Ex Parte Hunn and LeVan, 40660.

Decision Date12 January 1948
Docket NumberNo. 40671.,No. 40660.,40660.,40671.
Citation207 S.W.2d 468
PartiesEX PARTE ARTHUR A. HUNN. EX PARTE MELVIN LEE LeVAN.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court
207 S.W.2d 468
EX PARTE ARTHUR A. HUNN. EX PARTE MELVIN LEE LeVAN.
No. 40660.
No. 40671.
Supreme Court of Missouri.
Court en Banc, January 12, 1948.

Habeas Corpus.

PETITIONERS DISCHARGED.

Stanley R. Schuchat, Floyd D. Stewart, Paul J. Kaveney, Richard M. Stout, J. Jules Brinkman, Wiley, Craig & Armbruster, Robert A. Roessel, Raymond M. Freed, and Bartley & Bartley for petitioners.

(1) Picketing is protected as an incident of free speech by constitutional guaranties in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and in Article I, Section 8 and Section 10 of the Constitution of Missouri. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093; Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855; Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200; Bakery & Pastry Drivers Union v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178; Carpenters & Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L. Ed. 1143; Cafeteria Employees' Union, Local 302, v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 126, 88 L. Ed. 58; Miller's, Inc., v. Journeymen Tailors Union, Local No. 195, 128 N.J. Eq. 162, 15 A. (2d) 822, rev'd 312 U.S. 658, 61 S. Ct. 820, 85 L. Ed. 1106; Fred Wolferman, Inc., v. Root, 356 Mo. 976, 204 S.W. (2d) 733. (2) Picketing, like any other type of communication, is not an absolute right and is subject to restrictions, which will be upheld so long as they do not transcend constitutional limitations. Carpenters & Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, supra; Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local 753, v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., supra; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, supra. (3) A restriction upon free speech, including picketing, must, in order to be held valid, be narrowly drawn and directed toward some specific substantive evil, or perhaps, in the case of picketing, toward specific circumstances affording a reasonable basis for regulation. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470; Commonwealth v. Pascone, 308 Mass. 591, 33 N.E. (2d) 522; Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S. Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed. 1292; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S. Ct. 862, 87 L. Ed. 1313. (4) Legislation which places a ban on free speech, which ban is universal in respect to all persons, or in respect to all persons in a specified group, or even in respect to one individual, is unconstitutional and void. Commonwealth v. Pascone, supra; Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Carlson v. California, supra; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, supra; Bakery & Pastry Drivers Union v. Wohl, supra; Cafeteria Employees' Union, Local 302, v. Angelos, supra; Miller's, Inc., v. Journeymen Tailors Union, Local No. 195, supra. (5) The absence of an employer-employee relationship does not in and of itself afford a reasonable basis for depriving a person of his freedom of speech. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189; Purcell v. Journeymen's Barbers Union, 234 Mo. App. 843, 133 S.W. (2d) 662; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, supra; Bakery & Pastry Drivers Union v. Wohl, supra; Cafeteria Employees' Union, Local 302, v. Angelos, supra; Miller's, Inc., v. Journeymen Tailors Union, Local No. 195, supra. (6) A legislative classification which does not rest upon some real and substantial distinction, bearing a reasonable and just relation to the persons or things in respect to which the classification is imposed and to the object sought to be accomplished by the legislation, whether the law be a police regulation or otherwise, is unconstitutional and void as a denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and also as a special law in violation of Article III, Sec. 40(27) of the Constitution of the State of Missouri. Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 30 S. Ct. 287, 54 L. Ed. 536; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Vosberg, 238 U.S. 56, 35 S. Ct. 675, 59 L. Ed. 1199; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S.W. 781, 29 L.R.A. 257, 50 Am. St. Rep. 443; State ex rel. Wander v. Kimmel, 266 Mo. 611, 165 S.W. 1067; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S.W. 677; White v. Missouri, K. & T. Railroad, 230 Mo. 287, 130 S.W. 325, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874; State v. Hedrick, 294 Mo. 21, 241 S.W. 402; People v. Gidaly, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 758, 93 P. (2d) 660. (7) The nature of picketing itself does not provide a reasonable basis for distinguishing in respect thereto between persons who are employees of the person being picketed and those who are not such employees. People v. Gidaly, supra; People v. Garcia, 37 Cal. App. (2d) 753, 98 P. (2d) 265. (8) The nature of the controversy in connection with which picketing is permitted to the employees of an employer does not provide a reasonable basis for distinguishing between such employees and other workers in the same industry, for the reason that such other workers in the same industry may have the same type of controversy with an employer as his own employees. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855. (9) The classification made in Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 79 bears no just relation to the objects of the statute. (10) The classification made in Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 79 cannot be justified as a social experiment. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 S. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254. (11) Especially in matters affecting civil liberty the classification must be substantial. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430; Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 628. (12) The classification here in question is in conflict with and prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Civil Rights Statutes enacted pursuant thereto. U.S.C.A. Title 18, Sec. 52; U.S.C.A. Title 8, Sec. 41; State v. Tsutomu Ikeda, 61 Ariz. 41, 143 P. (2d) 880; Stapelton v. Mitchell, 60 Fed. Supp. 51. (13) The statute here attacked is an attempted impairment of the right of labor to organize, guaranteed by Article I, Sec. 29, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945. Debates in the Constitutional Convention, Vol. 5, pp. 1931-1974; N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189. (14) A criminal statute must be definite and certain in its terminology in order that a person may be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation and not deprived of his life, liberty and property without due process of law. Sixth Amend. of U.S. Constitution; Fourteenth Amend. of U.S. Constitution; Art. I, Sec. 10, Constitution of Missouri, 1945; Art. I, Sec. 18, Constitution of Missouri, 1945; Art. II, Sec. 22, Constitution of Missouri, 1945; Sec. 4853, R.S. 1939; United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 11 S. Ct. 538, 35 L. Ed. 190; Wabash Ry. Co. v. O'Bryan, 285 Fed. 583; United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S. Ct. 298, 65 L. Ed. 516, 14 A.L.R. 1045; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 85 L. Ed....

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT