Ex parte Krothapalli

• Decision Date: 18 February 2000
• Citation: 762 So.2d 836
• Parties: Ex parte Radha K. KROTHAPALLI, M.D. (Re Jeanne McCluskey, as administratrix of the estate of Robert Vernon McCluskey, deceased v. Dr. Radha K. Krothapalli).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

762 So.2d 836

Ex parte Radha K. KROTHAPALLI, M.D.

(Re Jeanne McCluskey, as administratrix of the estate of Robert Vernon McCluskey, deceased v. Dr. Radha K. Krothapalli).

1981354.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

February 18, 2000.

Frank J. Stakely and Ben C. Wilson of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for petitioner.

Kathryn H. Sumrall and Carrie D. Thornburgh of Garrison & Sumrall, P.C., Birmingham, for respondent.

MADDOX, Justice.

The question presented by this petition for the writ of mandamus is whether certain records of two hospitals relating to a staff physician are privileged under state law and, therefore, not subject to discovery. The trial judge held that the records were discoverable. We conclude that she erred. Therefore, we grant the petition for a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to vacate her orders compelling discovery and to quash the subpoenas for the records.

Jeanne McCluskey, as personal representative of the estate of Robert V. McCluskey, filed a wrongful-death action against Dr. Radha Krothapalli, alleging medical malpractice on the part of Dr. Krothapalli—that Dr. Krothapalli had breached the applicable duty of care by failing to adequately and properly treat Robert McCluskey—and that this breach had caused Robert McCluskey's death.

On February 19, 1999, the plaintiff filed notices of intent to serve subpoenas on the operators of two hospitals, Baptist Medical Center and Columbia Regional Medical Center.¹ Dr. Krothapalli is a member of the medical staff at both of these hospitals. Through the subpoenas, the plaintiff sought to obtain the "personnel files of Dr. Krothapalli, including, but not limited to, all contracts of employment and privileges between Dr. Krothapalli" and the two hospitals. On March 2, 1999, Dr. Krothapalli timely filed a motion to quash the subpoenas, or, alternatively, a motion for a protective order, based upon Alabama's peerreview statute, § 22-21-8, Ala.Code 1975, arguing that the records the plaintiff sought were not personnel files, but were instead credentialing files regarding Dr. Krothapalli's medical-staff privileges and that under the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 22-21-8(b),² those records were privileged and therefore not subject to discovery.

The trial judge denied the motion to quash the subpoenas and ordered the two hospitals to deliver the personnel files directly to the trial court for an in camera inspection. Following an in camera review of the files, the trial judge issued an order stating that all the materials in the files were subject to subpoena by the plaintiff. Dr. Krothapalli filed this petition for a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to vacate her orders and to quash the subpoenas.

Are the records reviewed by the trial judge credentialing records and, therefore, exempt from discovery by operation of § 22-21-8(b), Ala.Code 1975? We conclude that they are.

In construing a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature as that intent is expressed through the language of the statute. See BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. Hopkins, 678 So.2d 1052, 1054 (Ala.1996). The intent of the Legislature in adopting a statute may be gleaned from considering the language used, the reason and necessity for the statute, and the goals the Legislature sought to accomplish. Id. Section 22-21-8 was enacted as Act No. 81-801, Ala. Acts 1981. The title to that Act reads: "To provide for the confidentiality of all written materials and activities concerning the accreditation, quality assurance, or similar function of any hospital, clinic, or medical staff."

In construing this statute, we adopt the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court and the South Carolina Supreme Court in the following cases, in which those courts construed peer-review statutes substantially similar to § 22-21-8.

In Cruger v. Love, 599 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1992), the Florida Supreme Court, construing Florida's peer-review statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 766.101(5) (1989), stated:

"The Florida Legislature enacted these peer review statutes in an effort to control the escalating cost of health care by encouraging self-regulation by the medical profession through peer review and evaluation. In order to make meaningful peer review possible, the legislature provided a guarantee of confidentiality for the peer review process....

". . . .

"... While we recognize[ ] ... that the discovery privilege [impinges] upon the rights of litigants to obtain information helpful or even essential to their cases, we assume[ ] that the legislature balanced that against the benefits offered by effective self-policing by the medical community.

"We hold that the privilege provided by [the peer-review statutes] protects any document considered by the committee or board as part of its decision-making process. The policy of encouraging full candor in peer review proceedings is advanced only if all documents considered by the committee or board during the peer review or credentialing process are protected. Committee members and those providing information to the committee must be able to operate without fear of reprisal. Similarly, it is essential that doctors seeking hospital privileges disclose all pertinent information to the committee. Physicians who fear that information provided in an application might someday be used against them by a third party will be reluctant to fully detail matters that the committee should consider."

599 So.2d at 113-14. (Citation omitted.)

Similarly, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in McGee v. Bruce Hosp. System, 312 S.C. 58, 439 S.E.2d 257 (1993), explained:

"The overriding public policy of the confidentiality statute is to encourage health care professionals to monitor the competency and professional conduct of their peers to safeguard and improve the quality of patient care. The underlying purpose behind the confidentiality statute is not to facilitate the prosecution of civil actions, but to promote complete candor and open discussion among participants in the peer review process....

". . . .

"We find that the public interest in candid professional peer review proceedings should prevail over the litigant's need for information from the most convenient source."

312 S.C. at 61-62, 439 S.E.2d at 259-60. (Citations omitted.)

It seems clear to us, as it did to the Supreme Courts of Florida and South Carolina, that the purpose of a peer-review statute is to encourage full candor in peer-review proceedings and that this policy is advanced only if all documents considered by the committee or board during the peer-review or credentialing process are protected. In the title to Act ...