Ex parte McLendon

• Decision Date: 18 December 1924
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 704,712
• Citation: 102 So. 696,212 Ala. 403
• Parties: Ex parte McLENDON. v. BARTLETT et al. (McLENDON, Intervener). MEALEY McLENDON v. BARTLETT et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

102 So. 696

212 Ala. 403

Ex parte McLENDON.

MEALEY v. BARTLETT et al. (McLENDON, Intervener).

McLENDON v. BARTLETT et al.

8 Div. 704, 712

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 18, 1924

Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1925

Appeal from Circuit Court, Marshall County; W.W. Haralson, Judge.

Bill in equity by Rada Mealey against J.S. Bartlett and others. Intervention by J.S. McLendon to enforce lien for attorney's fees. From a decree denying his petition intervener appeals and brings an original petition for writ of mandamus. Affirmed, and writ denied.

Street & Bradford, of Guntersville, for respondents and appellees.

BOULDIN J.

One of the legatees and devisees of the estate of W.H. Bartlett deceased, filed a petition for removal of the administration of the estate from the probate court to the circuit court, in equity, pursuant to Acts 1915, p. 738. The order of removal was entered in the circuit court. Thereafter, petitioner, in person and with consent of the administrator and other legatees, filed a written direction to have the cause dismissed and remanded to the probate court for further proceedings and final settlement of the estate. Thereupon the circuit court entered an order vacating the order of removal and remanding the cause to the probate court. The petitioner then discharged her attorney without payment of fees for services rendered, including the service for removal of the administration to the circuit court. Her attorney, J.S McLendon, then filed his petition of intervention in the circuit court for the purpose of vacating the order remanding the cause to the probate court, and enforcing a lien for attorney's fees upon the funds of the estate, or against the interest of his client therein. The circuit court denied Mr. McLendon's petition. From that decree an appeal is taken, No. 712. A mandamus proceeding to vacate the order denying his petition, as well as the order remanding the cause to the probate court, is also presented, No. 704. The two are consolidated and here considered together.

Numerous questions are raised which we do not consider necessary to a decision.

It is disclosed by the record that at the time the original petition to remove the administration from the probate court was filed, that court had already taken jurisdiction for a final settlement of the estate, and the date of settlement was set on the same or following day.

The petition for removal set forth no special equity or showing that the probate court was wanting in jurisdiction to make a final settlement. The grounds of removal are substantially in the words of the statute. Acts 1915, p. 738. No special equity is given by addition of the clause, "Your petitioner prays for a construction of the will of W.H. Bartlett." No parties are made to the petition as a bill for construction of a will; the will is not made a part of it; and no ambiguity or controverted questions of construction are presented, giving rise to such jurisdiction. Haugher v. Hinson, 100 So. 221; Ashurst v. Ashurst, 175 Ala. 667, 57 So. 442.

The added prayer, that the administrator with the will annexed be required to report the personal property on hand, and that same be sold for division by order of court, confers no special equity. The probate court has full power in this regard. Shackelford v. Bankhead, 72 Ala. 477.

It need scarcely be noted that the sale of personal property of a decedent is an act of administration, to be performed by the administrator under orders of and as agent of the court. The heirs may not take the administration out of his hands and proceed in their own right. They have a remedy to remove him for legal cause or to call him to account for failure of duty. Moreover, this prayer touching a sale of the personal property, while appearing as an addenda to the statutory petition for removal, purports to be an amendment to a separate bill to sell lands for division among tenants in common, a proceeding to which the administrator is not a party. Such a proceeding is no part of an administration, but proceeds on the assumption that the lands have not become assets in the hands of the administrator for administration, either for the payment of debts, or, with consent of an adult heir, by sale for division. It follows that, for present purposes, the petition for removal of the administration from the probate court to the equity court was an ex parte proceeding under the statute.

The statute does not contemplate "the ouster of the jurisdiction of the probate courts, where that court has actually entered upon the exercise of its jurisdiction in and for a final settlement of estates." Carpenter v. Carpenter, 200 Ala. 96, 75 So. 472. See, also, Dent v. Foy, 204 Ala. 404, 85 So. 709; Dooley v. Dooley, 205 Ala. 281, 87 So. 545; Parker v. Robertson, 205 Ala. 434, 88 So. 418; Sewell v. Sewell, 207 Ala. 239, 92 So. 475; Marshall v. Marshall, 86 Ala. 383, 5 So. 475.

Jurisdiction for final settlement in the probate court begins upon filing accounts and vouchers with statement of the heirs invoking the court's jurisdiction for such settlement and an order entered setting day, directing notice, etc. Code 1923, §§ 5901, 5904.

The words "at any time before a final settlement," found in the removal act, mean before proceedings for settlement begin, not before they are completed. The better and approved practice is to aver in the removal petition that no steps have been taken for a settlement in the probate court. See authorities supra. We would say a petition using the statutory...