Ex parte Maddison
Decision Date | 26 April 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 10-16-00081-CR,10-16-00081-CR |
Citation | 518 S.W.3d 630 |
Parties | EX PARTE Billy Mack MADDISON |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Gabriel Price, Sterling A. Harmon, Seminole, Abel Reyna, Lubbock, for State of Texas.
Mark W. Bennett, Houston, Nina Patterson, Waco, for Appellee.
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins
Billy Mack Maddison was indicted for the felony offense of online harassment under section 33.07(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07(a)(1) (West 2016). Maddison filed a pre-trial application for writ of habeas corpus in which he asserted that section 33.07 is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Maddison requested that the trial court declare section 33.07 unconstitutional and, in turn, dismiss his indictment. The trial court granted habeas relief, declaring all of section 33.07 unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as written. The State appeals.
Because Maddison was indicted only under subsection (a)(1) of section 33.07, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to declare the entire statute unconstitutional.
We further conclude that section 33.07(a)(1) is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.1 Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
As noted above, Maddison was indicted under section 33.07(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code, which provides the following:
Id. § 33.07(a)(1). Specifically, the indictment alleged that Maddison, without obtaining the consent of Felicia Colburn, intentionally or knowingly used the name and/or persona of Colburn to create a webpage on Facebook, a commercial social-network site, with the intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten Colburn. See id. An offense under subsection (a) is a third-degree felony. Id. § 33.07(c).
Maddison filed a pre-trial application for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that section 33.07 is unconstitutional because it is a content-based restriction that criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech. Maddison further argued that section 33.07 is unconstitutionally vague and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. See Ex parte Thompson , 442 S.W.3d 325, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ( ).
On February 25, 2016, the trial court signed an order granting Maddison habeas relief. In its order, the trial court stated the following:
This appeal followed.
In one issue, the State argues that trial court erred in granting Maddison's application for writ of habeas corpus and declaring section 33.07 unconstitutional based on overbreadth and vagueness. And though the trial court did not reach Maddison's argument under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the State nevertheless contends that section 33.07 does not "unduly burden interstate commerce by attempting to place regulations on the entirety of the Internet, thus violating the Dormant Commerce Clause."
At the outset of our analysis, we note that Maddison was only charged under section 33.07(a)(1) ; thus, he could only challenge the constitutionality of section 33.07(a)(1), not the remainder of the statute. Accordingly, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to declare all of section 33.07 unconstitutional, but rather only subsection (a)(1). See State v. Stubbs , 502 S.W.3d 218, 223-24 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd) ( ). We now analyze the State's overbreadth argument.
"Whether a statute is facially constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo." Id. at 224 (citing Ex Parte Lo , 424 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ). When presented with a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, we presume that the statute is valid and that the Legislature has not acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Ex Parte Lo , 424 S.W.3d at 14-15 ; see Ex parte Flores , 483 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd) (citing Rodriguez v. State , 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ). Typically, the party challenging the statute has the burden to establish its unconstitutionality. Ex parte Lo , 424 S.W.3d at 15.
Stubbs , 502 S.W.3d at 224-25.
When a party challenges a statute as both overbroad and vague, we first consider the overbreadth challenge. See Ex parte Flores , 483 S.W.3d at 643. The overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine that is used sparingly and only as a last resort. State v. Johnson , 475 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) ; see also New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York , 487 U.S. 1, 14, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988). To be unconstitutionally overbroad, "the statute must prohibit a substantial amount of protected expression, and the danger that the statute will be unconstitutionally applied must be realistic and not based on ‘fanciful hypotheticals.’ " Johnson , 475 S.W.3d at 865 (quoting United States v. Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 485, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting)). Laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights will be held facially overbroad only if the impermissible applications of the law are real and substantial when judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. See Ex parte Flores , 483 S.W.3d at 643 (citing Broadrick v. Okla. , 413 U.S. 601, 612-15, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) ). An overbreadth challenge will rarely, if ever, succeed against a statute "that is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct that it necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating)." Johnson , 475 S.W.3d at 865 (quoting...
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