Ex parte King

• Decision Date: 23 April 2010
• Docket Number: 1090295.
• Citation: 50 So.3d 1056
• Parties: Ex parte Attorney General Troy KING et al. (In re Justin Price et al. v. Attorney General Troy King et al.).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

50 So.3d 1056

Ex parte Attorney General Troy KING et al.(In re Justin Price et al.

v.Attorney General Troy King et al.).

1090295.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 23, 2010.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Corey L. Maze, James W. Davis, andWilliam G. Parker, Jr., asst. attys. gen., for petitioners.

Edgar C. Gentle III, K. Edward Sexton II, Mark Englehart, and Diandra Debrosse Burnley of Gentle, Turner & Sexton, Birmingham, for respondents.

STUART, Justice.

Justin Price, Charles D. James, Colonel Stone Johnson, James Armstrong, Georgia Gray Hampton, Walter Brown, Jr., Tommie Lee Houston, Frederick D. Richardson, Jr., and Kenneth P. Marshall ("the plaintiffs"), purporting to represent a class made up of Alabama voters, sued, in their official capacities, Attorney General Troy King, Lieutenant Governor Jim Folsom, Jr., President Pro Tempore of the Alabama Senate Hinton Mitchem, Speaker of the Alabama House Seth Hammett, and Secretary of State Beth Chapman (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the State defendants"), alleging that they failed to ensure that the current Alabama Constitution ("the 1901 Constitution") was ever properly ratified. In fact, the plaintiffs allege, ratification of the 1901 Constitution was obtained only through voter fraud, and they therefore argue that, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 1901 Constitution should be declared void and that an injunction should be entered prohibiting the State defendants from enforcing the provisions of the 1901 Constitution. The trial court denied the State defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action; the State defendants now petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the action. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

I.

On February 4, 2009, the plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint in the Bessemer Division of the Jefferson Circuit Court. The gravamen of their complaint was the allegation that, in 1901, election officials in 12 "black belt counties" ¹ manipulated election returns to ensure that the 1901 Constitution received sufficient votes to be ratified. The plaintiffs supported their complaint with the affidavit of Wayne Flynt, a professor of history at Auburn University. Flynt stated in his affidavit that the goal of the Constitutional Convention of 1901 was to produce a new constitution to maintain white supremacy in the government of Alabama and that the constitution drafted at the convention sought to achieve that end by disenfranchising African-American citizens through the use of poll taxes and residency, literacy, and property-owning requirements. The 1901 Constitution was ultimately ratified by a statewide vote of 108,613 to 81,734 on the strength of the vote in 12 black belt counties that voted in favor of ratification 36,224 to 5,471, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of voters in those counties at that time was African-American and that the ratification of the 1901 Constitution was largely contrary to the interests of African-Americans. Flynt states that African-Americans in other parts of Alabama voted overwhelmingly against the ratification of the 1901 Constitution and that it is far more likely that the election returns in the 12 black belt counties were the product of fraud than a desire on the part of the African-American voters in those black belt counties, in effect, to disenfranchise themselves. He accordingly concludes that the 1901 Constitution was never properly ratified, and the plaintiffs in their complaint have adopted his argument and reasoning, asking the court to declare the 1901 Constitution void and to issue a permanent injunction prohibiting the Statedefendants from seeking to enforce its provisions.

Upon receiving the plaintiffs' complaint, the State defendants moved to transfer the action to the Montgomery Circuit Court and, after the plaintiffs consented to the transfer, the trial court transferred the case on April 28, 2009. The State defendants thereafter filed an answer and moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing generally that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On October 7, 2009, the trial court entered an order granting the State defendants' motion to dismiss; however, on October 9, 2009, the trial court vacated that order and scheduled a hearing for November 3, 2009. On October 16, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion opposing the State defendants' motion to dismiss and, on October 30, 2009, the State defendants filed their reply brief. At the conclusion of the November 3, 2009, hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the State defendants' motion to dismiss.

On November 24, 2009, the State defendants petitioned this Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs' action. On January 27, 2010, we ordered the plaintiffs to file a response. The plaintiffs filed their response on February 11, 2010, the day after filing an amended complaint in the trial court modifying the putative class to include only African-American voters in Alabama, and identifying with more particularity the injuries they alleged they had suffered.² The State defendants filed their response to the plaintiffs' petition on February 17, 2010.

II.

"As this Court has consistently held, the writ of mandamus is a

" ' "drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." '

" Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.2002) (quoting Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala.1993)). ' "In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss by means of a mandamus petition, we do not change our standard of review...." ' Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 937 So.2d 56, 57 (Ala.2006) (quoting Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d 928, 931 (Ala.2003)).

" 'In Newman v. Savas, 878 So.2d 1147 (Ala.2003), this Court set out the standard of review of a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction:

" ' "A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed without a presumption of correctness. Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993). This Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So.2d 285, 288 (Ala.2002). Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss we will not consider whether the pleader will ultimately prevail but whether the pleader may possibly prevail. Nance, 622 So.2d at 299."

" '878 So.2d at 1148-49.'" Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So.2d 557, 563 (Ala.2005). We construe all doubts regarding the sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Drummond Co., 937 So.2d at 58."

Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 20-21 (Ala.2007).

III.

In their petition for the writ of mandamus, the State defendants argue that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint because, they allege, the trial court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction. ³ The trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the State defendants argue, because: (1) the plaintiffs lack standing; (2) there is no statute that authorizes an "election contest" such as this; and (3) the complaint raises a nonjusticiable political question. As explained subsequently, we agree that the plaintiffs lack standing; accordingly, we need not consider the State defendants' latter two arguments at this time.

In Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children, 904 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Ala.2004), this Court explained the standing requirement as follows:

" 'To say that a person has standing is to say that that person is the proper party to bring the action. To be a proper party, the person must have a real, tangible legal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit.' Doremus v. Business Council of Alabama Workers' Comp. Self-Insurers Fund, 686 So.2d 252, 253 (Ala.1996). 'Standing ... turns on "whether the party has been injured in fact and whether the injury is to a legally protected right." ' [ State v. Property at ] 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d [1025,] 1027 [ (Ala.1999) ] (quoting Romer v. Board of County Comm'rs of the County of Pueblo, 956 P.2d 566, 581 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting)) (emphasis omitted). In the absence of such an injury, there is no case or controversy for a court to consider. Therefore, were a court to make a binding judgment on an underlying issue in spite of absence of injury, it would be exceeding the scope of its authority and intruding into the province of the Legislature. See City of Daphne v. City of Spanish Fort, 853 So.2d 933, 942 (Ala.2003) ('The power of the judiciary ... is "the power to declare finally the rights of the parties, in a particular case or controversy...." ' (quoting Ex parte Jenkins, 723 So.2d 649, 656 (Ala.1998))); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) ('[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.')."

Traditionally, Alabama courts have focused primarily on the injury claimed by the aggrieved party to determine whether that party has standing; however, in 2003 this Court adopted the following, more precise, rule regarding standing based upon the test used by the Supreme Court of the United States:

"A party establishes standing to bring a [constitutional] challenge ... when it demonstrates the existence of (1) an actual, concrete and particularized 'injury in fact'—'an invasion of a legally protected interest'; (2) a 'causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of'; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130,

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