PER CURIAM.
This is a capital murder case. A detailed statement of the facts is contained in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Johnson v. State, 507 So.2d 1337 (Ala.Cr.App.1985).
Anthony O'Hara Johnson, the defendant herein, was convicted in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County and sentenced to death for murdering William Albert Farmer while robbing him; the sentence was pursuant to § 13-11-2(a)(2), Code 1975 (repealed 1981). 1 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Johnson v. State, 399 So.2d 859 (Ala.Cr.App.1979). This Court affirmed the conviction but remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals with directions for it to order a new sentencing hearing, Johnson v. State, 399 So.2d 873 (Ala.1979), which it did, Johnson v. State, 399 So.2d 875 (Ala.Cr.App.1980). On return to remand in the Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant's conviction was reversed and the case remanded on the authority of Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala.1980). See Johnson v. State, 399 So.2d 875 (Ala.Cr.App.1981).
The defendant was again tried and convicted for the capital offense. Following a sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously recommended the death sentence. After holding a second sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction and death sentence and later overruled his application for rehearing. The defendant then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted pursuant to Rule 39(c), Ala.R.App.P. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
The defendant contends that the admission into evidence of state's exhibit "EE," a fingerprint record card, although not objected to at trial, constitutes plain error requiring reversal of his conviction. We agree.
In its opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals, after noting its scope of review in death penalty cases under Rule 45A, Ala.R.App.P., addressed the defendant's contention thusly:
"State's exhibit 'EE' was a police fingerprint card. On the front of the card are the name of the appellant Johnson, a series of police numbers and an FBI number, the fingerprints themselves, and the signature of the taker of the impressions, and the date taken. The reverse side of the fingerprint card contains the name of the appellant, his signature, the offense charged at the time the fingerprints were taken, a description, and other information. Also on the back of the card is a list of dates of arrests. The arrest list shows an arrest for burglary in 1977 followed by a release, an arrest for burglary and grand larceny in
1977 followed by a release, an arrest in 1978 for grand larceny from a person followed by a release, and the present charge of murder in 1978 followed by a delivery to the sheriff's office. The card also shows the original arrest in 1973 for robbery followed by a delivery to the sheriff's office.
"...
"As a preliminary matter, we note that fingerprints have long been held to be admissible in Alabama courts. Leonard v. State, 18 Ala.App. 427, 93 So. 56 (1922). On the other hand, it is equally well-settled that:
" 'On the trial of a person for the alleged commission of a particular crime, evidence of his doing another act, which itself is a crime, is not admissible if the only probative function of such evidence is to show his bad character, inclination or propensity to commit the type of crime for which he is being tried. This is a general exclusionary rule which prevents the introduction of prior criminal acts for the sole purpose of suggesting that the accused is more likely to be guilty of the crime in question.'
C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 69.01(1) (3rd ed. 1977), hereinafter cited as McElroy's.
"The rule is similar in this state as regards prior arrests; this court in Paul v. State, 47 Ala.App. 115, 251 So.2d 246, cert. denied, 287 Ala. 739, 251 So.2d 248 (1971), stated: 'Prior arrests of the accused on other charges which have no relevancy except as tending to show his bad character are not admissible....' Id., 47 Ala.App. at 117, 251 So.2d at 248.
"Other courts have grappled with the problem of receiving into evidence master fingerprint cards that contain a record of prior convictions or prior arrests, see e.g., United States v. Dressler, 112 F.2d 972 (7th Cir.1940). In the case of a photograph with an indication of a criminal record written on the back, our courts have approved the procedure of obliterating or covering the extraneous matter. Burkett v. State, 439 So.2d 737 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), with an admonition to the jury to 'leave it covered up.' See also Moon v. State, 22 Ariz. 418, 198 P. 288 (1921), and State v. Viola, 82 N.E.2d 306 (Ohio Ct.App.), app. dism'd, 148 Ohio St. 712, 76 N.E.2d 715 (1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 816 [68 S.Ct. 1070, 92 L.Ed. 1746] (1948). This court has held that in order to preserve error from the admission of identification material with evidence of a criminal record on the back, an objection specifically detailing the error must be made; otherwise, the error is not preserved for appellate review. Dorsey v. State, 406 So.2d 457 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). We have also held, however, in Brown v. State, 369 So.2d 881 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), that admission of a fingerprint record card such as the one employed by the Birmingham Police Department was, in that case, reversible error. 'The extraneous information contained on the exhibit reasonably implied the existence of a prior criminal record of the appellant.' Id., at 884. The court, per Judge Tyson stated:
" 'The mere existence of recorded fingerprints does not per se imply the existence of a criminal record. The error in this case was committed by showing the jury the additional extraneous and highly prejudicial information contained on the photostatic copy of the appellant's master card.... Nevertheless, we feel that the introduction of State's Exhibit Four served to place before the jury indirectly information which the State, by virtue of the appellant's not having taken the stand, was forbidden to present directly.' (Citations omitted.) Id.
"Thus the issue is presented to us as stated in Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1135 (1953):
" 'The introduction in evidence of a fingerprint record containing extraneous material which in itself is incompetent may or may not constitute reversible error, depending on such factors as whether the material was or was not seen by the jury or whether the objection thereto was waived by the defendant.'
"Addressing first the issue of whether the material was or was not seen by the jury, we note first that photocopies were made of exhibit 'EE.' Further, we note that thereafter there was a side bar conference held at the request of the defense
counsel. The state then established that the photocopy of 'EE' was a copy of the fingerprints kept in the file, so the substitutes were received into evidence. It is not clear whether a photocopy of only the front of 'EE' was received into evidence or whether a copy of both front and back were received into evidence. This may have been the subject of the side bar conference. The front of the card shows the name, 'Anthony O'Hara Johnson' and aliases, 'Tony Johnson' and 'Anthony O'Hara Johnson.' The card is signed on the back 'Anthony O'Harry Johnson.' The 'aliases' are simply versions of the principal name shown. At the left of one of the blanks on the card are the letters 'FBI' and thereafter are printed the numerals and letter constituting the FBI number. To the left of another blank are the words 'Police No.' and following that are a typed number and five handwritten numbers. The card is signed on the front by Jack T. Brand and dated 10-24-73. Admission, over proper objection, of the data on the front of a similar Birmingham Police Department master fingerprint card alone was held to be reversible error in Brown, even though the back was not in evidence. While there may be doubt whether the jury observed or examined the back of the card, we may certainly infer that they observed the front of the card. It, therefore, initially appears that Brown controls this case and requires us to again reverse the appellant's conviction. However, in Brown, the defense timely objected to the extraneous information being open to inspection by the jury, whereas in the present case, there was no such objection.
"We next consider whether the right to object to the admission of the copy of the card was waived by the appellant. In a noted fingerprint card case, United States v. Dressler, supra, the court recited that no one, not counsel for the state, counsel for the defense, nor the court, was aware of the existence of the defendant's 'criminal history' on the back of the fingerprint card. Such unknowing and unintentional exposures to the jury of such items resulted in reversals in Farese v. United States, 428 F.2d 178 (5th Cir.1970), and United States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938 (7th Cir.1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228 [103 S.Ct. 1235, 75 L.Ed.2d 468] (1983). But that situation did not occur here. The attorneys knew what was on the card. On direct examination, Officer Brand was asked whether the name of the person whose print was taken was on both sides of the card and whether the person was asked to sign the card. To both questions the witness answered affirmatively:
" 'Q: And I'll ask you, is the name of the person whose print is being taken, is it typed in or placed on this card?
" 'A: Yes, sir.
" 'Q: And are they asked to sign this particular card?
" 'A: Yes, sir.'
The signature line is on the back of the card where the arrest record appears. Brand testified that his own...
