Ex parte O'Leary, 4602.
Citation | 53 F.2d 956 |
Decision Date | 29 October 1931 |
Docket Number | No. 4602.,4602. |
Parties | Ex parte O'LEARY et al. O'LEARY et al. v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Philip A. McHugh, for appellants.
L. H. Bancroft, U. S. Atty., of Richland Center, Wis., for the United States.
Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and SPARKS, Circuit Judges.
Appellants were convicted and sentenced on a charge of conspiring to commit an offense in alleged violation of section 37 of the Criminal Code (18 USCA § 88). They appealed to this court. Pending the appeal, they applied for and secured leave to have the record returned while they presented a motion for a new trial. The motion was denied, and the appeal was again presented to this court. No bill of exceptions was ever settled, and ultimately the appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court denied an application for a writ of certiorari. While serving their sentences, appellants filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and moved for the issuance of the writ. The District Court denied the petition April 4, 1931. Upon the same day, an appeal was prayed, which apparently was not allowed. On July 1st, the court made three orders. One order granted leave to petitioners to amend the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Another order denied petitioners' motion to reopen the cause for additional proofs. The third order read: "It Is Ordered by the Court that said appeal be and hereby is allowed."
The order authorizing the appeal does not say from what order the appeal is taken. Appellants, in their prayer for appeal, failed to state from what order the appeal was sought. They said:
The assignments of error referred to related to the order of the 4th of April, which order denied appellants' petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. But such order was not a final disposition of the habeas corpus proceedings, and therefore was not appealable.
Moreover, petitioners' application to amend their petition on July 1st, followed by the granting of their motion, left the record with the cause still pending in the District Court. The transcript does not contain the petition upon which the court acted in April. We are therefore unable to pass upon the sufficiency of that petition. It necessarily follows that there is no appealable order before us for review, nor is there a record which presents the question appellants desire us to review.
However, we are going to assume that the question is properly before us that we may consider the merits of appellants' case. The asserted basis for the writ is the insufficiency of the indictment upon which appellants were convicted and sentenced. The attack upon the indictment is predicated upon the ruling of the court in United States v. Dietrich (C. C.) 126 F. 664, and is directed to the proposition that a conspiracy to commit the crime of bribery by two persons, who are the alleged conspirators, fails if it be shown that the bribery has been completed.
It seems to us, however, that the decision in United States v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140, 145, 35 S. Ct. 271, 59 L. Ed. 504, L. R. A. 1915D, 281, disposes of the question contrary to the contention of appellants. Reference to the decisions of other courts is hardly necessary in view of the language of the Supreme Court in this case. It is true that there was a dissenting opinion in this case, adopted by two judges, which relied in part upon the decision of United States v. Dietrich, supra. But the language of the majority opinion governs and is binding upon us. In the majority opinion, on page 145 of 236 U. S., 35 S. Ct. 271, 272, the court says:
To the cases cited might be added others. See note 4 to section 91, title 18, USCA.
To determine whether only the officer could commit the offense which was one of the objects of the conspiracy, we must look to the statutes. Section 207, title 18, USCA, defines the offense of an officer accepting a bribe. Only the officer receiving the money is guilty of the offense defined. Section 91, title 18, USCA, defines the offense of bribing a United States officer. Only the person who gives the bribe is guilty of the offense therein defined.
Appellants' argument necessarily assumed that the conspirators named in this indictment were both...
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