Ex parte Fuller, 14

• Decision Date: 06 October 1952
• Docket Number: No. 14,14
• Citation: 334 Mich. 566,55 N.W.2d 96
• Parties: Ex parte FULLER. Motion
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 96

55 N.W.2d 96

334 Mich. 566

Ex parte FULLER.

Motion No. 14.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 6, 1952.

Before the Entire Bench, except NORTH, C. J.

CARR, Justice.

On the 10th of May, 1945, the probate court of Wayne county entered an order adjudging Helen Fuller to be an insane person and ordering her committed to the Ypsilanti State Hospital or to the Eloise Hospital. She was confined to the latter institution, now known as the Wayne County General Hospital, and is an inmate thereof at the present time. The instant proceeding was brought by her husband for the purpose of obtaining her release. The petition filed alleges that the order of commitment was unauthorized and illegal in that provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions with reference to due process of law were violated, and also that certain mandatory provisions of the statute under which the proceeding was had were not followed.

On October 12, 1951, a writ of habeas corpus was issued by this Court, directed to the superintendent of the hospital, with ancillary writ of certiorari to the probate court. Returns to both writs have been duly filed. It appears therefrom that the basis for Mrs. Fuller's detention is the order above mentioned. The proceedings taken prior to the commitment, insofar as material, are set forth in the return to the writ of certiorari.

The petition seeking an adjudication as to Mrs. Fuller's sanity was filed by her husband on April 12, 1945. It was stated therein as the principal bases for the allegation of insanity that she was depressed and that she had attempted to commit suicide. She was examined by two physicians on whose certificates a temporary order for her restraint in Eloise Hospital, pending the hearing on the application, was made.

The statutory provisions governing the procedure at the time of the commitment were set forth in C.L.1929, § 6888, Stat.Ann. § 14.811, as last amended by P.A.1943, No. 250. Subsequent amendments to the section are not material in the present controversy. ¹ Pursuant to the statute the probate court, following the filing of the petition, fixed a date for hearing and appointed two physicians to examine Mrs. Fuller. The examination was duly held and the physicians filed their respective reports indicating their conclusions as to her mental condition.

In accordance with the statutory mandate, notice of hearing was given to the husband and sister of Mrs. Fuller, and was also served on her. However, she was under detention in the hospital at the time of the hearing and was not permitted to attend. Neither was she represented unless it can be said that her husband, who filed the petition on which the proceeding was had, was charged with the obligation of protecting her rights. The reasons for Mrs. Fuller's absence will be discussed more fully hereafter. On the hearing, the only testimony requiring specific consideration was that of Mr. Fuller who was sworn and examined by the probate judge. The order of commitment followed.

It is claimed in the instant proceeding that the requirements of the statute were not observed in the probate court, and that in consequence Mrs. Fuller's commitment was unauthorized and void. It is urged that the averments of the petition on which the hearing was held were insufficient to give the court jurisdiction, and that the affidavits of the examining physicians were deficient in that they did not set forth material facts in support of the conclusions stated therein. It is also urged that precluding her from attending the hearing constituted an invasion of her rights under the statute, and that the testimony taken did not support the conclusion of the probate judge on which his order of commitment was based. It is also argued that the probate proceeding as actually conducted failed to satisfy constitutional guaranties as to due process of law.

On behalf of the superintendent of the Wayne County General Hospital it is claimed that the petition of Mr. Fuller for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari should be dismissed on the ground that he was without right or authority to present it to this Court. On the basis of certain affidavits that have been filed in the matter it is argued that Mrs. Fuller is opposed to the proceeding. An attempt has been made to show that she is antagonistic to her husband because of his action in filing the petition in probate court, and perhaps for other reasons, and that it is against her wishes that he undertake at this time to do anything in her behalf. The claim that the husband should not be permitted to maintain the instant proceeding seems to be predicated on the theory that her wishes should be regarded as controlling, and that her mental condition is such that she should be deemed competent to determine what action, if any, should be brought in her behalf and who should represent her.

The statute relating to habeas corpus proceedings specifically provides for the filing of the petition by 'some person' other than the one whose alleged unlawful restraint is in issue. C.L.1948, § 637.9, Stat.Ann. § 27.2252. For obvious reasons such provision has been liberally construed. In the case of In re Nowack, 274 Mich. 544, 549, 265 N.W. 459, 461, in which the petition was filed by an attorney, it was said:

'It is claimed that the attorneys had no right to sue out the petition for habeas corpus. It was proper that an attorney knowing that a former client was unlawfully restrained of his liberty and had been temporarily divested of his property by the appointment of a guardian, all without lawful proceedings, should file a petition for habeas corpus and an ancillary writ of certiorari. Any person may sue out a writ of habeas corpus. In re Mould, 162 Mich. 1, 126 N.W. 1049.'

In the case of In re Mould, cited by the Court in the Nowack Case, supra, the right of an aunt of the child whose custody was in question to institute the proceeding was recognized. A petition filed by a parent, a spouse, a close relative, an attorney, or a friend, has been recognized by this Court as sufficient to confer jurisdiction to inquire into the matter of an alleged illegal restraint. The cases herein cited with reference to other matters involved in the controversy fairly indicate the situation in this regard. In the case at bar, notwithstanding the claimed aversion on the part of Mrs. Fuller to any action being taken in her behalf by her husband, we think that his petition was sufficient to charge this Court with the duty of determining the questions raised. It may be noted in passing that the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and certiorari following the filing of the petition was not opposed on the ground that Mr. Fuller was not entitled to file it.

As before noted, Mrs. Fuller was given notice of the hearing of May 10, 1945, but was not permitted to be present. The statutory provision as set forth in the section above cited, relating to the procedure to be observed in a matter of this character, is as follows:

'Such alleged mentally diseased person shall have the right to be present at such hearing, unless it shall be made to appear to the court, either by the certificate of the medical superintendent in charge of such hospital, home or retreat to which he may have been temporarily admitted, or by the certificate of 2 reputable physicians, that his condition is such as to render his removal for that purpose, or his appearing at such hearing improper and unsafe.'

The language quoted clearly implies that the court must, on the basis of the showing made by the certificate of the superintendent of the hospital or by the certificates of two physicians, determine whether it would be improper and unsafe to permit the one whose sanity is the subject of the inquiry to appear at the hearing, or to render his removal from the institution improper and unsafe. The statute may not be read as intending to delegate to the hospital superintendent or to physicians the final authority to determine that issue. Such a construction would raise a serious question as to the validity of the provision quoted. Dation v. Ford Motor Co., 314 Mich. 152, 22 N.W.2d 252. Under the specific language of the statute the presence at the hearing of the alleged insane person is required unless it is 'made to appear to the court' that such appearance would be improper and unsafe.

The return to the writ of certiorari contains a photostatic copy of a letter addressed to the probate court of Wayne county, under date of April 17, 1945, by the superintendent of the Eloise Hospital. Said letter was apparently filed on May 10, 1945, the date of the hearing. It referred to the fact that Mrs. Fuller was at the time a patient in the hospital under a temporary order issued by the court, and to the provisions of the statute with reference to her right to be present at the hearing. Following such references it was stated:

'I hereby certify that it is improper and unsafe for the above mentioned patient to appear in your Court at the time of the hearing regarding the alleged mental disease.'

No facts were set forth in the letter as the basis for the certification. Apparently the probate judge accepted it as a sufficient showing justifying a denial to Mrs. Fuller of the right to be present in court and to take such part in the proceeding as she might desire. It is argued on behalf of petitioner that such certificate, which merely indicated the opinion of the superintendent without any reference to facts on which he based it, was wholly insufficient to justify the action taken, and that in legal effect such attempted certification was a mere nullity.

In the case of In re Roberts, 310 Mich. 560, 17 N.W.2d 752, 753, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by the mother of an inmate of the Kalamazoo State Hospital. There, as in the case at bar, the alleged insane person was confined in the hospital under an emergency commitment at the time of the hearing in probate c...