Ex parte Jackson

• Decision Date: 18 May 2001
• Citation: 836 So.2d 973
• Parties: Ex parte Shonelle JACKSON. (In re Shonelle Jackson v. State).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

836 So.2d 973

Ex parte Shonelle JACKSON.

(In re Shonelle Jackson v. State).

1981723.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 18, 2001.

Bryan A. Stevenson and Randall S. Susskind of Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, Montgomery, for petitioner.

Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Kathryn D. Anderson, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Shonelle Jackson was convicted of murder made capital because it occurred during the commission of a robbery in the first degree, see § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, and first-degree theft of property, see § 13A-8-3, Ala.Code 1975. The jury recommended, on the capital conviction, a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, by a vote of 12-0; the trial court overrode that recommendation and sentenced Jackson to death. Jackson was also sentenced, as a habitual offender with three prior felony convictions, see § 13A-5-9(c)(2), Ala.Code 1975, to life imprisonment for the theft conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both convictions and sentences. See Jackson v. State, 836 So.2d 915 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), for a detailed statement of the facts. We granted certiorari review; see Rule 39(c), Ala.R.App.P. Jackson contends that the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing outside the presence of the jury on his motion to suppress his statement made to the police.

Initially, we note that the Court of Criminal Appeals conducted a plain-error review of this issue, stating: "Although [Jackson] requested a hearing in his written motion, he did not subsequently object when the trial court denied the motion without conducting a hearing." 836 So.2d at 934. The record indicates that on January 30, 1998, Jackson filed a pretrial motion to suppress his statement made to a law-enforcement officer. On February 2, 1998, the trial court denied the motion, by entering the following order on the first page of the motion: "Ordered, motion denied without a hearing." (C.R. 49.) At trial, Jackson entered two objections to the admission of his statement, one of them specifically referencing the pretrial motion to suppress. The trial court overruled Jackson's objections and admitted the statement. The specificity of the trial court's order denying Jackson's motion to suppress his statement indicates that the trial court was aware of Jackson's request for a hearing and that the trial court's determination was final. Jackson suffered an adverse ruling; therefore, the error is preserved for review. Cf. Ex parte Rowell, 666 So.2d 823 (Ala.1992)(holding that a ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress is sufficient to preserve the issue for review and that the defendant need not object to the evidence when it is admitted).

In Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 165, 176 So.2d 840, 859 (1965), this Court stated, "We are clear to the conclusion that whenever a motion is made for the question of the voluntariness of the confession to be determined outside the presence of the jury, the motion should be granted." See also Smith v. State, 554 So.2d 451 (Ala.1989), and Felder v. State, 470 So.2d 1321, 1326 (Ala.Crim.App.1984)(holding that "an accused is entitled to a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession").

The record indicates that Jackson moved to suppress his statement made to a law-enforcement officer, stating in his motion:

"1. The defendant, Shonell[e] Andre Jackson, was taken into custody and interrogated on April 29, 1997, according to police records, in connection with his alleged participation in the April 25, 1997, shooting of [Lefrick] R. Moore.

"2. He was questioned, which questioning was recorded, by Detective A.J. Signore, Montgomery, Alabama Police Department.

"3. Mr. Signore informed the defendant that his fingerprints had been found on a Dairy Queen cup in the automobile used in the robbery/killing of Mr. Moore.

"4. In fact no fingerprints were found.

"5. A preliminary hearing was held on this case on August 8, 1998, which was transcribed as per Court Order.

"6. The following exchange occurred on pages 17 and 18 of the transcript of that hearing:

"`Q. And his statement states that.... It says, Detective Signore then advised Mr. Jackson a Dairy Queen cup was found inside the vehicle, which the other three subjects were in and asked how his fingerprints got on the cup. Do you recall that statement?

"`A. I believe I may have made something... a statement similar to that, yes, sir.

"`Q. Did you, in fact, have forensics do a fingerprint analysis on a variety of this evidence?

"`A. Eventually, yes, we did.

"`Q. And I have a latent print search here which indicates one Dairy Queen cup. It says GNP and the results are negative.

"`A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

"`Q. Is it my understanding that negative means there were no fingerprints on that cup?

"`A. Yes, sir. That's my information.

"`Q. Why did you tell Mr. Jackson that you had a cup with his fingerprints on it?

"`A. Because I was conducting an investigation.

"`Q. But that wasn't true, was it?

"`A. No, sir. At that time I didn't know it to be true, no.

"`Q. So it was a lie?

"`A. Yes, sir.

"`Q. Is that a standard investigative technique with the police department?

"`A. Well, it's kind of interesting, because more times than not, the defendants come down and lie to us, so we have to use every means available to get the truth from them and sometimes we have to bend the truth or work around the truth.'

". . . .

"7. Mr. Jackson cannot be said to have voluntarily answered questions or voluntarily made a statement; but was, instead coerced into responding to the police interrogation. [Citations omitted.] The circumstances around the interrogation were coercive and the police investigator lied to the defendant about the evidence they possessed. The totality of the circumstances [shows] that the statement was involuntary and taken in violation of federal and state constitutional guarantees.

". . . .

"WHEREFORE, the defendant, Shonell[e] Andre Jackson, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to:

"(a) allow the presentation of evidence and argument on this motion;

"(b) schedule a hearing on this motion;

"(c) suppress Mr. Jackson's statement in its entirety; and

"(d) grant any other relief that is just and proper under the circumstances."

(C.R.46-48.) The trial court denied the motion, without conducting a hearing.

Jackson requested a hearing to determine the admissibility of his statement, and the trial court denied him the opportunity to present evidence. Consequently, Jackson was deprived of his chance to testify about the circumstances relating to the voluntariness of his statement. If the trial court had conducted a hearing, Jackson could have testified and presented evidence indicating that the statement was not voluntarily made, without being subjected to cross-examination on other issues. Rule 104, Ala.R.Evid. If Jackson had testified in the hearing, conflicting evidence might have been presented to rebut the state's evidence of voluntariness. Therefore, in accordance with Duncan, Smith, and Felder, we hold that the trial court erred in determining the admissibility of Jackson's statement without conducting a hearing.

Jackson argues that in light of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), and this Court's holding in Smith, this error requires that the case be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. We agree.

In Jackson v. Denno, the defendant's statement was admitted into evidence without a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to determine its admissibility. The defendant testified at trial that his statement was coerced. The trial court permitted the jury to determine the voluntariness of the statement. The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to a posttrial evidentiary hearing, rather than a new trial, to determine whether the confession was voluntary.

In Smith, the trial court admitted the defendant's statements made at the scene of the accident, without conducting a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine their admissibility. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred in not conducting a hearing outside the presence of the jury and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial. This Court, however, applying the rationale in Jackson v. Denno, ordered that the case be remanded for a evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the statements.

In accordance with Smith, we remand this case for a hearing to determine the admissibility of Jackson's statement. If, after the hearing, the trial court determines that Jackson's statement was voluntarily made and was properly admitted into evidence for the jury's consideration, a new trial is not required. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 393-94, 84 S.Ct. 1774 (stating that if the statement was properly admitted into evidence, "we see no constitutional necessity at that point for proceeding with a new trial, for [the defendant] has already been tried by a jury with the confession placed before it and has been found guilty"). However, if the trial court determines that Jackson's statement was not voluntary and therefore was not admissible into evidence, then there must be a new trial, at which the statement is not admitted into evidence.

This cause is remanded with instructions for the Court of Criminal Appeals to remand the case for a hearing in the trial court to determine the admissibility of Jackson's extrajudicial statement, in accordance with this opinion. After the trial court makes its return to the Court of Criminal Appeals, that court shall forward that return to this Court.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, LYONS, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.

SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., dissent.

STUART, Justice (dissenting).

In light of the facts in this particular case, I do not believe a remand for an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the admissibility of Jackson's...