Ex parte Martin

• Decision Date: 20 June 1910
• Docket Number: 3,514.
• Citation: 180 F. 209
• Parties: Ex parte MARTIN.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

180 F. 209

Ex parte MARTIN.

No. 3,514.

United States Circuit Court, D. Oregon.

June 20, 1910

A. C Lyon and Ralph R. Duniway, for petitioner.

George J. Cameron, Dist. Atty.

WOLVERTON District Judge.

John Martin, a citizen and resident of the state of Iowa, while engaged, as agent and representative of the Spaulding Manufacturing Company, also of Iowa, in taking orders for buggies manufactured by said company, with a view to selling such manufactured vehicles by sample, was, on the 27th day of May, 1909, complained against in the justice court, and arrested for violation of an act of the Legislative Assembly of the state of Oregon, entitled 'An act to define and license and regulate peddlers and to provide a punishment for peddlers who peddle without a license,' etc. Laws 1909 p. 386. Immediately after entering a plea of not guilty, and before trial was had, Martin applied to this court for a writ of habeas corpus to be released from his arrest; it being claimed that the act of the Legislative Assembly of the state of Oregon is in violation of the Constitution of the United States in three particulars, not necessary to specify, except that it is claimed especially that the said act is in contravention of the clause of the United States Constitution delegating to Congress the regulation of commerce among the several states. The writ of habeas corpus was allowed and issued on the 28th day of May, 1909. Subsequently, on the 5th of June, 1909, Martin was tried in the justice's court and acquitted. This fact of acquittal is set up by amended return of the officer who formerly had him in custody.

It is first insisted, by way of defense, that, Martin having been acquitted in the justice's court, this proceeding should be dismissed, for the reason that, by virtue of his acquittal and discharge, there is nothing left for controversy here. By section 766, Rev. St. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 597), relating to habeas corpus, it is provided that:

'Pending the proceedings or appeal in the cases mentioned in the three preceding sections, and until final judgment therein and after final judgment of discharge, any proceeding against the person so imprisoned or confined or restrained of his liberty, in any state court, or by or under the authority of any state, for any matter so heard and determined, under such writ of habeas corpus, shall be deemed null and void.'

The effect of this statute is to stay the hand of the state court, after a writ of habeas corpus has been issued by a federal court, until the cause thus brought upon the record is heard and determined. The state court is, after the issuance of such writ, wholly without authority to proceed further in the premises as against the petitioner. Such is the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the cases of In re Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291, 294, 295, 11 Sup.Ct. 770, 35 L.Ed. 510; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 Sup.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867.

While in the present case it is urged that the discharge of the prisoner on trial was not contrary to his interest, yet it must be held that he was proceeded against by prosecuting him to trial, and, whatever was the result of the trial, the proceeding was contrary to the authority of Congress. Hence it must be held that the judgment of the justice's court, so far as it affected this proceeding in any way, is utterly null and void.

This brings us to the question whether the writ of habeas corpus was properly issued. It is unquestioned that state courts of original jurisdiction, consistent with existing federal legislation, may determine cases at law or in equity arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or involving rights dependent upon such Constitution or laws. Upon these courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States, and laws made in pursuance thereof, whenever those rights are involved in proceedings before them. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637, 4 Sup.Ct. 544, 28 L.Ed. 542, reaffirmed in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 Sup.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868. The leading case upon the question as to when a writ of habeas corpus should issue is that of Ex parte Royall, just cited. In that case it is declared that the court is endowed with a discretion in that particular. The discretion, of course, is one which should be governed by legal principles, and should be exercised in the furtherance of justice and right. Speaking of the relation existing between the state and national courts, and when the national courts should interfere with proceedings pending in the state courts, Mr. Justice Harlan has this to say:

'We cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel those courts, by such means, to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions commenced in state courts exercising authority within the same territorial limits, where the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law and justice require,' does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the states, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution.'

And as to when the federal court may properly entertain the authority, the learned justice continues:

'When the petitioner is in custody by state authority for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; or where, being a subject or citizen of a foreign state, and domiciled therein, he is in custody, under like authority, for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations-- in such and like cases of urgency, involving the authority and operations of the general government, or the obligations of this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations, the courts of the United States have frequently interposed by writs of habeas corpus and discharged prisoners who were held in custody under state authority.'

It was finally held in that case that the Circuit Court from which the appeal was taken had the discretion whether to entertain the writ or not, and that a proper exercise of that discretion would have been not to entertain the writ. It should be noted that the Circuit Court dismissed the cause believing it had no jurisdiction thereof, while the Supreme Court held that it had undoubted jurisdiction, but affirmed the judgment of the lower court for a different reason, namely, that it had a discretion in the premises, and that a proper exercise of that discretion was to refuse to entertain the writ. The same question arose in a later case, namely, Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 194, 13 Sup.Ct. 40, 36 L.Ed. 934, and Mr. Justice Brown, announcing the opinion of the court, says:

'We adhere to the views expressed in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (6 Sup.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868), and Ex parte Fonda, 117 U.S. 516 (6 Sup.Ct. 848, 29 L.Ed. 994), that, where a person is in custody under process from a state court of original jurisdiction for an alleged offense against the laws of that state, and it is claimed that he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Circuit Court of the United States has a discretion whether it will discharge him in advance of his trial in the court in which he is indicted, although this discretion will be subordinated to any special circumstances requiring immediate action. While the federal courts have the power and may discharge the accused in advance of his trial, if he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the federal Constitution or laws, they are not bound to exercise such power even after a state court has finally acted upon the case, but may, in their discretion, require the accused to sue out his writ of error from the highest court of the state, or even from the Supreme Court of the United States. * * * We are unable to see in this case any such special circumstances as were suggested in the case of Ex parte Royall as rendering it proper for a federal court to interpose before the trial of the case in the state court. While the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to state courts which are proceeding in disregard of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States may exist, the practice of exercising such power before the question has been raised or determined in the state court is one which ought not to be encouraged. The party charged waives no defect of jurisdiction by submitting to a trial of his case upon the merits and we think that comity demands that the state courts, under whose process he is held, and which are equally with the federal courts charged with the duty of protecting the accused in the enjoyment of his constitutional rights, should be

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