Ex Parte Loving

• Decision Date: 09 December 1903
• Parties: Ex parte LOVING.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

77 S.W. 508

178 Mo. 194

Ex parte LOVING.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

December 9, 1903.

STATUTES — TITLE — LOCAL OR SPECIAL LAWS — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — CITY CHARTER — TAXATION.

1. Any reasonable doubt as to the constitutionality of an act must be resolved in favor of its validity.

2. Act March 23, 1903 (Sess. Acts 1903, p. 213), entitled "An act to regulate the treatment and control of neglected and delinquent children in counties having a population of 150,000 inhabitants," is not in violation of Const. art. 4, § 28, providing that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title; "neglected and delinquent children" constituting only one subject.

3. That Act March 23, 1903 (Sess. Acts 1903, p. 213), regulating the treatment of neglected and delinquent children in counties of 150,000 inhabitants and over, applies at the time of its enactment to only two counties, does not render it in violation of Const. art. 4, § 53, prohibiting local laws, since it will include other counties which may hereafter come within the class described.

4. That Act March 23, 1903 (Sess. Acts 1903, p. 213), applies a rule of punishment to a class of children in counties of over 150,000 inhabitants that is not applied to the same class in other counties, does not render it in violation of Const. art. 4, § 53, prohibiting a special law where a general law can be made applicable; the conditions reasonably justifying the distinction made.

5. Act March 23, 1903 (Sess. Acts 1903, p. 213), relating to the treatment of neglected and delinquent children, is not invalidated by its failure to provide for the separation of neglected from delinquent children.

6. The provisions of a city charter are subject to, and must be in harmony with, the general laws of the state.

7. Act March 23, 1903 (Sess. Acts 1903, p. 213), relating to the treatment of neglected and delinquent children, and providing that the localities for whose benefit the law is enacted shall be required to pay the expenses of carrying out its provisions, is not violative of Const. art. 10, §§ 1, 10, prohibiting the General Assembly from levying taxes for municipal purposes.

In Banc. Petition by James Loving for writ of habeas corpus against John P. Gilday, sheriff of Jackson county. Petitioner remanded to the custody of the sheriff.

Frank Gordon and John A. Sea, for petitioner. Seddon & Blair, J. Henry Altschu, Roland Hughes, Gardiner Lathrop, Jas. P. Gilmore, J. V. C. Karnes, and Alfred Gregory, for respondent.

FOX, J.

The facts in the case at bar are practically admitted. The defendant, James Loving, was arrested and charged with petit larceny, committed in Jackson county. The petitioner is a boy eight years of age, and brought before the juvenile court of Jackson county. The case was heard by the judge of the juvenile court, and, having heard the facts, he found the defendant guilty, and thereupon the following judgment was made and entered of record in the records of said county: "The State of Missouri v. James Loving. (No. 63.) Now on this day comes the prosecuting attorney of Jackson county, Missouri, and files information charging said James Loving with petit larceny, upon which information a warrant was issued, and said defendant was brought into court; and Frank Gordon, Esq., appears in court as attorney for said defendant, and, in his behalf, pleads `Not guilty.' And the court, after hearing all of the evidence adduced, and being fully advised in the premises, finds that the defendant is guilty of a misdemeanor, that he is a delinquent child, and that he is eight (8) years of age. The court further finds that the parents of said defendant have not exercised the needed care and control over said defendant, and that he be committed to the State Reform School for Boys, and that his said parents are indigent, and that neither they nor the said defendant have any property or estate out of which the expenses of conveying said defendant to and his detention in said school can be paid. It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that the said James Loving be, and is hereby, committed to the guardianship of said State Reform School for Boys, at Boonville, Cooper County, Missouri, there to remain for the full period of two (2) years. It is further ordered and adjudged that the said James Loving be, and is hereby, committed to the custody of the sheriff of Jackson county, Missouri, and that said sheriff deliver said James Loving into the custody of the proper officer in charge of said State Reform School. It is further ordered and adjudged by the court that the county court of Jackson county, Missouri, pay the necessary expenses incurred by said sheriff in conveying said James Loving to, and of his detention in, said reform school." A writ of habeas corpus was sued out by the mother of the petitioner, and against the sheriff, who had the custody of James Loving, made returnable to this court. The legal service of the writ was waived, as was also the production of the body of the person, who, it was charged, was illegally restrained of his liberty. To this writ, in proper form, the sheriff filed his return, which is partly as follows: "John P. Gilday, sheriff of Jackson county, Missouri, for his return to the writ of habeas corpus directed to him from the Supreme Court of Missouri, the formal issue of which writ has been waived, states that James Loving was placed in his custody on the 17th day of June, 1903, by an order of commitment issued by Honorable James Gibson, judge of Division No. 1 of the circuit court of Jackson county, Missouri, and acting as judge of the juvenile court of said county. He says that, acting under the authority of an act of the General Assembly of the state of Missouri approved March 23, 1903, and found in the Session Acts of 1903, at page 213, said James Loving was brought before the Honorable James Gibson, judge as aforesaid, and that, upon due information and process and full hearing, the said judge committed said James Loving to the Missouri Reform School for Boys." Accompanying this return is a copy of the entire proceeding, including the judgment and commitment. To this return there is a demurrer filed, which is as follows: "Comes now the petitioner, by his attorney of record, and demurs to the return of John P. Gilday, sheriff of Jackson county, for the reason that said return does not state sufficient facts to authorize the detention of said petitioner. Petitioner further states that the act of March 23, 1903, under which the sheriff of Jackson county claims said petitioner is held, is invalid, for the reason that said act is in violation of section 53, art. 4, of the Constitution of Missouri; that said act is in violation of sections 1, 10, art. 10, of the Constitution." This statement indicates clearly the controverted questions, and it is unnecessary to say more.

This proceeding presents but one question for our consideration. That is the validity of the act of March 23, 1903, commonly known as the "Juvenile Court Act." We have examined with a marked degree of care, and read with deep interest, all of the provisions of the act of the Legislature involved in this controversy. We confess, at the outset, that the wise and beneficent purposes sought to be accomplished by this act — the prevention of crime, and the upbuilding of a good and useful citizenship — tends, at least, to the creation of a desire to uphold it. However, in the determination of so grave and important a question as the one with which we are confronted, inclinations and desires should not be consulted; and, in approaching the consideration of the questions presented, we hope to do so with that high conception of duty so appropriately expressed by Chief Justice Ryan in the Wisconsin Industrial School Case, 40 Wis. 333, 22 Am. Rep. 702: "Notwithstanding this prepossession in favor of the statute before us, it is our duty to test all its provisions involved in this case by the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and to hold the restraints and principles of that instrument sacred, as against any provision of any act of the Legislature, however humane or benevolent." It must be conceded that this act reaches out into a new field of legislation, and, in a sense, may be said to be a new departure from the ordinary paths, in the exercise of the functions of that, the co-ordinate branch of the state government; but, in the language of what has been appropriately said elsewhere, "we live in a time of inquiry and innovation, when many things having the sanction of time are questioned, and many novelties jarring with long-accepted theories are proposed." This act is assailed on the ground that it is offensive to, and in violation of, the organic law — the Constitution of this state. In the solution of the proposition before us, we must keep in view that familiar principle that, if there is a reasonable doubt existing as to the constitutionality of the act, such doubt must be resolved in favor of its validity. This principle is so well recognized that the mere statement of it is sufficient. In State ex rel. v. Aloe, 152 Mo. 477, 54 S. W. 496, it was very clearly and tersely stated: "When the validity of a statute is drawn in question, the court approaches the subject as one involving the gravest responsibility, and to be considered with the greatest caution. The General Assembly is presumed to have been as careful to observe the requirements of the Constitution in enacting the statute as the court in applying it. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the act, and that presumption is to continue until its invalidity is made to appear beyond a doubt." To the same effect is State ex rel. v. Pike County, 144 Mo. 277, 45 S. W. 1098, where it is said: "It is the duty of the courts to uphold a legislative act unless it plainly and clearly violates the Constitution, and, if its language is susceptible of a meaning...