Ex parte Key

Decision Date27 June 2003
Citation890 So.2d 1056
PartiesEx parte Ralph Lynn KEY. (In re Ralph Lynn Key v. State of Alabama).
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

J. William Cole, Birmingham; and Sondra K. McDaniel, Birmingham, for petitioner.

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Andy S. Poole and Cecil G. Brendle, asst. attys. gen., for respondent.

SEE, Justice.

This case comes before this Court on a petition for the writ of certiorari. Ralph Lynn Key asks this Court to reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of his conviction on charges of manslaughter and of leaving the scene of an accident in which someone was injured, violations of § 13A-6-2(3), Ala.Code 1975, and § 32-10-1, Ala.Code 1975. Key v. State, [Ms. CR-00-0305, March 1, 2002] 890 So.2d 1043 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). We reverse Key's manslaughter conviction, and we remand the case with instructions as to Key's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.

On March 28, 1997, Brian Rollo was struck by an automobile and was seriously injured. On October 2, 1998, approximately 18 months after the accident, Rollo died as a result of complications from his injuries.

On November 6, 1998, the Jefferson County grand jury indicted Ralph Lynn Key for murder, § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975; reckless murder, § 13A-6-2(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975; and leaving the scene of an accident in which someone was injured, § 32-10-1, Ala.Code 1975. The State moved the trial court to abrogate the common-law year-and-a-day rule and to allow it to proceed with the murder charges against Key. The common-law year-and-a-day rule stipulates that "a defendant can be prosecuted for homicide only if the victim dies within one year and a day of the defendant's wrongful act." Woods v. State, 709 So.2d 1340, 1346-47 n. 3 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). Key moved the trial Court to dismiss the murder indictment based on the operation of that rule. On December 20, 1999, the trial court denied Key's motion and granted the State's request to proceed on the murder charge, thereby abrogating the year-and-a-day rule.

At Key's trial, the testimony of Joy Tolbert placed Key in the car that struck Rollo. Tolbert testified that she had dated both Rollo and Key. She testified that she married Key two or three days after Rollo was hit by the car, but that she later learned that her marriage to Key was void because Key had never divorced Patricia Key. Tolbert testified that on the night of March 28, 1997, she, Rollo, and Key were out together drinking, playing pool, and driving around in Key's car. Tolbert recalled that the three had had a lot to drink. Tolbert testified that she was driving, but that she had stopped the car so that Key could "get out and use the bathroom." Tolbert testified that when Key returned to the car, she and Key started fighting and Key was hitting her and grabbing her. In order to get away from Key, Tolbert got out of the car and ran down a hill. Tolbert recalled that it was very dark, that when she looked up the hill she saw someone fall and she heard tires squealing and then what sounded like thunder. Tolbert also testified that Key later told her that he had to back the car up in order to get Rollo out from under the car. Key was not present at the accident scene when the police arrived.

On cross-examination, Tolbert testified that a police investigator had interviewed her nearly a year after the incident, that the investigator had tape-recorded her statement, and that she had seen a transcript of the tape-recorded statement. Tolbert also testified that the investigator was the first person to whom she reported that Key had told her that he had to back the car up in order to get Rollo out from under it. Defense counsel then asked the court to order the State to allow defense counsel see a copy of the transcript of the interview, or, in the alternative, for the judge to review the transcript in camera. The trial court denied both requests.

Dr. Charles Wiggins had treated Rollo at a long-term care facility in Tennessee. Dr. Wiggins testified that Rollo died of complications from the injuries he had received when he was struck by the car. The State offered into evidence during Dr. Wiggins's testimony medical records from Rollo's initial treatment at an emergency room in Birmingham. Wiggins did not treat Rollo in Birmingham and did not, himself, produce any of the records from the Birmingham hospital. Key objected to the introduction of the medical records on the basis that the records were not properly authenticated, but the trial court admitted them over the defense's objection.

Ruby Hunter, Key's aunt, testified at trial that she had seen Key on the night of the accident, but that she could not remember what Key told her that night. To refresh her recollection, the State showed Hunter a transcript of her grand-jury testimony in this case. She testified at trial that reading the transcript of her grand-jury testimony did not help her memory. The State moved to have her grand-jury testimony read to the jury. Key objected, and the Court overruled his objection. Hunter had testified before the grand jury that on the night of the accident Key told her that he had run over someone and had hurt the person badly. Hunter had testified before the grand jury more than a year after Rollo was struck by the car.

Phyllis Rollan, a forensic scientist at the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences, testified that she was unable to identify any of the samples taken from Key's car as being human blood, and that she was unable to perform any DNA analysis on any of the material taken from Key's car.

On September 7, 2000, a jury found Key guilty of manslaughter and of leaving the scene of an accident in which someone was injured, violations, respectively, of § 13A-6-2(3), Ala.Code 1975, and § 32-10-1, Ala.Code 1975. The trial court sentenced Key as an habitual offender to life imprisonment for the manslaughter conviction and to 99 years' imprisonment for the conviction for leaving the scene of an accident, the sentences to run concurrently. Key appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions on all charges. Key v. State, supra. Key petitioned this Court for the writ of certiorari, which we granted.

Key argues (1) that the trial court erred when it abrogated the year-and-a-day rule and that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's judgment abrogating that rule; (2) that even if the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in abrogating the year-and-a-day rule, any change in the rule may not be applied retrospectively to him; (3) that the trial court erred in not conducting an in camera inspection of the transcript of Joy Tolbert's statement to the investigator; (4) that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Ruby Hunter's grand-jury testimony; and (5) that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the medical records from Rollo's treatment at the emergency room on the night of the accident.

This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de novo. We review issues concerning the admission of evidence to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion.

The Year-and-a-Day Rule

The State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible error when it abrogated the year-and-a-day rule, because, the State argues, the Legislature abolished the year-and-a-day rule in 1977 when it reenacted the Criminal Code without expressly providing for the rule in the new Criminal Code. The State notes that § 13A-2-5(a), Ala.Code 1975, defines what constitutes "causation" of a criminal act; §§ 13A-3-1 through 13A-3-31, Ala.Code 1975, codify defenses based on a person's responsibility for a crime; and § 13A-6-2, Ala.Code 1975, defines the offense of murder. The State argues that because none of those sections mentions the year-and-a-day rule, the rule is not a part of the Criminal Code.

Key, however, asserts that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's judgment abrogating the year-and-a-day rule. He argues that because the Legislature did not expressly abolish the common-law year-and-a-day rule when it reenacted the Criminal Code in 1977, that common-law rule remains viable in Alabama law.

The main opinion in the Court of Criminal Appeals, authored by Presiding Judge McMillan, rejected the State's argument that the Legislature had abolished the year-and-a-day rule when it reenacted the Criminal Code: "The year-and-a-day rule is a part of the common law of this State. `Pursuant to the common law rule, a defendant can be prosecuted for homicide only if the victim dies within one year and a day of the defendant's wrongful act.'" Key v. State, 890 So.2d at 1046 (quoting Woods v. State, 709 So.2d 1340, 1346-47 n. 3 (Ala.Crim.App.1997)).1

Section 1-3-1, Ala.Code 1975, provides:

"The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be altered or repealed by the Legislature."

Therefore, the year-and-a-day rule, which was a part of the common law of Alabama when the current Criminal Code was enacted in 1977, remains a part of that common law unless the Legislature has "altered or repealed" it.

By Act No. 607, Ala. Acts 1977, Act No. 770, Ala. Acts 1978, and Act No. 79-125, Ala. Acts 1979, the Legislature adopted and subsequently amended the Criminal Code. The Criminal Code is found in Title 13A of the Code of Alabama 1975. Section 13A-1-4, Ala.Code 1975, states: "No act or omission is a crime unless made so by this title or by other applicable statute or lawful ordinance." The Commentary to § 13A-1-4, Ala.Code 1975, states:

"The original draft of this section included an explicit provision to abolish common law crimes, which is a feature of most modern criminal
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
105 cases
  • Woods v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • April 29, 2016
    ...a Rule 32 petition is a question of law. ‘The standard of review for pure questions of law in criminal cases is de novo. Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003).’ " Ex parte Beckworth, 190 So.3d at 573. Last, "this Court may affirm the judgment of the circuit court for any reason, eve......
  • Barber v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • May 27, 2005
    ... ... Although the lack of an objection at trial will not bar our review of an issue in a case involving the death penalty, it will weigh against any claim of prejudice the appellant may raise. See Ex parte Kennedy, 472 So.2d 1106 (Ala.1985). Rule 45A, Ala. R.App. P., provides: ...         "In all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings under review ... whenever such error has or probably has ... ...
  • Lockhart v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • April 23, 2021
    ...a Rule 32 petition is a question of law. 'The standard of review for pure questions of law in criminal cases is de novo. Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003).' " Ex parte Beckworth, 190 So. 3d 571, 573 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Ex parte Lamb, 113 So. 3d 686, 689 (Ala. 2011)). Further,......
  • Phillips v. State (In re Phillips)
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • October 19, 2018
    ...(some footnotes omitted).I. Standard of Review "This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de novo." Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Ala. 2003). Further, " ‘[u]nder the ore tenus standard of review, we must assume the trial court's factual finding ... was correct, and t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • §31.01 HOMICIDE
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Chapter 31 Criminal Homicide
    • Invalid date
    ...Code § 194 (2015) (creating a rebuttable presumption that a killing after three years and a day is not criminal); contra, Ex parte Kay, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1060 (Ala. 2003) (state legislature's silence regarding the year-and-a-day rule when it enacted the modern penal code means that the lawma......
  • § 31.01 Homicide
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2022 Title Chapter 31 Criminal Homicide
    • Invalid date
    ...Code § 194 (2015) (creating a rebuttable presumption that a killing after three years and a day is not criminal); contra, Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1060 (Ala. 2003) (state legislature's silence regarding the year-and-a-day rule when it enacted the modern penal code means that the lawma......
  • § 3.02 Modern Role of the Common Law
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2022 Title Chapter 3 Sources of the Criminal Law
    • Invalid date
    ...See § 31.01[C], infra.[20] 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2003).[21] E.g., United States v. Chase, 18 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1994); Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056 (Ala. 2003) (in the absence of express evidence, the state legislature's enactment of a new criminal code did not abolish the common law year-......
  • § 3.02 MODERN ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2018 Title Chapter 3 Sources of the Criminal Law
    • Invalid date
    ...See § 31.01[C], infra.[19] . 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2003).[20] . E.g., United States v. Chase, 18 F.3d 1166 (4th Cir. 1994); Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056 (Ala. 2003) (in the absence of express evidence, the state legislature's enactment of a new criminal code did not abolish the common law y......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT