Ex parte Haney

Decision Date19 June 1992
PartiesEx parte Judy M. HANEY. (Re Judy M. Haney v. State of Alabama). 1910244.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Charlotta Norby and Stephen B. Bright, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and P. David Bjurberg and William D. Little, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

INGRAM, Justice.

Judy M. Haney was convicted by a Talladega County jury of capital murder and was sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately affirmed the conviction. See Haney v. State, 603 So.2d 368 (Ala.Crim.App.1991). This Court granted Haney's petition for the writ of certiorari. Rule 39(c), A.R.App.P.

In her petition to this Court, Haney presents over 20 issues for review. She presented all but one of these issues to the Court of Criminal Appeals. That court issued a detailed and lengthy opinion, which provided a thorough treatment of each issue raised by Haney. We have thoroughly reviewed the record before us for error regarding the issues raised as well as for plain error not raised. 1 We find no error by the Court of Criminal Appeals in affirming the conviction and will not specifically address each of the issues raised by Haney in this Court. However, we address Haney's principal contention presented to this Court--that she was a "battered wife" or a victim of "spouse abuse" and that the consequence of that alleged abuse should preclude the imposition of the death penalty in this case.

Haney argues that she was a "battered wife." She contends that the murder of her husband was the culmination of a long family tragedy that began 15 years before, when, she says, her husband began abusing her. Haney acknowledges that the murder of her husband was a grossly inappropriate response, as well as a violation of the laws of Alabama. She recognizes that it deserves punishment, but argues that because of the alleged abuse, the death sentence is not appropriate. She contends that the trial court failed to consider the alleged abuse as a mitigating factor and, therefore, that her sentences are due to be reversed.

In support of her argument that she was a victim of an abusive husband, Haney testified at trial that her husband had beaten, kicked, and otherwise physically abused her and their children for numerous years, and that just before the murder he had been having an affair with her best friend. She also called Dr. Michael Holt, a psychologist, to testify on her behalf. Dr. Holt opined that Haney was suffering from a psychological defect, which he characterized as "spouse abuse syndrome." However, he also testified that she knew right from wrong and possessed the capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct and to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.

In response to Haney's contention that she was suffering from "spousal abuse," the State called its own psychologist, Dr. Doug McKeown. Dr. McKeown agreed with Dr. Holt that Haney possessed the capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct. However, Dr. McKeown did not agree that Haney was suffering from a psychological defect known as "spouse abuse syndrome." Dr. McKeown found that there was no evidence to suggest that Haney had such a defect, and he concluded that she was psychologically normal.

The concept of a "battered spouse" syndrome has won recognition in courts throughout the country. See Ex parte Hill, 507 So.2d 558 (Ala.1987); State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn.1989); State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash.2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988); Commonwealth v. Rose, 725 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.1987); State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121 (1986); State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 716 P.2d 563 (1986); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C.App.1983); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.1981).

In Koss, the wife was indicted for the murder of her husband. At trial she presented witnesses who testified that her husband had beaten her on numerous occasions. Various witnesses testified to these alleged beatings, including a counselor at a "Witness and Victim Services Center." The wife took the stand at trial and recounted several instances when her husband had beaten her or had threatened to kill her. She testified that on one occasion he had tried to smother her with a pillow and that on another occasion he had put a radio in the bathtub while she was taking a bath. She stated that her husband had threatened to kill her children if she did not drop a domestic violence charge she had filed against him. On the night of the murder, the wife testified, the following happened:

"[U]pon entering the bedroom, she saw a gun on the bedside table. She stated that this frightened her because she previously had never seen the gun out. She testified that she 'must have picked' up the gun, afraid that her husband was going to kill her. According to appellant, her husband then hit her. She could not remember anything from the time her husband hit her to the time when she heard a 'noise,' which she believed was gurgling blood. When asked upon cross-examination if she caused the death of Michael, purposely or not, appellant answered that she had 'no idea.' She testified that 'I purposely did not kill Michael Koss,' and '[i]f I killed him, it was an accident.' "

Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 214, 551 N.E.2d at 971.

The trial court denied the wife's motion to introduce evidence of the "battered wife syndrome." The jury found the wife not guilty of murder, but guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced her to 8 to 25 years in prison. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding:

"Expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome can be admitted to help the jury not only to understand the battered woman syndrome but also to determine whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent danger when considering the issue of self-defense.

" 'Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would help dispel the ordinary lay person's perception that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at any time. The expert evidence would counter any "common sense" conclusions by the jury that if the beatings were really that bad the woman would have left her husband much earlier. Popular misconceptions about battered women would be put to rest, including the beliefs that the women are masochistic and enjoy the beatings and that they intentionally provoke their husbands into fits of rage. See Walker, The Battered Woman, 19-31 (1979).' "

Koss, 551 N.E.2d at 973 (quoting State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 68-69, 716 P.2d 563, 567 (1986)).

In Hennum, the wife was convicted of second degree felony murder in the shooting death of her husband. There was evidence that throughout their marriage the husband behaved violently toward his wife and the children. The wife was once taken to a hospital with contusions and scratches on her face and a punctured lung caused by a blow to her ribs inflicted by the husband. Another time, the husband attacked the wife by kicking her with steel-toed boots, causing a ruptured spleen, which required surgery to remove the spleen. The wife on another occasion entered the hospital after the husband hit her in the face with a beer bottle; she suffered a broken nose and severe lacerations on her face as a result of the blow. The husband was even arrested after another attack on the wife and in regard to that attack he pleaded guilty to assault.

In Hennum, the events leading up to the murder were as follows:

"Upon his return [the husband] entered the trailer, slamming the door behind him. [The wife] was standing near the stove and [the husband] pushed her away, shouting, 'What's for supper, bitch?' [The husband] saw some oatmeal left over from breakfast sitting on the stove. He picked up the pan of oatmeal, hit [the wife] with it on the side of the head and dumped the oatmeal on top of her. [The child] was awakened by the fighting and saw [the husband] dump the oatmeal on [the wife].

"[The husband] then grabbed [the wife] by the hair and began pulling her around the room showing her some cans of chili and telling her to warm some up for him. When she began to prepare the chili, he went after her again, throwing her to the floor and ripping her shirt. Whenever she fell he would grab her back up by the hair. At one point [the husband] had her pinned to the floor with his hands on her throat.

"Eventually, [the husband] went into the living room and while [the wife] was attempting to cook dinner, he threw a piece of firewood at her. He then threw a car part at her. [The wife] tried to protect herself by hiding under the kitchen table. [The husband] grabbed a rocking chair and threw it at her, causing the chair to break."

Hennum, at 795-96.

The abuse continued until the husband went into the bedroom and fell asleep. The wife testified that after he went to sleep, she noticed a gun lying on the floor and saw a bullet sticking out of it. She stated that she loaded the bullet back into the gun and decided to scare her husband. She testified that "she went into the bedroom, closed her eyes, and fired the gun."

At trial the wife admitted killing her husband, but introduced evidence of "battered woman syndrome" as a defense. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed that the trial court correctly allowed such evidence.

Alabama courts have also addressed the issue of spousal abuse. In Hill, the wife shot her common law husband three times in the head while he was sleeping. She was indicted for his murder, but contended that she was not guilty, because, she said, she was suffering from "battered spouse syndrome." The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction of intentional murder, holding that the evidence of the battered spouse syndrome had been...

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