Ex parte Edgerton

• Decision Date: 11 December 1893
• Parties: Ex parte EDGERTON.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

59 F. 115

Ex parte EDGERTON.

United States Circuit Court, D. South Carolina.

December 11, 1893

Bryan &amp Bryan, for petitioner.

W. St J. Jervey, for respondent.

SIMONTON District Judge.

This case comes up on a petition for habeas corpus, the rule thereon, and the return thereto. James E. Edgerton, the petitioner, is the general freight and passenger agent of the Clyde Line of steamships, and its general manager in the port of Charleston. These steamships ply between New York Charleston, and Jacksonville over the high seas. Their business is that of common carriers engaged in foreign commerce and in commerce between the states.

On the 19th of September, 1893, there were brought to this port in the steamship Seminole, and unloaded at the dock of the line along with other freight of a miscellaneous character, 12 barrels.

Each barrel had its mark,--nine of them were lettered; three had on them the name of the consignee in full. On each barrel was a statement of its supposed contents,--two were marked 'Soda Water;' five, 'Ginger Ale;' one, 'Sarsaparilla;' one, 'Mineral Water;' one, 'B Cider.' The manifest showed that all of the barrels were shipped in due course at New York, for delivery at the port of Charleston. On reaching the dock they were discharged with, and as a part of, the ship's cargo. On that day one R. H. Pepper obtained a warrant from a trial justice in Charleston, which, after reciting that complaint had been made before him by said Pepper that 'James E. Edgerton, general freight agent of the Clyde Steamship Company, has brought into this state 12 barrels of intoxicating liquors, in violation of sections 2 and 25 of an act approved December 24, 1892,' commands the arrest of Edgerton, to be brought before the justice, to be dealt with according to law. The affidavit with the warrant alleges that 'Edgerton did unlawfully bring into this state the intoxicating liquors, contrary to the act of assembly in such case made and provided, and that Edgerton is not a licensed dispenser, and is without any permission or license to bring in the same.' The petitioner was arrested, carried before the trial justice, released on bail, was afterwards surrendered by his sureties, and is now in custody of the sheriff of Charleston county under this warrant. He prays his discharge, for that his arrest, and the act of assembly upon which it is based, are in contravention of the interstate commerce law, of which he seeks the protection. The return of the sheriff gives as the cause of detention that Edgerton has been under recognizance to answer for a violation of the law of the state, and was surrendered by his sureties. The barrels in question were opened, and were found to contain beer,--an intoxicating liquor.

Looking to the warrant as stating the cause and ground of arrest, and assuming that the act of assembly which it quotes as its authority does in fact forbid the bringing of intoxicating liquors into this state, the question is, can any state forbid the importation of intoxicating liquors into its territory by a common carrier engaged in interstate and foreign commerce? The authority to regulate commerce with foreign countries and between the states is exclusively in the congress of the United States. When congress has not legislated on any part of this subject, such commerce is free. Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465, 8 S.Ct. 689, 1062. Mr. Justice Field, in County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 696, says:

'That power [to regulate commerce] is without limitation. It authorizes congress to prescribe the conditions upon which commerce in all its forms shall be conducted between our citizens and the citizens or subjects of other countries, and between citizens of the states, and to adopt measures to promote its growth and insure its safety. * * * Some of the subjects of commerce are national in their character, and admit and require uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the states. * * * Of this class is that portion of commerce with foreign countries or between the states which consists in the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. Here, then, can be of necessity only one system or plan of regulations, and that congress alone can prescribe.' Mr. Justice Lamar, in Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 17, 9 S.Ct. 6, says:

'The power expressly conferred on congress to regulate commerce is absolute and complete in itself, with no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution; is to a certain extent exclusively vested in congress, so far free from state action; is coextensive with the subject on which it acts, and cannot stop at the external boundary of a state, but must enter into the territory of every state whenever required by the interests of

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