Ex parte Monsanto Co.
| Decision Date | 23 March 2001 |
| Citation | 794 So.2d 350 |
| Parties | Ex parte MONSANTO COMPANY et al. (In re Thomas G. Long, Sr. v. Monsanto Company et al. and Sabrina Abernathy et al. v. Monsanto Company et al.) |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Warren B. Lightfoot, Adam K. Peck, Harlan I. Prater IV, William S. Cox III, and Suzanne Alldredge of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham; and Arthur F. Fite III of Merrill, Porch, Dillon & Fite, Anniston, for petitioners.
Donald W. Stewart of Stewart & Smith, P.C., Anniston; and James C. Johnston and J. Michael Druhan of Johnston, Wilkins & Druhan, L.L.P., Mobile, for respondents.
This petition for a writ of mandamus arises out of three separate cases pending in the Calhoun Circuit Court that were consolidated during the pretrial proceedings.2 There are approximately 2,714 plaintiffs in the three cases, and each of them asserts a toxic-tort claim against Monsanto Company and other defendants (referred to collectively hereinafter as "Monsanto"). Monsanto petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court: (1) to transfer these cases from Calhoun County to another county, pursuant to § 6-3-20, Ala.Code 1975; (2) to conduct jury-selection procedures so as to ensure a randomly selected jury, as provided by law; (3) to conduct a pretrial conference, pursuant to Rule 16, Ala.R.Civ. P., and to issue a case-management order to govern the disposition of these cases; (4) to sever all of the plaintiffs' separate claims and to try each of the 2,714 claims separately; or to conduct what it calls a "benchmark" trial, i.e., a trial in which a limited number of representative plaintiffs are designated for trial; or to resolve the case under some other procedure designed for the efficient and timely disposition of complex tort cases; (5) to rule on pending motions for summary judgment and motions in limine; and (6) to grant Monsanto's motion for a continuance.
A writ of mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary remedy " " Ex parte Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 548 So.2d 1029, 1030 (Ala.1989).
On March 1, 1999, Monsanto filed this mandamus petition; trial of these cases was scheduled to begin March 15, 1999. In its petition, Monsanto claimed that the trial judge had not ruled on approximately 30 pending motions, including a motion requesting a pretrial conference, a motion for a change of venue, motions seeking to narrow and delineate the issues for trial, discovery motions to compel the plaintiffs to provide basic information regarding their claims against Monsanto, and a motion to continue. On March 8, 1999, this Court ordered answers and briefs and stayed the proceedings in the trial court pending disposition of Monsanto's petition. It would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to proceed to trial on these toxic-tort cases without a case-management order to govern the disposition of the cases. However, the passage of time and the intervening actions of the trial court taken at our direction have resolved many of the issues raised in Monsanto's petition.
In March 1996, Thomas Long, Sr., sued Monsanto, alleging that Monsanto was responsible for releasing polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") and other harmful chemicals or pollutants into the air, soil, surface, and groundwater in, on, or adjacent to Long's property in Calhoun County. He further alleged that he had suffered damage as a result of the release of those chemicals or pollutants.
Thereafter, two additional lawsuits, each with multiple plaintiffs, were filed against Monsanto. The court consolidated the three lawsuits. These lawsuits are not class actions. The plaintiffs allege that they live in, work in, or regularly visit the area around the site of Monsanto's manufacturing plant in Calhoun County and that because of Monsanto's actions they and their property have been exposed to toxic chemicals and pollutants, including PCBs, and that, as a result of that exposure, highly toxic levels of PCBs have been detected in their bodies and on their property.
The plaintiffs seek compensatory damages and punitive damages for personal injury (including the fear of future disease) and property damage they allege were caused by Monsanto's actions. They allege negligence, wantonness, breach of duty to warn, fraud, misrepresentation and deceit, nuisance, trespass, the tort of outrage, common-law strict liability, assault, battery, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief, including an order requiring Monsanto to remove and clean up the PCBs and other toxins and pollutants that they allege Monsanto has dispersed into the air, soil, surface, and groundwater of Calhoun County. The plaintiffs also request that Monsanto be required to pay for future medical testing, monitoring, and medical treatment of the plaintiffs for ailments or diseases related to, or that may be caused by, the PCBs or other toxins.
On February 1, 1999, the trial court began to select a petit jury for these consolidated cases. It soon became apparent, however, that an insufficient number of potential jurors had been summoned; the court adjourned the trial until March 15, 1999, so that additional jurors could be summoned.3 In his response to Monsanto's petition for the writ of mandamus, the trial judge stated that he had ruled upon the pending motions, but that he had been unable to file the orders disposing of those pending motions because this Court had stayed proceedings in the trial court. On May 16, 2000, this Court lifted the stay for the express purpose of allowing the trial court to file its orders with the circuit clerk and with this Court. On October 12, 2000, the trial judge filed 30 orders ruling on the various motions.
After these orders were filed, the stay was reimposed. The plaintiffs contend that the petition should be denied, because the trial judge has now ruled upon the pending motions and his failure to rule, they argue, was the basis of Monsanto's petition. In a filing made in support of its petition, Monsanto contends that "the trial court's orders have not clarified the fundamental issues [i.e., Monsanto's challenge of venue, Monsanto's desire to have proper jury-selection procedures established, and Monsanto's desire to have an established structure for the trial of the case] which formed the basis of [Monsanto's] petition and guidance from this Court is necessary before the matter is returned to the trial court for further proceedings." However, the plaintiffs, relying upon Ex parte Weaver, 781 So.2d 944 (Ala.2000), contend that Monsanto's request that this Court provide "guidance" to the trial court on the "fundamental issues" is not within the scope of mandamus relief.
Monsanto contends that the trial court should transfer these cases from Calhoun County to another county, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 6-3-20, and it requests this Court to direct the trial court to transfer these cases. On February 9, 1999, Monsanto filed, under seal, a motion for a change of venue. The trial court had not ruled upon this motion when Monsanto filed its mandamus petition with this Court, and when the trial court issued its October 12, 2000, orders it did not rule on the change-of-venue motion, but stated, "At such time as this case is set for trial, [Monsanto's] motion for change of venue shall be scheduled for hearing and heard at an appropriate length of time prior to this case being called for trial."
In its motion, Monsanto gave the following reasons for requesting a transfer of the cases: the difficulty of selecting a jury in Calhoun County because of the connection of a large number of the plaintiffs to Calhoun County and their relationships with potential jurors; what Monsanto claims is the "overwhelming" pretrial publicity this case has received in newspaper articles about the case and in televised news broadcasts aired on stations that would have been seen by viewers in Calhoun County; and what Monsanto refers to as the difficulties in finding potential jurors willing to commit the time it was estimated it would take to try these cases.4 In support of its motion, Monsanto filed videotapes of television news coverage of these cases, as well as copies of numerous newspaper articles dealing with issues presented in these cases.
This Court has never issued a writ of mandamus directing a trial court to transfer a case where the trial court has not yet ruled on a motion for a change of venue. Generally, the writ of mandamus will not issue to compel a trial court to exercise its discretion in a particular manner. Ex parte Ford Motor Credit Co., 607 So.2d 169, 170 (Ala.1992).
In Braswell v. Money, 344 So.2d 767 (Ala.1977), Braswell petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus after the trial court had denied a motion for a change of venue. This Court wrote:
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