Ex parte Mutual Sav. Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 08 October 2004 |
| Citation | 899 So.2d 986 |
| Parties | Ex parte MUTUAL SAVINGS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. (In re Crystal Taite v. Mutual Savings Life Insurance Company). |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
899 So.2d 986
Ex parte MUTUAL SAVINGS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.(In re Crystal Taite v. Mutual Savings Life Insurance Company)
1031021.
Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 8, 2004.
Glenn L. Davidson, Mobile; and C.S. Chiepalich, Mobile, for respondent.
STUART, Justice.
Mutual Savings Life Insurance Company petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Thomas ap R. Jones to vacate his order granting Crystal Taite's motion to compel Mutual Savings to produce (1) applications for insurance completed by Jennifer Abrams for customers of Mutual Savings and (2) records of complaints alleging fraud or misrepresentation made to Mutual Savings by its customers in Alabama for the past 10 years. We deny the petition.
Facts
In February 2002, Jennifer Abrams, an agent for Mutual Savings, sold Earline Taite a "Final Expense Insurance" policy valued at $5,000. The policy named Crystal Taite as the beneficiary. Earline Taite died in May 2002. Crystal Taite submitted a claim on the policy to Mutual Savings. After investigating, Mutual Savings denied the claim because, it said, Earline Taite did not disclose on her application for insurance that she had a heart condition and that she had undergone a coronary artery bypass graft in January 2002.
In August 2003, Crystal Taite sued Mutual Savings, alleging that Abrams "knowingly
In her first set of interrogatories and requests for production to Mutual Savings, Taite requested:
"12. Has [Mutual Savings] received a complaint (oral, written or otherwise) in the State of Alabama over the past ten (10) years which alleges fraud or misrepresentation regarding the terms of a life insurance policy or in the application process of the proceeding. If so, for each such complaint, produce the name, address and telephone number of each complainant, identify all employees of [Mutual Savings] that received, investigated and/or responded to said complaint, and attach to your responses all documents related to each such complaint, including but not limited to, the complaint itself, memorandums, investigative findings, investigative reports, correspondences, records of disciplinary actions, etc."
Mutual Savings responded:
"Mutual Savings objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant and admissible information, is not reasonably tailored to the allegations of [Taite's] Complaint, and constitutes information that is available to [Taite] from the public records of the State of Alabama."
Taite further requested:
"13. Please produce the application of each and every person or other legal entity who purchased an insurance policy from [Mutual Savings] and which application was completed in part or in whole by Jennifer Abrams in the State of Alabama from 1999 until the present."
Mutual Savings responded:
"Mutual Savings objects to this request because it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant and admissible information, encompasses confidential and proprietary records in the nature of trade secrets, identifies persons not a party to this lawsuit without their authorization, and requests information not discoverable pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801 et seq."
In December 2003, Taite moved to compel Mutual Savings to respond to these discovery requests, arguing that the information requested is relevant to "display plan, motive or scheme on behalf of" Mutual Savings and that the information constituted "pattern and practice discovery in a fraud action." In January 2004, Mutual Savings responded to the motion to compel, arguing that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. ("the GLBA"), prohibited disclosure of the information. Additionally, Mutual Savings moved for a protective order as to Abrams's personnel file. After conducting a hearing, the trial court granted Taite's motion to compel. The trial court further ordered the parties to submit an "appropriate protective order" to maintain the confidentiality of the customers' nonpublic personal information contained in the insurance applications and records of complaints of fraud or misrepresentation concerning life-insurance policies. Mutual Savings moved for clarification of the order
Standard of Review
"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and will be granted only where there is `(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So.2d 889, 891 (Ala.1991). This Court will not issue the writ of mandamus where the petitioner has `"full and adequate relief"' by appeal. State v. Cobb, 288 Ala. 675, 678, 264 So.2d 523, 526 (1972) (quoting State v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311, 316 (1881)).
"Discovery matters are within the trial court's sound discretion, and this Court will not reverse a trial court's ruling on a discovery issue unless the trial court has clearly exceeded its discretion. Home Ins. Co. v. Rice, 585 So.2d 859, 862 (Ala.1991). Accordingly, mandamus will issue to reverse a trial court's ruling on a discovery issue only (1) where there is a showing that the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion, and (2) where the aggrieved party does not have an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal. The petitioner has an affirmative burden to prove the existence of each of these conditions.
"Generally, an appeal of a discovery order is an adequate remedy, notwithstanding the fact that that procedure may delay an appellate court's review of a petitioner's grievance or impose on the petitioner additional expense; our judicial system cannot afford immediate mandamus review of every discovery order. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex.1992)(`Mandamus disrupts the trial proceedings, forcing the parties to address in an appellate court issues that otherwise might have been resolved as discovery progressed and the evidence was developed at trial.'). In certain exceptional cases, however, review by appeal of a discovery order may be...
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