Ex parte Gytl

• Decision Date: 20 January 1914
• Citation: 210 F. 918
• Parties: Ex parte GYTL et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota

210 F. 918

Ex parte GYTL et al.

United States District Court, D. North Dakota, Southeastern Division.

January 20, 1914

Seth Richardson, of Fargo, N.D., and C. J. Murphy, of Grand Forks N.D., for petitioners.

Edward Engerud, U.S. Dist. Atty., of Fargo, N.D., for respondents.

AMIDON District Judge.

This is a proceeding by habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of imprisonment of the above-named persons by a commissioner of immigration and the sheriff of Grand Forks county, N. D acting under authority of such commissioner. All of the defendants are Austrians. Two of them arrived by steamer at Quebec, in the Dominion of Canada, in the month of April 1912. Three of them arrived at the port of Halifax in May 1913. They vary from 19 to 34 years in age and are in sound health. They were all examined by Canadian inspectors of immigration at the port of entry and passed. They all had through tickets to Winnipeg, and proceeded at once to that city, where they had acquaintances, and some of them relatives. They have since worked as common laborers upon railroads and farms in the province of Manitoba. In the month of September, 1913, they were at work as harvest hands near the village of Gretna, which is located on the Canadian side of the international boundary. Having completed their job, they went to Gretna, for the purpose of taking the train back to Winnipeg. While they were spending the evening in a hotel there, one Napoleon Longtin solicited them to work for him as members of a threshing crew. They accepted the employment, and four of them were taken in an automobile and one in a carriage to Longtin's farm. The journey was made when it was very dark, late at night. The farm is situated on the American side of the line, about three miles from the boundary. The petitioners did not know that they were being taken into the United States, and would not have gone there if they had known. Neither did they know that it was illegal for them to enter the United States. Longtin himself knew nothing of our Alien Labor Law, and was quite unaware that he was violating its provisions.

The men worked for him as members of his threshing crew until October 2d, when they were arrested by an immigration inspector. They were all examined by him under oath, and their testimony taken in shorthand, and it is now before me as part of the return to the writ. They had no counsel, but gave their evidence with transparent candor. As part of his report, the inspector used the following language as to each alien:

'Attention is especially called to the fact that this alien claims that he was virtually kidnapped and taken into the United States against his will. Considering his attitude and willingness to answer all questions put to him, I believe he is telling the truth.'

The inspector further found, however, that these aliens were in the United States in violation of law: (1) Because they entered under a contract to perform manual labor; (2) because they entered by wagon road instead of a port, and without inspection; (3) because they were persons likely to become a public charge.

The aliens all testified, however, that they were in perfect health, and had been since their arrival in Canada, and there was no evidence whatever to support the last finding. Each man had $45 on his person at the time of the arrest. The inspector reported the evidence and his findings to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, who thereupon issued his warrants directing that petitioners be deported to the country whence they came.

In the meantime Longtin had been arrested for violating the Alien Labor Law, and bound over to the grand jury, and the deportation of the aliens was suspended in order that they might be used as witnesses upon his trial. At the next term of court Longtin was indicted, and was arraigned for plea in the month of December, 1913. Upon his examination, it appeared that he was a man of substance and character in the community where he had lived for many years; that he owned a half section of land upon which he resided with his wife and children; that he had never been arrested before, or charged with any crime. He made a frank statement of what he had done, and informed the court that he was not aware that he was violating any law, but was simply trying to get laborers to thresh his grain. Counsel for the government confirmed his statements as the result of their investigation.

A plea of guilty was then entered. The court, considering the offense to be without any wrongful intent, imposed a fine of $5 as a sufficient vindication of an innocent violation of the law. A short time thereafter a civil suit was brought against Mr. Longtin by the government, in which it is sought to recover a penalty of $5,000 and costs because of his bringing these aliens into the United States. This is the minimum penalty fixed by the statute. That case is still pending.

The aliens have been detained in jail. After the case against Longtin had been disposed of, they supposed that they would be permitted to return to Canada. It was then that they learned for the first time that the government contemplated deporting them to Austria. Thereupon their counsel sued out a writ of habeas corpus, to test the right of the Commissioner of Labor to deport them to that country. The facts above recited as to Mr. Longtin are a part of the records of the court. The petition and return disclose the facts as to the petitioners, and it is conceded by the government that the Secretary of Labor at the time he issued his warrants had before him no evidence except that which is now before the court.

It is clear from the evidence that petitioners are illegally in the United States. It is equally clear that their entry was the result of an innocent mistake on their part, and on the part of Mr. Longtin. It is the right and duty of the Department of Labor to deport them, but this power ought to be exercised by a just government with scrupulous regard to the rights of petitioners. They do not cease to be human beings simply because they are aliens, nor are they wholly outside of the protection of the Constitution. The evidence presenting no controverted issue of fact, the determination of the country to which they should be deported is wholly a matter of law, and the decision of that question by administrative officers is not binding upon the court.

The question involved turns upon sections 20, 21, and 35 of the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907. The two first sections require that any alien who enters the United States in violation of law shall be deported to the country 'whence he came.' Section 35 reads as follows:

'That the deportation of aliens arrested within the United States after entry, and found to be illegally therein, provided for in this act, shall be to the trans-Atlantic or trans-Pacific ports from which said aliens embarked for the United States, or if such embarkation was for foreign contiguous territory, to the foreign port at which such aliens embarked for such territory.'

These three sections are to be read together, and a meaning arrived at, if possible, which will give effect to all their provisions. In the great majority of cases the alien comes direct from the country of his nativity, and in case of deportation should be returned there. The Department, as the cases on the subject show, has been zealous to make this a universal rule. That would simplify matters. But, like most universal rules, it will work cruel hardship in individual cases. The general rule under the statute clearly is that the alien shall be deported to the country whence he came. This of course, is not necessarily the country of his nativity or citizenship. Section 35 gives a specific definition of the words 'whence he came' in certain cases. The first clause of that section deals with aliens who embark directly for some port of the United States. They are to be deported to the place from which they embark. The second clause deals with aliens who embark for the United States, but land at some foreign contiguous territory. In my judgment the last clause, like the first, is confined to aliens who embark 'for the United States.' It was a well-known evil at the time the statute was passed that aliens seeking to enter the United States in violation of its laws frequently landed either in Mexico or Canada, and passed into the United States across the long and unguarded international boundary lines. The last clause was intended to meet that evil. If Mexico or Canada was simply used as a front porch for entering the United...