Ex parte Morgan
Citation | 78 F. Supp. 756 |
Decision Date | 06 July 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 8350.,8350. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Parties | Ex parte MORGAN. |
Richard A. Haley, of Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner.
Ray L. Chesebro, City Atty., Donald M. Redwine, Asst. City Atty., and John L. Bland, Deputy City Atty., all of Los Angeles Cal., and Frank Richards, Deputy Atty., Gen., of California, for respondents.
Interstate Extradition.
The Constitution of the United States provides that a person charged in any State with treason, felony or other crime, who flees from justice, and is found in another State, shall be delivered to the State having jurisdiction of the crime on demand of the Executive authority of such State.1
The object of this provision, which in the identical language appeared first in the Articles of Confederation of 1781, has been stated by the Supreme Court in this manner:
Three conditions must concur before a person can be extradited. They are stated by the Supreme Court in a leading case:
3
The designation of the crimes within the constitutional provision has been held comprehensive enough to embrace "any offense, whatever its nature, which the State, consistently with the Constitution and laws of the United States, may have made a crime against its laws."4
The Courts have been equally liberal in determining who is a fugitive. Perhaps the broadest statement is this:
"To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense of the act of congress regulating the subject under consideration, it is not necessary that the party charged should have left the state in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that, having within a state committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer for his offense, he has left its jurisdiction, and is found within the territory of another."5
Implementing Legislation.
To give effect to this constitutional clause, the Congress enacted, on February 12, 1793, a statute which is the source of the present provision in the Criminal Code, the main portion of which, so far as material to this inquiry, reads:
"Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear."6
All States, including California, have statutes relating to the procedure to be followed when demand for extradition is addressed to their authorities. The California law now in effect derives from a uniform criminal extradition statute which has been adopted by a large number of states.7 The procedure, in substance, provides for honoring by the Governor of the State of a demand for extradition, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the taking of the arrested person before a magistrate. On the whole, ample opportunity is given for questioning the validity of the extradition to satisfy the most punctilious observance of the requirements of due process. Here we are concerned only with certain specific clauses of the statute. The first of these reads:
8
Its application to the present case is brought into play by undisputed facts.
On June 4, 1948, the Governor of California honored a demand for extradition by the Governor of Colorado, dated May 27, 1948. The petitioner was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued thereafter, and placed in the custody of the Chief of Police of Los Angeles. On June 7, 1948, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Appeal of California for the Second District, Division Two. That court heard the matter on June 9, 1948, and on June 15, 1948, discharged the writ. A petition for a similar writ filed in the Supreme Court of California on June 16, 1948, was denied on June 1, 1948. The present petition was filed on June 23, 1948, and a writ issued by me on the same day, returnable on June 25, 1948.
The petitioner has been for many years a resident of Burbank, Los Angeles County, California. The offense with which he is charged in Colorado is conspiracy to commit grand larceny, a crime denounced by Colorado statutes.9 He was not in the State of Colorado at the time of the alleged commission of the offense. And the inquiry centers around the proposition whether he was a fugitive within the meaning of the pertinent constitutional clause and the federal statute implementing it. This, in turn, brings up the question whether the provision of the California statute which allows extradition in cases where "the accused was not in the demanding State at the time of the commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom"10 is constitutional.
Constitutionality of California Statute.
The petitioner contends that it is not. He urges that it conflicts both with the constitutional provision and the federal statute. It may be conceded that the federal statute11 does not, in so many words, apply to offenses committed in the State by a person not present in it at the time of their commission. Nevertheless, it is accepted doctrine that a State may punish acts committed beyond its boundaries which result in a crime within the State. As said by Mr. Justice Holmes:
"Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its power."12
And the decisions of the Supreme Court, interpreting the federal statutes under consideration have held that the commission of an offense in a State while the defendant is not physically present in it, come within the purview of the constitutional provision.13 These cases stress the fact that the important factor in determining the matter is not so much actual presence of a person in a State as "having within a state committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime."14 This being so, state legislation in aid of the federal statute which governs such situations cannot be said to conflict with the letter or spirit of the constitutional provision.15 And high state courts which have had occasion to pass on such statutes have so ruled.16 The California District Court of Appeal followed these pronouncements in the opinion filed in this case.17
As these cases relate to federal constitutional interpretation, they are not binding on us. However, a study of them, in the light of the principles to which we have already alluded in the first portions of this opinion, leads us to the conclusion that they interpret the constitutional grant of power correctly, and that such...
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...Circuit court found that all available remedies in California had not been exhausted. Neither the Circuit or the District court, Ex parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756, discussed or considered the question of exhausting State remedies in To sustain respondent's argument would require that a priso......