Before
JAY P. LUCAS, THU A. DANG and DEBRA K. STEPHENS
Administrative Patent Judges.
LUCAS
Administrative Patent Judge.
Appellant
appeals from multiple rejections of claims 1 to 11, 13 to 24
26 to 31, 33 to 60 and 63 to 89 under authority of35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a). Claims 12, 25, 32, 61 and 62 are cancelled.
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) has
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We
affirm.
Appellant's
invention relates to a method and system for managing the
heat generated in a computer component by varying the
operations the component is tasked to perform. In the words
of Appellant:
The present invention relates to methods and [an] apparatus
for performing thermal management in a processing
environment, and, in particular, for reducing thermal hot
spots by effectively allocating instructions and tasks.
In accordance with aspects of the present invention, thermal
scheduling methods are provided. In a preferred embodiment, a
component has a thermal threshold, and the method includes
providing a plurality of operations to be performed by the
component. Thermal information associating the operations
with a thermal attribute is provided. The thermal attribute
represents a value related to the amount of heat expected to
be generated or incurred by the component during performance
of the operation. The order in which the operations are to be
performed is scheduled based on the thermal attribute so that
the thermal threshold is not exceeded.
In another preferred embodiment, a method first obtains
program code having a series of operations, and determines
thermal attributes associated with one or more of the
operations. The thermal threshold of a component is also
determined. The operations are scheduled for execution by the
component in accordance with the thermal attributes so that
the thermal threshold is not exceeded.
(Spec. ¶¶ [0002], [0009], and [0014]).
The
following illustrates the claims on appeal: Claim 1:
1. A method of scheduling operations to be performed by a
component having a thermal threshold comprising:
providing a plurality of operations to be performed by the
component;
associating the operations with a thermal attribute, the
thermal attribute representing a value related to a heat
amount expected to be generated or incurred by the component
during performance of the operations;
determining a cooling attribute;
scheduling the operations in an order of performance based on
the thermal attribute and the cooling attribute so that the
thermal threshold is not exceeded; and
generating the order of performance for use in execution of
the operations.
The
prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims
on appeal is:
Chauvel
|
2002/0065049 A1
|
May 30, 2002
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REJECTIONS
The
Examiner rejects the claims as follows:
R1:
Claims 1 to 11, 24, 26 to 31, 33, 34, 53 to 60 and 63 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed
invention is directed to nonstatutory subject matter.
R2:
Claims 1 to 11, 13 to 24, 26 to 31, 33 to 60 and 63 to 89
stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (paragraph 2) for
being unduly multiplied.
R3:
Claims 1 to 11, 24, 26 to 31, 33 to 44, 53 to 60 and 63 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for being anticipated
by Chauvel.
We will
review the rejections in the order presented and as argued in
the Briefs. We have only considered those arguments that
Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant
could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not
been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
The
issue for rejection R1 issue is whether Appellant has shown
that the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims under 35
U.S.C. § 101. The issue hinges on the current law
concerning non-statutory subject matter with respect to the
rejected claims. The issue for rejection R2 is whether the
rejected claims (all) are unduly multiplied as described in
the currently effective legal guidance. The issue for
rejection R3 is whether Chauvel anticipates the claims as
presented.
The
record supports the following findings of fact (FF) by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1.
Appellant has invented a system and method for maintaining a
component in an electrical circuit under its thermal
threshold for operation. (Spec. 3, ¶ [0009]). The
invention provides for the component certain operations that
do not heat the component (e.g. a processor integrated
circuit) when the threshold is being approached.
(Id.).
2. The
Chauvel reference teaches "scheduling events to avoid
critical temperature effects in a specific area of a
die." [of a component in an electrical circuit]. (¶
[0052]).
3.
Further findings of fact are recited in the Analysis section
below.
Undue
Multiplicty (Excerpts from the two Chandler cases)
We are confronted with the issue of undue multiplicity of
claims raised by the board's affirmance of the
examiner's rejection of all the claims on this ground. As
apposite precedent for this action, the board cited In re
Chandler, 254 F.2d 396 (CCPA 1958).
The examiner held that, in view of the state of the art
thirty-eight claims are not justified and
serve to confuse rather than to define the invention, since
many of the claims differ from each other in no material
aspect, pointing out that:
[C]laims 3, 7, 9, 10, 15 and 20 differ from each other only
in the recitation of such conventional elements as manual
means and constant pressure regulating valves. . . .
In support of their contention that In re Chandler,
supra, is not apposite here, appellants seek to distinguish
that case from the case at bar on a factual basis. It is
asserted that this distinction resides mainly in the fact
that Chandler embraced fifty claims divided about
evenly between method and apparatus claims, each divided into
ten categories comprising broad and narrow claims, while in
the instant case thirty-eight claims are presented, all for
apparatus, defining a different combination of elements
involving a far more complex invention.
In Chandler the patent sought was for an automatic
control for jet engines predicated on fifty claims. We agree
with appellants that the instant matter presents a more
complex situation. Certainly the invention claimed and those
disclosed by the references are not simple. The gravamen of
complexity resides, however, not in the subject matter of the
invention but in the volume of claims and the repetitious
pyramiding of "means" and "elements"
which tend more "to confuse rather than define" the
invention. While many of the claims are couched in different
language involving varying phrases, they are not different in
material substance. Groups of them employ repetitious
recitation of conventional elements. With a difference in
phraseology, some of them call for the same combination of
elements.
We are constrained to agree with the examiner and the board
as to the examples pointed out in reference to claims which
do not materially differ from each other.
Appellants' contention here is very similar to that made
by appellant in the Chandler case in which the court
held that the alleged complexity of the specific apparatus
afforded no basis for an excessive number of claims. The
court stated:
As was pointed out in In re Barnett, 155 F.2d 540
(CCPA 1946), it is proper to allow applicants a reasonable
latitude in setting forth their inventive concepts in
different phraseology, but it is the purpose of claims to
point out and define what an applicant regards as his
invention, and that purpose is not served if, as the result
of frequent repetitions, they present to the mind a blur
rather than a definition.
We are in accord with the view that applicants should be
allowed reasonable latitude in stating their claims in regard
to number and phraseology employed. The right of applicants
to freedom of choice in selecting phraseology which truly
points out and defines their inventions should not be
abridged. Such latitude, however, should not be extended to
sanction that degree of repetition and multiplicity which
beclouds definition in a maze of confusion. The rule of
reason should be practiced and applied on the basis of the
relevant facts and circumstances in each individual case.
It is our opinion that the record in the instant case clearly
supports the decision of the board on the issue of undue
multiplicity. In re Chandler is, in our opinion
apposite and controlling.
It appears that claims 24, 37 and 38, which were rejected
only on the ground of undue multiplicity, are patentable in
the absence of the other thirty-five claims which were
rejected on prior art.
In re Chandler and Wright, 319 F.2d 211, 224-225
(CCPA 1963).
Anticipation
Over One Reference
In
rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102, "[a] single
prior art reference that discloses, either expressly or
inherently, each...
