Ex parte Glover

• Decision Date: 04 May 2001
• Citation: 801 So.2d 1
• Parties: Ex parte Houston County Sheriff Lamar GLOVER; and Michael W. Haley, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections. (Re Order of the Houston Circuit Court dated December 4, 2000).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

801 So.2d 1

Ex parte Houston County Sheriff Lamar GLOVER; and Michael W. Haley, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections.

(Re Order of the Houston Circuit Court dated December 4, 2000).

1000500.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 4, 2001.

Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Margaret L. Fleming and Charles Brinsfield Campbell, asst. attys. gen.; Edward A. Hosp, Legal Adviser to Governor Don Siegelman; and Albert S. Butler, asst. general counsel, Alabama Department of Corrections, for Sheriff Lamar Glover, Commissioner Michael W. Haley, and Governor Don Siegelman.

James W. Webb, Kendrick E. Webb, and Bart Harmon of Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, for Sheriff Lamar Glover.

Gary C. Sherrer and W. Davis Malone III of Farmer, Farmer, Malone & Sherrer, P.A., Dothan, for Judges Larry K. Anderson, Denny L. Holloway, S. Edward Jackson, and Charles L. Little.

Frank C. Ellis, Jr., of Wallace, Ellis, Fowler & Head, Columbiana, for amici curiae Sheriff James Jones and Shelby County. Edwin A. Strickland and Charles S. Wagner, Jr., for amicus curiae Jefferson County Commission.

Albert L. Jordan and Algert S. Agricola, Jr., of Wallace, Jordan, Ratliff & Brandt, L.L.C., Birmingham, for amicus curiae Jefferson County Sheriff.

J. Robert Faulk of McDowell, Faulk & McDowell, L.L.C., Prattville, for amici curiae James W. Johnson, Sheriff, and Autauga County.

Robert M. Spence of Crownover, Standridge & Spence, Tuscaloosa, for amici curiae Tuscaloosa County Commission and Sheriff Edmund M. "Ted" Sexton, Sr.

SEE, Justice.

Michael W. Haley, commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, acting by and through Attorney General Bill Pryor, petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the judges of the Houston Circuit Court to vacate their order of December 4, 2000, which directs the sheriff of Houston County to transfer certain inmates from the Houston County jail to the Department of Corrections ("DOC") and, if the DOC refuses to accept the inmates, to secure the inmates to the DOC's property.¹ Governor Don Siegelman petitions this Court for permission to intervene in this mandamus proceeding, to join Commissioner Haley as a petitioner; we grant Governor Siegelman's petition. See Ex parte Weaver, 570 So.2d 675, 683 (Ala. 1990) ("[T]he Governor, as `chief magistrate' of the State, may intervene in any... litigation" in which the attorney general is representing the State.). For the reasons discussed below, we deny the petition for the writ of mandamus.

Facts and Procedural History

In the early 1990s, a class of counties and county sheriffs sued the commissioner of the DOC, arguing that he had a pattern of refusing, through his subordinates, to accept from county sheriffs inmates sentenced to serve time in the state penitentiary ("state inmates") and that that refusal was a violation of § 14-3-30, Ala.Code 1975.² The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring the commissioner and his staff to accept state inmates in accordance with the plaintiffs' interpretation of § 14-3-30. That Code section provides that when a defendant is sentenced to the penitentiary, the clerk of the sentencing court must notify the DOC, and, "[t]hereupon, the [DOC] shall direct where the inmate shall be taken for confinement or hard labor."³ After a hearing, the circuit court issued an injunction requiring the DOC to accept state inmates from the plaintiff counties within 30 days of the DOC's receipt of the notification required by § 14-3-30.⁴

Several years later, apparently dissatisfied with the DOC's efforts to comply with the trial court's injunction, the plaintiffs moved the court for an order holding the commissioner in contempt of court. The parties, however, reached an agreement that the court approved, and the plaintiffs withdrew their contempt motion. Essentially, the DOC agreed to comply with the terms of the court's earlier injunction.⁵ On December 4, 2000, the judges of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, in response to what they perceived to be "critical" over-crowding of the Houston County jail, issued the order that the commissioner challenges here.⁶ That order reads:

"ORDER

"After thorough review of the criminal justice system in Houston County, Alabama, by the Circuit Judges in Houston County, Alabama, it is apparent that there exists within the Houston County Jail a backlog of state inmates who have been sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections, and that the Department has refused to accept these inmates in compliance with state law. This has impeded the criminal justice system in Houston County, Alabama, slowing down and in certain circumstances obstructing the appropriate imposition of punishment of those convicted of a crime or held in contempt of court.

"THEREFORE, pursuant to Alabama Code § 12-17-24, the Sheriff of Houston County, Alabama, is hereby ordered to effectuate the transfer to the Department of Corrections of any and all state inmates who have been housed in the Houston County Jail for thirty (30) or more days after the Clerk of the Court transmitted to the Department of Corrections a copy of the judgment entry and sentence. The Sheriff is ordered to transport these state inmates to the Department's receiving center at Kilby (for male inmates) or Tutwiler (for female inmates) and effectuate the transfer of the state inmates to the custody of the Department. In the event the Department refuses to accept any state inmate in compliance with state law, the Sheriff is ordered to secure any such inmate or inmates so refused to the property of the Department's receiving center. This Order shall be continuing in nature.

"Done this 4th day of December, 2000. "/s/Larry K. Anderson "Presiding Circuit Judge "/s/Denny L. Holloway "Circuit Judge "/s/Edward Jackson "Circuit Judge "/s/Lawson Little "Circuit Judge"

This Court stayed implementation of the circuit judges' order and ordered answers and briefs from the parties.⁷

Discussion

The standard this Court applies in determining whether a petition for the writ of mandamus will issue is well settled. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy; one seeking it must show: "(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991). The petitioner bears the burden of proving each of these elements before the writ will issue. See Ex parte Consolidated Publ'g Co., 601 So.2d 423 (Ala.1992).

The respondent judges argue that the Commissioner is not entitled to the writ of mandamus because, they argue, the Commissioner has another adequate remedy. In Ex parte Galanos, 796 So.2d 390 (Ala.2000), the judges of the Mobile Circuit Court adopted a system for reviewing fee declarations by attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants. Under that system, a committee composed of five members of the criminal-defense bar of Mobile County reviewed fee declarations and made recommendations to a circuit judge as to the proper fee to award. The judge reviewed the committee's recommendation, independently reviewed the declaration, and then approved a fee. The responsibility of reviewing those declarations rotated among the judges of the circuit on an annual basis.

An attorney who had represented indigent defendants, and who had submitted 11 attorney-fee declarations, petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the system for reviewing attorney-fee declarations adopted by the judges of the Mobile Circuit Court violated § 15-12-21, Ala.Code 1975. The Court of Criminal Appeals issued the writ, holding the Code section required the judge who had presided over an indigent defendant's case to review the fee declaration submitted by the attorney appointed to represent the defendant. The judges of the Mobile Circuit Court petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to vacate its judgment.

The petitioning judges argued that the attorney, Bush, had an adequate alternative remedy and that the Court of Criminal Appeals had therefore erred in issuing the writ. This Court agreed, holding that Bush could have sought relief through an action for a declaratory judgment. The Ex parte Galanos analysis applies to the case before us here. But cf. In re Ingram, 356 So.2d 618 (Ala.1978)

(court conditionally issued writ of mandamus without discussing the possibility of the petitioner's obtaining alternative relief through a declaratory-judgment proceeding).

Section 6-6-223, Ala.Code 1975, provides: "Any person ... whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." We have long held that a declaratory-judgment action is the appropriate way to challenge the legality of an official action:

"[T]he declaratory judgment statute will be extended to cases involving public rights or important public matters and to controversies in which the legality of action of public officials or public agencies is challenged. We have said in effect that where official action done or threatened is challenged as unlawful, whether the lack of authority appears in the provisions of a statute or because of its unconstitutionality, the controversy can be determined under the declaratory judgment statute...."

Morgan v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 248 Ala. 22, 25, 26 So.2d 108, 110 (1946); see also Gibbs v. Cochran, 281 Ala. 22, 198 So.2d 607 (1967). Thus, the Commissioner may challenge the legality of the December 4, 2000, order through a declaratory-judgment action.⁸

Accordingly, we conclude that the petition for the writ of mandamus is due to be denied. In denying the petition, we are not...