Ex parte Locke
| Decision Date | 29 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-101,87-101 |
| Citation | 527 So.2d 1347 |
| Parties | Ex parte Edward LOCKE. (Re Edward Locke, alias v. State). |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Paul M. Harden and Russell L. Hubbard, Evergreen, for petitioner.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and P. David Bjurberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Petitioner, Edward Locke, was tried before a jury and convicted of murder during the course of an arson. Code of Alabama (1975), § 13A-5-40(a)(9). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction with a written opinion. Locke v. State, 527 So.2d 1343 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). This Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether there exists a conflict between the Court of Criminal Appeals' statement of the corpus delicti of arson in its opinion below and the statement of the arson corpus delicti in prior decisions of this Court and the former Court of Appeals. See Rule 39(c)(4), A.R.App.P. Although we find that such a conflict does exist, we nonetheless affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, based on our conclusion that the State did meet its burden of proving the corpus delicti of arson at petitioner's trial. 1
In response to petitioner's contention that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti of arson, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
" 'The evidence is sufficient if the corpus delicti is proved. Speegle v. State, 51 Ala.App. 504, 286 So.2d 914 (1973).
" ' "In arson the corpus delicti consists first of a building burned; and second, that it was wilfully fired by some responsible person ... and the guilt of defendant may be proven by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct evidence...." ' " (Citations omitted.) Whatley v. State, 37 Ala.App. 706, 75 So.2d 182 (1954).
" " ' "
527 So.2d at 1343, quoting from Harris v. State, 358 So.2d 482, 485 (Ala.Crim.App.1978).
Petitioner argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals misstated the elements of the corpus delicti of arson. Specifically, he argues that the court incorrectly omitted from its statement of the arson corpus delicti the requirement that burning by accidental and natural causes must be satisfactorily excluded. We agree.
In Winslow v. State, 76 Ala. 42 (1884); Carr v. State, 16 Ala.App. 176, 76 So. 413 (1917); Colvin v. State, 32 Ala.App. 142, 22 So.2d 544, reversed on other grounds, 247 Ala. 55, 22 So.2d 525 (Ala.1945); and Smiley v. State, 376 So.2d 813 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), the rule has been stated that in addition to a burned building willfully fired by a responsible person, the corpus delicti of arson includes the requirement that "burning by accidental and natural causes must be satisfactorily excluded." (Emphasis added).
It would seem that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals has eliminated what has been a part of the corpus delicti of arson and has converted that part into a method of proving criminal agency via negative circumstantial evidence. As pointed out, the long-established rule is that burning by accidental and natural causes must be satisfactorily excluded in order for the State to meet its burden of proving the corpus delicti of arson. We here reaffirm that requirement. We note that the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on Whatley v. State, 37 Ala.App. 706, 75 So.2d 182 (1954), for its statement of the corpus delicti of arson. The Whatley opinion left out the requirement that burning by accidental or natural causes must be excluded. Whatley, and the cases relying on Whatley, are overruled to the extent they conflict with this opinion.
Next, petitioner reiterates the argument made in the court below, that the State failed to prove the corpus delicti of arson.
The opinion below contains a more detailed statement of the facts surrounding the fire. For purposes of the present discussion, we quote from that opinion:
"The evidence presented at trial which is relevant to this issue includes: 1) The fire started on the front porch of the house. The only possible source of ignition near the front porch was an electrical wire that ran parallel to the joist between the living room and the front porch. However, the fire inspector stated that the point of origin of the fire was on the front porch, not at the point where the front porch and the living room join. He and the Evergreen Fire Chief testified that the house sustained the most damage on the front porch and lessened as one went from the front porch to the living room to the remainder of the house. 2) The appellant [petitioner] obtained a lighter from Lett at a house one block away from Jackson's house on the...
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Sheffield v. State Of Ala.
...of proof (1) that a building was burned, and (2) that the building was wilfully burned by some responsible person.7 Ex parte Locke, 527 So. 2d 1347, 1348 (Ala. 1988). "[B]urning by accidental and natural causes must be satisfactorily excluded." Id. Additionally, "[t]he corpus delicti of the......
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