Ex parte Littlepage
Decision Date | 16 February 2001 |
Citation | 796 So.2d 298 |
Parties | Ex parte Thomas D. LITTLEPAGE. (Re Thomas D. Littlepage v. Renee W. Littlepage). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Richard E. Shields of McCleave, Roberts, Shields & Green, P.C., Mobile, for petitioner.
Grady R. Edmondson, Mobile, for respondent.
Thomas Littlepage ("the husband") and Renee Littlepage ("the wife") were divorced on December 3, 1997. On April 23, 1998, the wife filed a "Motion for Rule Nisi" to require the husband to pay debts she said were covered by the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce judgment. After an ore tenus proceeding, the trial court ordered the husband to pay $14,398.78 in additional debts not stipulated by the settlement agreement, even though it comprehensively addressed each party's rights to and obligations for the payment of debts. The husband appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court without an opinion on January 28, 2000. Littlepage v. Littlepage (No. 2981261), 790 So.2d 368 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (table). The Court of Civil Appeals also overruled the husband's application for rehearing and denied his Rule 39(k), Ala. R.App. P., motion. The husband then petitioned this Court for certiorari review, which we granted to determine whether the trial court erred by modifying the divorce judgment incorporating the parties' settlement agreement, on the wife's motion filed more than 30 days after the entry of the divorce judgment.
Paragraph 15 of the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce judgment provides:
(C.R.36.) (Emphasis added.)
After the divorce, the wife submitted to the husband seven credit card bills for him to pay. The husband refused to pay any of the bills, and the wife subsequently filed a "Motion for Rule Nisi," which alleged in pertinent part:
(C.R.41.) Answering this allegation, the husband alleged:
(C.R.46.) The husband asserted further that he "cannot pay all the bills until it is determined which two of the seven Visa Bills are to be paid and until an address for Discover is provided." (C.R.16-17.)
The trial court then conducted a hearing to determine whether paragraph 15 of the divorce judgment required payment of the additional debts submitted by the wife from the parties' savings account or brokerage account. At the hearing, the mediator who presided over the parties' settlement negotiations testified that one of the objectives of the negotiations was for the wife to be debt free after the divorce. He testified also that only two Visa accounts were discussed during the mediation and that those two accounts were not specifically identified by the bank to which each debt was owed, the account number, or the amount owed. The mediator acknowledged that the wife gave him a list of debts. According to the mediator, those are the debts stipulated in paragraph 15 of the divorce agreement. The husband's counsel then asked the mediator to review Defendant's Exhibit 2, a list of credit card debts identified according to the name of the bank to which each debt was owed and the amount owed—totaling $27,146.75. Upon reviewing the exhibit, the mediator reiterated that only two Visa accounts were discussed during the mediation. He stated further that he was not able to identify those two accounts in Exhibit 2 because he was not aware of the names of the banks to which the debts discussed during the mediation were owed. Exhibit 2 reads as follows:
"Compass Visa $ 1,270.98 "Wachovia $ 2,995.69 "Visa SouthTrust $ 5,011.59 "Visa $ 3,468.71 "Visa BancAmerica $ 4,833.29 "Visa Advanta $ 3,516.88 "First Card Visa $ 6,049.61 "TOTAL $27,146.75"
The parties agreed that the Compass Visa account was the parties' joint account, which had been paid by the husband. (R. 15-18.) The parties agreed also that the other accounts listed belonged to the wife and that the balances on the accounts were incurred before September 1, 1997, the cutoff date stated in the divorce judgment. (R. 17-18, 52.) The parties, however, disagreed on whether the five Visa accounts other than the Compass Visa joint account were covered by paragraph 15 of the divorce judgment. The wife's counsel argued that paragraph 15 should have read that the monies in the Compass Bank savings account were to be used to pay the wife's "individual accounts" rather than her "individual account." When the trial court asked the mediator whether the five Visa accounts were contemplated in paragraph 15 of the agreement, the mediator maintained that only two Visa accounts were discussed during the mediation and that, according to the wife, those Visa accounts together had an approximate total balance of $12,000. (R. 18-19.) When the wife's counsel asked the mediator whether paragraph 15 should have read that the Compass Bank savings account was to be used to pay, among the other accounts specified in the paragraph, all "individual accounts" held by the wife rather than a single "individual account" held by the wife, the mediator answered: (R. 19.)
The husband testified that he was aware of the...
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