Ex parte Moss

• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.
• Citation: Ex parte Moss, 446 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
• Decision Date: 05 November 2014
• Docket Number: 76,635–03
• Parties: Ex parte Jecia Javette Moss, Applicant

446 S.W.3d 786

Ex parte Jecia Javette Moss, Applicant

76,635–03

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Delivered: November 5, 2014

Taryn Davis, Kaufman, for Appellant.

Sue Korioth, Special Prosecutor, Dallas, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for the State.

OPINION

Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.

Applicant, Jecia Javette Moss, pled guilty to aggravated assault and was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision for five years on October 4, 2000. Her community supervision was subsequently revoked, and she was sentenced to confinement in a state penitentiary. She now argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her supervision and adjudicate her guilty because the motion to adjudicate was not timely filed and the capias was not timely issued. We will grant relief.

Facts

The day Applicant's period of community supervision expired—October 3, 2005—the State took a motion to adjudicate and an order directing the district clerk to issue a capias for Applicant's arrest directly to the judge, who signed both of them. Applicant's supervision was subsequently revoked, and she was sentenced to twelve years' confinement and a $1,500.00 fine.

On April 5, 2006, at the time of sentencing, the judge notified Applicant that he would allow her to remain at large for twelve days before turning herself in at the Kaufman County Sheriff's Office to carry out her sentence. During that time, Applicant filed a notice of appeal. However, instead of reporting to the Kaufman County Sheriff's Office on April 17, 2006, to be taken into custody and continue the appellate process, she absconded from the jurisdiction. Subsequently, the State asked the Dallas Court of Appeals to dismiss Applicant's appeal, which it did on July 25, 2006. See Moss v. State, No. 05–06–00556–CR, 2006 WL 2053491 (Tex.App.–Dallas July 25, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication). Applicant was arrested more than three years later on November 13, 2009.

Ex parte Townsend

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the convicting court found that, even if the motion to adjudicate was not timely filed or the capias timely issued, Applicant's claim is procedurally barred because she could have raised her jurisdictional issue on direct appeal had she not absconded from the jurisdiction. We believe the court is referring to this Court's decision in Ex parte Townsend, 137 S.W.3d 79 (Tex.Crim.App.2004), in which this Court held that, when an applicant has an adequate remedy at law, such as the appellate process, but that applicant does not make use of that remedy, the applicant has forfeited his claim. Id. at 81–82.

Applicant can raise her claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act despite this Court's holding in Townsend.

Because Applicant absconded, her direct appeal was dismissed, and, therefore, this application is her first opportunity to assert this challenge. Although the capias eventually issued by the clerk's office was not in the appellate record, the document upon which the Applicant relied (i.e., the order directing the clerk to issue the capias) was in that record. In addition, Applicant raised her jurisdictional issue in her writ application and the capias was, thereafter, included in the writ record (by order of this Court). See Ex parte Moss , WR–76,635–03, 2014 WL 1512955 (Tex.Crim.App. Apr. 16, 2014) (per curiam) (not designated for publication).

However, Applicant's claim is different from the one raised in Townsend, in that she is alleging facts that, if true, would prove that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her supervision. In contrast, the applicant in Townsend raised an improper-stacking claim, which was a non-jurisdictional claim. Townsend, 137 S.W.3d at 80. The crucial difference between Townsend and the instant case is that constitutional rights can be forfeited on habeas due to lack of action but a lack of jurisdiction cannot. Compare id. at 81 (citing Ex parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), Ex parte Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), Ex parte Groves, 571 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) ), Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.14(a) (“The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights secured him by law ...” but not addressing jurisdiction); see also Ex parte McCain, 67 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (footnote omitted) (stating that the Great Writ “is available only for relief from jurisdictional defects and violations of constitutional and fundamental rights”), with Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (citing Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) ) (“[A] number of requirements and prohibitions ... are essentially independent of the litigants' wishes. Implementation of these requirements is not optional and cannot, therefore, be waived or forfeited by the parties. The clearest cases of nonwaivable, nonforfeitable systemic requirements are laws affecting the jurisdiction of the courts.”).

We have held that a lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction deprives a court of any authority to render a judgment. See Garcia, 596 S.W.2d at 527 (quoting Ex parte Armstrong, 110 Tex.Crim. 362, 366, 8 S.W.2d 674, 675–76 (1928) (stating that “[u]nless the power or authority of a court to perform a contemplated act can be found in the Constitution or laws enacted thereunder, it is without jurisdiction and its acts without validity.”)). We have further explained that when a court acts without jurisdiction, such as by entering a judgment without the necessary authority to do so, the purported action taken by the court is void. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (identifying a lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction as reasons a judgment would be void). Thus, for example, when a defendant is convicted at trial, but his trial counsel was ineffective, the court had jurisdiction to hold the trial and sentence the defendant, although defendant might later obtain relief in the form of a new trial for a constitutional violation. In contrast, if a defendant confesses and is convicted at trial because he is guilty of the crime committed, but the court lacked subject-matter or personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the judgment of conviction is void. See Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279 (citing Garcia, 596 S.W.2d at 527 ).

This Court's decision in Ex parte Sledge, 391 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.2013), which was handed down after Townsend, also elucidates the difference between Townsend and the instant case. In Sledge, the applicant did not appeal his conviction, but filed an initial writ application seeking to obtain relief, which was denied. Later, he brought a successive writ application arguing that that trial court lost jurisdiction to adjudicate him guilty and revoke his deferred-adjudication community supervision because the capias for his arrest was issued three days after his supervision expired. Id. at 106. We dismissed his application because the applicant did not allege a new legal basis or sufficiently new factual basis upon which to justify this Court's consideration of his subsequent writ. Id. at 106–07, 111 ; see Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 4. We rejected the applicant's allegation that he could not have discovered the factual basis for his claim until after he filed his initial postconviction writ application because he could have learned of the factual basis for relief he cited in his subsequent application through the exercise of due diligence. See Sledge, 391 S.W.3d at 106–07 (stating that “it is readily apparent that the applicant could have easily obtained the information before now, just as he did for the purpose of developing his current post-conviction writ application”). And although the applicant did not cite a new legal basis as justification for this Court to consider his subsequent writ application, we did note that a legal basis for relief was available to him at the time he filed his initial writ in the form of a decision from this Court. See Langston v. State, 800 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Harris v. State, 843 S.W.2d 34, 35 n.1 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (holding that the jurisdiction of a trial court to adjudicate a defendant's guilt is lost if the clerk fails to issue a capias as required by law). Thus, our decision in Sledge stands for at least two principles relevant to this case: (1) jurisdictional claims are not normally subject to typical notions of procedural default (which is why Applicant can raise her claim here), but (2) the Legislature can permissibly restrict the cognizability of courts to hear jurisdictional claims on habeas (which is why the applicant in Sledge could not raise his claim in a subsequent writ application). See Sledge, 391 S.W.3d at 106–09, 111.

In sum, we hold that Townsend is not applicable to jurisdictional claims raised in an initial writ application because, absent legislation to the contrary (such as the statute discussed in Sledge ), we have held that a lack of jurisdiction renders a judgment void and that claims challenging a court's lack of jurisdiction are cognizable in an initial writ application. However, we caution individuals seeking habeas relief in a subsequent writ application that Sledge continues to bar an applicant from obtaining relief on a jurisdictional claim in a subsequent application if the applicant cannot overcome applicable procedural bars.¹

Laches

The State argues that laches should apply to Applicant's claim because she voluntarily absconded from the jurisdiction of the court to avoid serving her sentence.See Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206 (Tex.Crim.App.2013). It also asserts that laches should bar our consideration of Applicant's claim because “it is highly unlikely that the trial court or any of its personnel, or the deputy clerks involved, would retain a distinct memory of something as routine and commonplace as...