Ex parte Newman
Decision Date | 01 December 1871 |
Citation | 14 Wall. 152,81 U.S. 152,20 L.Ed. 877 |
Parties | EX PARTE NEWMAN |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
PETITION for writ of mandamus to the United States Circuit judge for the Eastern District of New York; the case being thus:
The Constitution ordains1 that the judicial power of the United States shall extend 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'
The 10th article of the treaty of the United States with the King of Prussia, made May 1st, 1828,2 contains this provision:
'All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,' it is ordained by the Constitution of the United States,3 'shall be the supreme law of the land.'
With this treaty thus in force, the mate and several of the crew, all Prussians—who had shipped in Prussia on the Prussian bark Elwine Kreplin, under and with express reference, made in the shipping articles, to the laws of Prussia—got into a difficulty at New York with the master of the bark, who caused several of them to be arrested on charges of mutiny and desertion. They, on the other hand, took the case before the Prussian consul; denying all fault on their part, and claiming wages. The vice-consul heard the case, and decided that on their own showing they had forfeited their wages by the Prussian law applied to their contract of shipment. In addition to this he issued a requisition addressed to any marshal or magistrate of the United States, reciting that the master and crew had been guilty of desertion, and requiring such marshal or magistrate to take notice of their offence.
The mate and men now filed a libel in the District Court at New York against the bark for the recovery of wages (less than $2000), which they alleged were due to them; and the bark was attached to answer. The master of the bark intervening for the interest of the owners answered, and set up various grounds of defence to the claim, some of which arose under the laws of Prussia, and especially he invoked the protection of the clause in the above-quoted treaty between his country and this, and denied the jurisdiction of the District Court, alleging, moreover, that the matter in difference, the claim of the libellants for wages, had already in fact been adjudicated by the Prussian consul at the port of New York.
Before the cause was tried in the District Court, the consulgeneral of the North German Union presented to that court his formal protest against the exercise of jurisdiction by that court in the matter in difference.4 He invoked therein the same clause in the treaty, and claimed exclusive jurisdiction of such matters in difference; and declared also that, before the filing of the libel the matter had been adjudicated by him, and insisted that his adjudication was binding between the parties, and could only be reviewed by the judicial tribunals of Prussia.
The District Court proceeded notwithstanding to hear and adjudge the case; placing its right to do this, on the ground that the suit before it was a proceeding in rem to enforce a maritime lien upon the vessel itself, and not a 'difference between the captain and crew;' and, also, because the Prussian consul had no power to conduct and carry into effect a proceeding in rem for the enforcement of such a lien, and had not in fact passed at all and could not pass upon any such case. Accordingly after a careful examination of the facts, that court decreed in favor of the libellants $712. The case then came by appeal to the Circuit Court. This latter court considered that the District Court had given to the treaty too narrow and technical a construction. The Circuit Court said:
The Circuit Court adverted to and relied on the fact, that the Prussian consul had moreover actually heard the mate and sailors, and pronounced against them.
The Circuit Court accordingly, while it expressed on a general view of the merits its sympathy with the sailors, and a strong inclination to condemn the conduct of the master in the matter, yet was 'constrained to the conclusion that the treaty required that the matter in difference should have been left where the treaty with Prussia leaves it, viz., in the hands and subject to the determination of their own public officer.' The result was the dismissal of the libels by the Circuit Court for want of jurisdiction.
Thereupon Newman and the others, by their counsel, Messrs. P. Phillips and D. McMahon, filed a petition in this court for a writ of mandamus to the Circuit judge, commanding him 'to entertain jurisdiction of the said cause on appeal, and to hear and decide the same on the merits thereof.' The judge returned that the Circuit Court had entertained the appeal, and had heard counsel on all the questions raised in the case, and had decided it; and that the said court had decided that the matter in controversy was within the jurisdiction of the consul under the treaty, and that in the exercise of the jurisdiction so given him, he had decided the matter, and that therefore the court had dismissed the libel.
The question now was whether the mandamus should issue.
The reader will of course remember the provision in the 13th section of the Judiciary Act, by which it is enacted:
'That the Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed or persons holding office under the authority of the United States.'
And also the provision of the 22d section, extended by an act of 1803 to appeals in admiralty, by which it is enacted:
'That final judgments and decrees in civil actions . . . in a Circuit Court . . . removed there by appeal from a District Court, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of $2000, exclusive of costs, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court.'
Messrs. D. McMahon and P. Phillips, in support of the motion:
The mandamus should issue:
1st. Because the treaty stipulation is unconstitutional. It strips the courts of the United States of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution of the United States. It is well settled that admiralty courts have jurisdiction, at their discretion, over foreign vessels within their jurisdiction, and actions in rem against them brought by foreign seamen. If then the treaties attempt to confer on a foreign officer exclusive jurisdiction of cases already within the control of admiralty, they violate the Constitution, and are so far null.
2d. The treaty with Prussia has no reference to suits or proceedings in rem, and in that respect differs from the case mentioned in the treaty, of a difference between the master and seamen. The proceeding is against the vessel to foreclose a lien, and the owners are brought in incidentally. The master, as such, has no interest, nominal or otherwise, in the suit in question, and it is a misnomer to call the present case a controversy between a master and his crew.
3d. The Prussian consul made no adjudication in the matter now in difference, between the libellants and the master.
4th. The treaty is with the kingdom of Prussia, and the tribunals referred to in it are the consuls, vice-consuls, and commercial agents of that government. Now, at the time of the occurrence of the facts here in controversy, there were no consuls, or vice-consuls, or commercial agents of the kingdom of Prussia in the city of New York, or in the United States, though there are such officers of the North German Union. A treaty stipulation to maintain tribunals independent of our own, in this country, is contrary to the spirit of our institutions, as its effect may be to create in our midst many tribunals independent of our national courts. It should, therefore, be construed strictly.
5th. The consul is estopped from asserting his exclusive jurisdiction, because that he appealed in his 'requisition' to our marshals and other magistrates, and prayed them to take cognizance of the case. He cannot be permitted, after doing so, to avail himself of the benefit of the treaty stipulations.
Messrs. Salomon and Burke, contra:
This is an attempt to cause this court to review the decision already rendered in the Circuit Court and to direct the...
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