Ex parte Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co.
Decision Date | 21 September 1987 |
Citation | 514 So.2d 1283 |
Parties | Ex parte ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY. (In re Faye HORTON, as Mother and Next Friend of Jeffrey Allan Wiginton v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY, et al.) ILLINOIS CENTRAL GULF RAILROAD COMPANY v. Faye HORTON, as Mother and Next Friend of Jeffrey Allan Wiginton. 86-204, 86-205. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Hobart A. McWhorter, Jr., and Joseph B. Mays, Jr., of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, for Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R.
Roger H. Bedford, Sr., and Robert I. Rogers, Jr., of Bedford, Bedford & Rogers, Russellville, for Horton.
This is an appeal from a default judgment entered against Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company ("ICG") in the amount of $500,000. The Circuit Court of Franklin County refused to vacate the default judgment, and entered an order pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P., making the judgment final as to ICG. We reverse and remand.
On the night of March 6, 1986, Guy Wayne Jenkins lost control of the car in which he and passenger Jeffrey Allan Wiginton were riding. The car went through the side railings of a one-lane wooden bridge, owned and maintained by ICG, and then over an embankment onto railroad tracks also owned and maintained by ICG. Wiginton died in the accident. Faye Horton, as mother and next friend of Wiginton, filed a wrongful death action in the Circuit Court of Franklin County against Guy Wayne Jenkins, the Marion County Commission, and ICG. Mrs. Horton's allegations of negligence on the part of ICG were as follows:
The summons and complaint were sent by certified mail to ICG's agent in Haleyville, Alabama, and were received on August 2, 1986. The agent promptly forwarded the summons and complaint to ICG's office in Chicago, Illinois, and the documents were received there on August 6, 1986. The Chicago office directed the summons and complaint to attorney Hobart A. McWhorter, Jr., at the office of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White in Birmingham, where the documents were received on August 8, 1986. The summons and complaint were opened by Mrs. Carole Estes, secretary to McWhorter, and, in accord with standard office practice, Mrs. Estes forwarded the documents to Joseph B. Mays, Jr., who normally acknowledged the receipt of such papers and normally filed an initial appearance in such matters.
Mays, however, was out of the office, having left the previous day for Dothan, Alabama, where he was preparing for a lengthy antitrust trial. Mays's trial began on August 11, 1986, and did not conclude until September 3, 1986; and, during that time, Mays returned to his Birmingham office only on weekends and on two days when the court was not in session. The file did not come to Mays's attention when he returned to the office on September 4.
After ICG failed to respond to the summons and complaint, Mrs. Horton filed an application for default judgment against ICG on September 4, 1986. On September 5, 1986, the trial court made an entry of default against ICG, and on September 11, 1986, the court allowed Mrs. Horton to present testimony in support of an award of damages. ICG was not informed of this hearing. The trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Mrs. Horton in the amount of $500,000 on September 12, 1986.
ICG first learned of the September 5 entry of default on September 12, 1986, when its Haleyville office received a notice in the mail. The ICG agent immediately telephoned ICG's Chicago office, and a telephone call was then made from Chicago to McWhorter in Birmingham, giving McWhorter his first personal knowledge of this lawsuit and of the entry of default. McWhorter immediately prepared an answer and a motion to set aside default, which he mailed to the clerk of the circuit court on September 12, 1986. McWhorter also telephoned the plaintiff's attorney to advise him of McWhorter's representation of ICG, and McWhorter then sent the plaintiff's attorney a copy of the answer and the motion to set aside default.
On September 15, 1986, the circuit court received and filed ICG's answer and its motion to set aside default, supported by the affidavit of McWhorter. On September 16, however, ICG's Haleyville office received notice of the September 12 entry of default judgment against ICG and the award of $500,000 damages to Mrs. Horton. Upon learning of the entry of default judgment, McWhorter filed with the circuit court a motion to set aside default judgment, supported by McWhorter's affidavit, on September 19, 1986. After a hearing on September 29, 1986, the trial court, on October 8, 1986, entered an order denying ICG's motion to set aside the default judgment. After a hearing, ICG's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. This appeal followed. 1
ICG makes several arguments in support of its contention that the default judgment is due to be set aside as void, voidable, or premised upon error: 1) That service of process was not proper because Horton failed to file a written request for service by certified mail, as required by Rule 4.1(c)(1), A.R.Civ.P.; 2) that the default judgment should be set aside because there was no proof that Mrs. Horton, as mother of the deceased minor child, had the authority to maintain a wrongful death action; 3) that the trial court's award of damages was improper because Mrs. Horton failed to waive the written jury demand she had made, as required by Rule 38, A.R.Civ.P.; 4) that the default judgment is void because the complaint sets forth inconsistent claims; and 5) that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to set aside the default judgment.
Because we reverse and remand as to the fifth issue presented (abuse of discretion), an in-depth treatment of each of the first four issues is unnecessary. Suffice it to say, after careful consideration, we find no basis for reversal with respect to any of the first four claims of error.
ICG maintains that in situations where the requisites for granting a Rule 60(b) motion may not be met, a Rule 55(c) motion may, nevertheless, be granted. Therefore, contends ICG, the trial court erred when it analyzed ICG's Rule 55(c) motion by the requirements of Rule 60(b). We agree.
The trial court entered the following order:
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