Ex Parte Lee

Decision Date22 April 1936
Docket NumberNo. 6699.,6699.
Citation93 S.W.2d 720
PartiesEx parte LEE et al.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Hardy Hollers, formerly Asst. Dist. Atty., of Austin, for respondent Sheriff Lee O. Allen.

SHARP, Justice.

On March 16, 1934, W. Edward Lee and R. H. Still were found guilty of contempt by violating a restraining order previously issued by the Honorable C. A. Wheeler, judge of the Fifty-Third district court of Travis county, at Austin, and W. Edward Lee was fined $25 and costs, and R. H. Still was fined $10 and costs, and both were committed to the custody of the sheriff of Travis county. They seek by original habeas corpus proceeding release from such commitment. This writ was issued on the application of relators, Lee and Still.

The controlling facts are as follows: On February 21, 1934, the Railroad Commission issued an order granting R. H. Still and wife, Mary Still, a permit to drill a well for oil and gas on a tract of 1.52 acres of land, situated in Gregg county. On February 26, 1934, the Gulf Production Company, in cause No. 53549, instituted suit in the Fifty-Third district court of Travis county, Tex., against the Railroad Commission and its members, R. H. Still and Mary Still, and the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation: (1) To set aside and annul the permit issued by the Railroad Commission to drill a well on the tract of land aforesaid, because the permit violated rule 37, which had been adopted by the Railroad Commission relating to the production of oil and gas; (2) for a temporary restraining order against the Stills and the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation, restraining them from attempting to drill a well on the 1.52-acre tract of land, and for a temporary injunction upon hearing; (3) for judgment for title and possession to the oil and gas in and under said 1.52 acres of land; and (4) for reformation of the oil and gas lease so as to include said 1.52 acres of land. The pleadings with respect to rule 37 in part read as follows:

"XII. That on November 26, 1919, defendant Commission made, promulgated and adopted Rule 37 governing the spacing of wells for oil and gas in Texas, which said rule was in full force and effect on November 19, 1930, when defendants, Still, executed said oil and gas mining lease, as aforesaid, and was made and delivered in view of said rule, reads as follows, to-wit:

"`Rule 37: No well for oil and gas shall hereafter be drilled nearer than Three Hundred (300) feet to any other completed or drilling well on the same or adjoining tract or farm; and no well shall be drilled nearer than One Hundred and Fifty (150) feet to any property line; provided, that the Commission, in order to prevent waste or to protect vested rights, will grant exceptions permitting drilling within shorter distances than the above described, upon application filed fully stating the facts, notice thereof having first been given to all adjacent lessees affected thereby. Rule 37 shall not for the present be enforced within proven salt dome fields.'

"Plaintiff says that the lands involved herein are not situated within a proven salt dome field.

"That at the time defendants, Still, attempted to convey to the defendant, Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation, a leasehold estate in, on and to said 1.52 acres of land, the Rule 37 above alleged had been amended so as to prohibit the drilling of wells for oil and gas in the East Texas field in which the involved land is situated at a nearer distance than 330 feet to property lines, and 660 feet to drilling or producing wells. That said 1.52 acre tract is not so shaped as to be susceptible of being drilled under Rule 37 as originally promulgated, or any amendment thereafter adopted because said strip is approximately 752.5 feet long and varies in width from 114.1 feet and less, culminating in a point at the South end thereof. That said 1.52 acre tract in conjunction with the said 185 acre tract, is capable of being fully developed under and in strict accord with said Rule 37 and its amendments governing the East Texas field.

"XIII. Plaintiff says that the order complained of issued, as aforesaid, by the defendant Commission granting defendants, Still, a permit to drill said 1.52 acre tract, is in violation of its Rule 37, and without authority in law in that it is an order of defendant Commission purporting to grant to defendants, Still, the right to drill a well on lands within the physical possession of plaintiff, held by it under a claim of right, and is arbitrary and discriminatory in that same was granted to the defendants, Still, only upon evidence that defendants, Still, claimed title to the 1.52 acre strip of land, and necessitated an adjudication by the Commission of the title to said land, or the leasehold estate in and to the same, which the Railroad Commission has no authority in law to determine and adjudicate, and it being unquestionably shown at said hearing that plaintiff was in actual, physical possession of said land, holding same under a claim of right, and that said order of the defendant Commission is void and of no force and effect, and should be so declared by decree of this Court."

The foregoing petition was verified, and a hearing thereon was set for March 2, 1934. On February 26, 1934, the court in chambers issued a temporary restraining order restraining R. H. Still and Mary Still and the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation from drilling, and attempting to drill, a well for oil and gas on the 1.52 acres of land, effective until March 2, 1934, the date set for hearing on the petition filed by the Gulf Production Company. No bond was required.

On February 20, 1934, the Stills and the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation as plaintiffs, filed a suit in the district court of Gregg county, in cause No. 2693-b, seeking an injunction against the Gulf Production Company from interfering with the plaintiffs in drilling their well on said 1.52 acres of land, and for damages. On February 24, 1934, plaintiffs filed in the same cause their first amended original petition, praying for the same relief. On this date the district court of Gregg county granted a temporary injunction restraining the Gulf Production Company, and its agents and employees, from interfering with paintiffs in drilling their well. On March 1, 1934, plaintiffs in the Gregg county suit filed their first supplemental petition, setting up the action that had been taken in the Travis county court and praying for an order restraining the Gulf Production Company, its representatives et al., from further prosecuting said cause in Travis county. On that date the district judge of Gregg county issued a temporary restraining order, which was served on March 2, 1934. On March 2, 1934, the Stills and the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation filed in the Travis county court their pleas of privilege. On the same day the Travis county court, of its own motion, after it appeared that the Gulf Production Company had been restrained by the Gregg county court from further prosecuting this cause against the Stills and the Powder Horn Corporation, continued its temporary restraining order of February 26, 1934, in full force, and also on that date issued its temporary restrainin order restraining the Stills and the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation from drilling, and attempting to drill, a well for oil and gas on the 1.52 acres of land, effective until March 10, 1934. On March 5, 1934, a hearing was had in the Gregg county proceedings, after which the court, on March 7, 1934, issued a temporary injunction restraining the Gulf Production Company and its agents from interfering with the plaintffs in drilling their well, and from further prosecuting cause No. 53549 in the district court of Travis county, in so far as said cause was for injunctive relief against the Stills and the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation. On March 10, 1934, an instrument entitled "Statement For Information of Court," which was verified, was filed by the Gulf Production Company, through its attorneys, stating that the defendants to their suit, other than the Railroad Commission, were proceeding in the actual drilling of a well for the production of oil upon said 1.52 acres of land. On the same date the district court of Travis county, of its own motion, granted a restraining order without bond, prohibiting the Stills and the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation from drilling the well. On the same date the district court of Travis county entered an order reciting that it had come to the knowledge of the court that R. H. Still and Mary Still and W. Edward Lee, an officer and agent of the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation, had violated the court's restraining order, and commanding them to appear on March 16, 1934, and show cause, if any, why they should not be adjudged and held in contempt of court. On March 16, 1934, a hearing was had, and W. Edward Lee and R. H. Still were adjudged and held in contempt of court, and committed to the custody of the sheriff of Travis county as above indicated.

The judge, in summing up his conclusions, said: "The Gulf Production Company brought suit here against the Railroad Commission and against the Powder Horn Petroleum Corporation and R. H. Still. They did not ask for a temporary injunction, but they said the matter was rather urgent, and they asked for it to be set down for a hearing; and I issued a temporary restraining order holding the matter up until the temporary injunction could be heard. I granted that order and set it for hearing on March 2. On March 2, the Gulf's attorneys were here and Mr. Lee was here representing the Powder Horn...

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  • Ex parte Shields
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • December 22, 1976
    ...time or in an improper manner do not render the proceeding void. Ex parte Duncan, 127 Tex. 507, 95 S.W.2d 675 (1936); Ex parte Lee, 127 Tex. 256, 93 S.W.2d 720 (1936); 27 Tex.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 11, p. 674; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 36, p. It is observed that Article 26.04, Vernon's An......
  • Davis v. Gillen, 4658
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    ...decisions cited hereinafter, see particularly City of Dallas v. Wright, 120 Tex. 190, 36 S.W.2d 973, 77 A.L.R. 709, and Ex parte Lee & Still, 127 Tex. 256, 93 S.W.2d 720. (3) The trial court, as we stated in the opinion now on file, was justified in assuming that the defendants would contin......
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    ...with them in interest, in `privity' with them, represented by them or subject to their control." In the case of Ex parte Lee and Still, 127 Tex. 256, 93 S.W.2d 720, 723, this Court said: "In habeas corpus proceedings this court is restricted to the inquiry whether or not the trial court had......
  • Ring Energy v. Trey Res., Inc.
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    ...to enforce its earlier judgment, or whether acts complained of were taken under newly issued drilling permits); Ex parte Lee , 127 Tex. 256, 93 S.W.2d 720, 723–24 (1936) (deciding in habeas proceeding whether Travis County trial court had authority to hold party in contempt for violating it......
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