Ex parte Parker. 1

• Decision Date: 21 March 1887
• Citation: 120 U.S. 737,7 S.Ct. 767,30 L.Ed. 818
• Parties: Ex parte PARKER. 1
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

120 U.S. 737

7 S.Ct. 767

30 L.Ed. 818

Ex parte PARKER.¹

March 21, 1887.

[Statement of Case from pages 737-738 intentionally omitted]

A. T. Button, A. B. Browne, W. W. Upton, J. H. Mitchell, and Walter H. Smith, for petitioner.

J. H. Hoffecker, jr., for respondents.

MATTHEWS, J.

This is an application under section 688 of the Revised Statutes for a writ of mandamus, directed to the supreme court of Washington territory, to reinstate an appeal from a decree of the district court of the territory for the First judicial district in a suit in equity, wherein Elizabeth Denney, executrix of the estate of Timothy P. Denney, is plaintiff, and Hollon Parker and John F. Boyer are defendants. The decree in question was against each of the defendants severally, and the appeal was taken by the defendant Hollon Parker. Upon his petition heretofore filed, a rule to show cause has been issued, to which the chief justice and associate justices of the supreme court of the territory of Washington, on behalf of the court, have made and filed their return. They set forth that, at the time the said Hollon Parker sought to appeal said cause referred to from said district court to said supreme court of Washington territory, the manner of taking such appeal was defined by section 458 of the territorial Code, still in force, as follows:

'Sec. 458. An appeal or writ of error is taken by filing with the clerk of the court in which the judgment or order of the court appealed from is entered a notice, stating the appeal from the same, or some specific part thereof, and serving a copy of said notice on the adverse party or his attorney. Every notice of appeal or writ of error must be signed by the party taking the same, or his attorney of record, and must contain the title of the district court in which the proceedings sought to be reviewed were had; the title of the cause as in the district court; a particular description of the judgment, decree, or order sought to be reviewed; and in case of appeal, a particular description of every decision, ruling, order, or decree by which the appellant claims to have been aggrieved, and which he relies upon as grounds for a reversal or modification of the judgment, order, or decree; and, in case of a writ of error, a particular description of the errors assigned.'

The return further sets forth that the defendant John F. Boyer did not join in said appeal as an appellant, nor was he made an appellee therein, as appears by the notice of appeal which is set out. This notice of appeal is entitled, 'In the district courto f the First judicial district of the territory,' with the title of the cause, and is addressed to Timothy P. Denney, the plaintiff, James K. Kennedy, W. A. George, John B. Allen, and T. J. Anders, attorneys for plaintiff, and A. Reeves Ayres, clerk of the court, giving notice that the said Hollon Parker in the above-entitled action 'hereby appeals to the supreme court of Washington territory from the decree and judgment therein made and entered in the district court of the First judicial district of Washington territory, in and for Walla Walla county, in favor of the plaintiff, Timothy P. Denney, in said action, and against the defendants, Hollon Parker and John F. Boyer, and from the whole thereof; said decree and judgment rendered on the thirty-first day of March, 1882, against the defendants, Hollon Parker and John F. Boyer.' It is further stated in the return that no notice of appeal was served on Boyer, nor was service thereof waived by him. The statute of Washington territory relative to co-parties on appeal is as follows:

'Sec. 454. A part of several co-parties may appeal or prosecute a writ of error; but in such case they must serve notice thereof upon all the other coparties, and file the proof thereof with the clerk of the supreme court.'

It is further set forth that section 464 of the Code of Washington territory prescribed the only means by which, in a cause appealed to the supreme court of the territory, the evidence upon which the same was tried could be certified to said supreme court. That section is as follows:

'Sec. 464. In an action by ordinary proceedings, and in an action by equitable proceedings, tried in whole or in part on oral testimony, all proper entries made by the clerk, and all papers pertaining to the cause and filed therein, except subpoenas, depositions, and other papers which are used as mere evidence, are to be deemed part of the record. But in an action by equitable proceedings, tried upon written testimony, the depositions, and all papers which were used as evidence, are to be certified up to the supreme court, and shall be so cer- tified, not by transcript, but in the original form. But a transcript of a motion, affidavit, or other paper, when it relates to a collateral matter, shall not be certified unless by direction of the appellant. If so certified, when not material to the determination of the appeal or writ of error, the court may direct the person blamable therefor to pay the costs thereof.'

It is further set forth that, accompanying a large quantity of written testimony, and a great number of detached papers in said cause, were two certificates, copies of which are, respectively, as follows:

'CERTIFICATE OF REFEREE.

'I, B. L. Sharpstein, referee in the case of Timothy P. Denney v. H. Parker and J. F. Boyer, do hereby certify that the foregoing evidence, consisting of five packages or bundles numbered one, (1,) two, (2,) three, (3,) four, (4,) and five, (5,) is the evidence written down before me and taken in said action, and that the same, with the documentary evidence returned herewith by me into court, constitute the evidence submitted to and taken by me in said action.

'Dated March 10, 1882.

B. L. SHARPSTEIN, Referee.'

'CERTIFICATE OF CLERK.

'I, A. Reeves Ayres, clerk of the district court of Washington territory and for the First judicial district thereof, holding terms at Walla Walla, Walla Walla county, in said territory, do hereby certify that the five packages of testimony herewith transmitted to the supreme court, and numbered by pages from 1 to 1572, is all the testimony in the case of Timothy P. Denney v. Hollon Parker and John F. Boyer, as taken before B. L. Sharpstein, Esquire, referee in said case, and by him deposited with the clerk of said court; and I further certify that the letters, papers, and exhibits herewith transmitted, and numbered in red ink figures from 1 to 130, respectively, are all the papers, letters, and evidence introduced in said cause before saidr eferee, and by him deposited with the clerk of said court.

'In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said district court this fifteenth day of June, 1883.

[Seal.]

'A. REEVES AYRES, Clerk,

'BY FRANK W. GOODHUE, Deputy,

'U. S. District Court, First Judicial District,

'Walla Walla, Washington Territory.'

The evidence in said cause was in no other manner authenticated.

It further appears that the said cause was docketed in the supreme court as upon the appeal of Hollon Parker; that after divers motions had been determined in said cause, the same was argued on the merits at the regular July term, 1883, and taken under advisement; but, before a decision had been reached, by an act of congress, the organization of the supreme court of Washington territory was so altered as to make the same consist of four justices, and as to disqualify the justice rendering a decision or judgment from sitting in the review thereof. The death of the appellee was suggested, and due showing made, and thereupon Elizabeth Denney, executrix of the last will of Timothy P. Denney, deceased, was substituted as appellee, and thereupon the cause was again placed upon the docket of the supreme court for hearing at its regular July term, 1885. At that time the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds—First, that all the co-parties had not joined in said appeal, and had not been served with any notice of appeal; and, second, because no evidence was properly certified. After argument, it was determined by the court, and decided, that each of the grounds in said motion was well taken; and thereupon, for want of jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause upon its merits, a final judgment of the court was entered that the appeal from the judgment of the said district court be dismissed with costs.

Althought the supreme court of Washington territory rendered judgment in this case for costs against Parker, the appellant, it nevertheless dismissed his appeal for...