parental presumption rule. Specifically, the parental "presumption does not apply after a voluntary forfeiture of custody or a prior decree removing custody from the natural parent and awarding it to a nonparent." Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863, 865 (Ala.1984). Where these exceptions apply, " 'the parent will not be permitted to reclaim the custody of the child, unless [s]he can show that a change of the custody will materially promote h[er] child's welfare.' " Id. at 865 (emphasis added) (quoting Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155, 157, 30 So.2d 444, 445 (1947), and Stringfellow v. Somerville, 95 Va. 701, 29 S.E. 685, 687 (1898)). In its August 19, 1992, order, the trial court clearly applied the standard required under these exceptions to the parental presumption. We must consider whether either of them is applicable.
D.J. first insists that the judgment was supported by evidence that W.B.Z. had "willingly relinquished custody to the mother," Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari, at 3 (emphasis added), "and to [the] grandmother." Id. at 4. In this respect, she essentially adopts the view of Judge Thigpen, who concurred in part with the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and dissented in part. He stated:
(Emphasis added.) As to this proposition, we disagree with D.J. and with Judge Thigpen.
"Relinquishment" is defined as "[a] forsaking, abandoning, renouncing or giving over a right." Black's Law Dictionary 1161 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Voluntary relinquishment is thus essentially synonymous with the concept of "waiver," which has been defined as the "voluntary and intentional surrender or relinquishment of a known right." Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So.2d 1047, 1058 (Ala.1984) (emphasis added). By definition, therefore, a party "cannot waive a...
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