Ex parte Kelley
Decision Date | 11 February 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 5551,5551 |
Citation | 256 P.2d 211,1953 NMSC 11,57 N.M. 161 |
Parties | Ex parte KELLEY. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Joe L. Martinez, Atty. Gen., Willard F. Kitts, Asst. Atty. Gen., N. Randolph Reese, Dist. Atty., Hobbs, for appellant.
M. W. Hamilton, Santa Fe, for appellee.
We are asked to determine whether an information charging rape on a female under the age of 16 years, contrary to Section 41-3901, New Mexico Statutes 1941 Annotated, which fails to give the name of the victim states an offense which will support a conviction. The offense charged was committed in Lea County, New Mexico, on December 20, 1949. Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a term in the state penitentiary from 70 to 99 years. The information reads:
Homer C. Kelley, Defendant.
'Information
'Mack Easley, Assistant District Attorney for the County of Lea, accuses Homer C. Kelley of rape on a female under the age of 16 years, contrary to Section 41-3901, New Mexico Statutes 1941 Annotated.
'(s) Mack Easley
'Assistant District Attorney
'Witnesses:
'Horace Owens
'A. B. Munsey
'Otis Bailey
'Gene Morris
'Mr. Blair
'Ernest Gilman
'Dr. Gillette
'Exhibit 'C'.'
The defendant was transported to the state penitentiary shortly after his plea of guilty and began serving his sentence. Thereafter and on February 20, 1952, he filed a petition in habeas corpus in the District Court of the First Judicial District sitting within and for the County of Santa Fe, that being the county in which he was imprisoned in the state penitentiary, under which he sought his release upon the primary ground that the information to which he pleaded guilty failed to state an offense. After hearing, the district court entered an order discharging the prisoner from which this appeal is prosecuted by the state under statutory authority. Incidentally, although it has no bearing on the decision of this appeal, new informations were filed in Lea County immediately after the order of discharge and the defendant was rearrested directly following his discharge. It should be stated since petitioner's counsel seeks to make some point of the matter in his argument that defendant was charged with raping three separate females under the age of 16 years on the same day.
Pertinent statutes to be considered will be set out prior to discussing the legal question involved. 1941 Comp., Sec. 41-3901, reads as follows:
'A person perpetrating rape upon or an act of sexual intercourse with a female when the female is under the age of sixteen (16) years, * * * is punishable by imprisonment for not less than one (1) nor more than ninety-nine (99) years.'
It is provided by 1941 Comp., Sec. 42-606, touching the form of information and by Sec. 42-607, as to charging an offense, as follows:
'The State of New Mexico vs. A. B.
'X. Y., _____ district attorney for the county of _____, accuses A. B. of (here charge the offense in one of the ways mentioned in section 42-607--e. g., murder (assault with intent to kill, poisoning an animal contrary to section 31 of the Penal Code)) and charges that (here the particulars of the offense may be added with a view to avoiding the necessity for a bill of particulars.)
'(a) By using the name given to the offense by the common law or by a statute.
'(b) By stating so much of the definition of the offense, either in terms of the common law or of the statute defining the offense or in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the court and the defendant notice of what offense is intended to be charged.
'(2) The indictment or information may refer to a section or subsection of any statute creating the offense charged therein, and in determining the validity or sufficiency of such indictment or information regard shall be had to such reference.'
A related statute having a bearing upon the question involved is 1941 Comp., Sec. 42-638(1)(d), which provides that no indictment or information shall be invalid or insufficient because of any uncertainty therein if it charges an offense in accordance with section 42-607. Furthermore, paragraph (3) of this section provides for a bill of particulars in the following language:
'(3) If the court is of the opinion that the defect stated in subsection 1, clause (d) exists in any indictment or information it may order that a bill of particulars be filed in accordance with section 42-608.'
Counsel for the state, the former Attorney General, Joe L. Martinez and his staff, and N. Randolph Reese, Esquire, former district attorney for the Fifth Judicial District of the State of New Mexico within and for the County of Lea, place main reliance in their claim of error on our earlier decisions in the cases of State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1, and State v. Shroyer, 49 N.M. 196, 160 P.2d 444. See, also, People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 69 A.L.R. 1378.
We think this case is controlled by the two New Mexico decisions cited next above, State v. Roy and State v. Shroyer, more especially the latter. Indeed, the Shroyer case is almost on all fours with the one now considered. There, an information charging larceny of two sheep failed to allege ownership of the stolen animals. An objection based on omission of this allegation was called to the attention of the trial judge who now is a member of this Court, Mr. Justice McGhee, whereupon he permitted an amendment by interlineation to specify the owner. But if the omission of such an allegation in the first instance was fatal, that is to say, if the information as it stood failed to charge an offense, it was not subject to amendment and several indispenable conditions to proceeding with the trial, such as waivers of preliminary hearing and of a jury, occurring prior to amendment, could not now be relied upon since the information as amended constituted an entirely new charge. We held against the contentions made and pointed out that under the liberal provisions of the reformed Rules of Criminal Procedure, a crime was charged by the information as it stood prior to amendment, reserving to defendant the right, nevertheless, to demand by bill of particulars the omitted allegation as to ownership.
So it is in the information here challenged. The name of the victim is not given, to be sure, but the offense of rape of a female under 16 years of age was charged almost in the language of the statute. It is called to our attention, however, that the defendant is charged in separate informations with raping two other females under 16 years of age on the same occasion upon invading in the nighttime the home they were occupying at a slumber party. He claims he could not know or tell which of the three he was to be charged with raping on a given setting for trial. The state answers he would have a very easy and ready means of finding out by a motion for bill of particulars.
Our Reformed Rules of Criminal Procedure, approving among other things the short form of indictment, effective July 1, 1934, and providing among other things for a bill of particulars, contained this introductory 'Interpretation by Court,' as section 35-4400 (Supplement No. 2, page 1) reading:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Weddle
...for the release of a prisoner upon application for writ of habeas corpus. See Ex parte Selig, 29 N.M. 430, 223 P. 97; Ex parte Kelley, 57 N.M. 161, 256 P.2d 211; Smith v. Abram, 58 N.M. 404, 271 P.2d 1010; and Johnson v. Cox, 72 N.M. 55, 380 P.2d It is, accordingly, apparent that habeas cor......
-
State v. Graves
...of the furnishing of a bill of particulars, if requested. In State v. Shroyer, 1945, 49 N.M. 196, 160 P.2d 444; Ex parte Kelley, 1953, 57 N.M. 161, 256 P.2d 211; State v. Roessler, 1954, 58 N.M. 102, 266 P.2d 351, and State v. Romero, 1961, 69 N.M. 187, 365 P.2d 58, attacks on the informati......
-
State v. Brown
...Paul Brown had desired clarification of the charge against him, he could have asked the court for a bill of particulars. Ex parte Kelley, 57 N.M. 161, 256 P.2d 211; State v. Shroyer, 49 N.M. 196, 160 P.2d 444; State v. Roy, supra. The record is devoid of any request by appellants for a bill......
-
Roehm v. Woodruff
...court possessed jurisdiction of the parties, jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the power to impose the sentence. Ex part Kelley, 57 N.M. 161, 256 P.2d 211; Smith v. Abram, 58 N.M. 404, 271 P.2d 1010, We readily conclude the trial court was vested with both jurisdiction and the power. ......