Ex parte Dalton
| Decision Date | 24 April 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 7839,7839 |
| Citation | 243 P.2d 594,72 Idaho 451 |
| Parties | Ex parte DALTON. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Gigray & Boyd, Caldwell, for petitioner.
Robert E. Smylie, Atty. Gen., Allan G. Shepard and John Clinton Peterson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.
Convicted of murder in the second degree, petitioner was sentenced May 6, 1942 to not less than ten nor more than twelve years in the State Penitentiary.
September 26, 1951 he petitioned for writ of Habeas Corpus in the District Court, contending that under Section 20-417, I.C.A., he was entitled to sufficient good time credit to warrant his discharge.
August 3, 1949 the record of the minutes of the Idaho State Board of Corrections stated petitioner's good time was revoked because of his failure to carry out the orders of prison personnel, and also threats against prison personnel. The Penitentiary authorities contend the adoption of the indeterminate sentence law in 1909 and 1911, Section 19-2413 and Sections 19-3906 to 19-3912, I.C.A., impliedly repealed the good time statutes first enacted in 1891, 1890-91 Session Laws, page 30, Sections 20-417 and 20-419, I.C.A., part on Ex parte Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 171 P. 958; In re Thompson, 54 Cal.App. 177, 201 P. 473; Ex parte Piantanido 56 Cal.App. 259, 205 P. 17; State v. Kinnear, 145 Wash. 686, 261 P. 795; and that if not impliedly repealed, discharge is solely within the discretion of the Board.
Petitioner takes the opposite view and that the revocation of his good time August 3, 1949, being without notice to him of the nature of the charges and without his presence, was void as violative of due process, relying upon Ex parte Mac-Donald, 45 Cal.App. 480, 187 P. 991.
The record does not show what has been the practice of the various Boards, Art. IV, Sec. 7 of the Constitution; Title 20, Chap. 2, Idaho Code, but our decisions indicate that good time has been allowed without definitive declaration as to whether it was a matter of right or grace.
'This court held that the prisoner should have been sentenced under the provisions of section 6768, and ought to have been given a sentence of not less than five years, and that the judgment was not void, and that until the prisoner had served his term of five years, which may be shortened under the statute by good behavior, he should not be entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus.' Matter of Setters, 23 Idaho 270 at page 277, 128 P. 1111, 1113. (Emphasis added.)
In re Erickson, 44 Idaho 713, 260 P. 160, 161, quoting and following with approval Ex parte Lee, supra, held that the indeterminate statute in effect repealed, so far as inconsistent, then Sections 8079-80 of the Compiled Statutes, now Sections 18-106 and 18-107, I.C., but again it does not appear the question now before us was raised therein, and the opinion indicated that under the record good time was allowed:
'It further appears from the allegations of the petition that petitioner has served the maximum term of imprisonment imposed, less time earned for good behavior, * * *.' (Emphasis added.)
In Storseth v. State, Idaho, 236 P.2d 1004, 1005, we said:
Apparently, since 1911, the Boards have so acted under and reconciled both the good time statute and the indeterminate sentence statute that prior hereto the question herein has not been the subject of litigation.
Therefore, since the various Boards have apparently been able to reconcile the good time statute with their powers under the indeterminate statute, we do not feel constrained to hold the latter repealed the former.
Section 46, Chapter 53, 1947 Session Laws, page 71, expressly repealed the good time statute. Section 29 of said Chapter, now Section 20-229, I.C., however, thus provides:
(Emphasis ours.)
The only good time this Section could possibly have referred to was that previously authorized by Section 20-417, I.C.A., regulated by Section 20-419, I.C.A., both now repealed. This Section, therefore, must of necessity have contemplated that it would be retroactive; otherwise, there would have been no situations to which it could apply. This was sufficient...
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State v. Evans
...acts are committed, indicates that the two statutes are not necessarily inconsistent. Storseth v. State, Idaho, 236 P.2d 1004; In re Dalton, Idaho, 243 P.2d 594. In a doubtful case the question as to which statute is applicable would be determined by the proof available as to the specific i......
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Newland v. Child
...Both are, therefore, valid and effective, and there is no implied repeal. Storseth v. State, 72 Idaho 49, 236 P.2d 1004; Ex parte Dalton, 72 Idaho 451, 243 P.2d 594. It is also contended that § 56-224a is defective in that no provision is made therein for the release of the lien in case of ......