Ex parte McLaughlin
Decision Date | 23 April 2020 |
Docket Number | Application 12/728,Appeal 2019-002441,121 |
Parties | Ex parte MICHAEL McLAUGHLIN Technology Center 3600 Name Reference Date |
Court | Patent Trial and Appeal Board |
Before JOHN A. EVANS, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and MICHAEL M. BARRY Administrative Patent Judges.
PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge.
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-24, which are all of the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appellant generally describes the disclosed and claimed invention as relating to "notification management and more specifically to notification management for service providers." Spec. ¶ 2.[2] Claims 1, 8, 14, and 20 are independent. Independent claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal and reads as follows:
Appeal Br. A-1-A-2 (Claims App.).
References
Name Reference Date Janas et al. (Janas) US 2009/0286559 A1 11/19/09 Rice et al. (Rice) US 2006/0184381 A1 08/17/06 Pandey US 2010/0146558 A1 06/10/10 Lundy et al. (Lundy) US 8, 331, 912 B1 12/11/12 Bristow et al. (Bristow) US 8, 166, 126 B2 04/24/12
The Examiner rejected claims 1-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Final Act. 2-5.
The Examiner rejected claims 1-7 and 14-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Janas, Rice, Pandey, and Lundy. Id. at 6-16.
The Examiner rejected claims 8-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Janas, Rice, and Pandey. Id. at 16-22.
The Examiner rejected claims 21, 23, and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Janas, Rice, Pandey, Lundy, and Bristow. Id. at 22-23.
The Examiner rejected claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Janas, Rice, Pandey, and Bristow. Id. at 23-24.
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's arguments in the Appeal Brief (see Appeal Br. 7-48) and the Reply Brief (see Reply Br 1-6), and are not persuaded the Examiner has erred. Unless otherwise noted, we adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Office Action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2-31), and in the Examiner's Answer (Ans. 3-14), and we concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. For emphasis, we consider and highlight specific arguments as presented in the Briefs.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof" is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories, the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first to consider whether the claim is "directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine "the elements of [the] claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)). That is, we examine the claim for an "inventive concept," "an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.'" Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73).
In January 2019, the Patent Office issued guidance about this framework. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("Revised Guidance").[3] Under the Revised Guidance, to decide whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the claim (1) recites one of the abstract ideas listed in the Revised Guidance ("Prong One") and (2) fails to integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application ("Prong Two"). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51, 54. If the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we then determine whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider whether the additional claim elements add "a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field" or "simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality." Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we first analyze whether claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
To continue reading
Request your trial