Ex parte Pressley

• Decision Date: 28 January 2000
• Citation: 770 So.2d 143
• Parties: Ex parte Marcus PRESSLEY. (Re Marcus Pressley v. State.)
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

770 So.2d 143

Ex parte Marcus PRESSLEY.

(Re Marcus Pressley v. State.)

1981061.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

January 28, 2000.¹

Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 7, 2000.

John C. Robbins, Birmingham; and Dennis Jacobs, Birmingham, for petitioner.

Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and A. Vernon Barnett IV, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.

COOK, Justice.

In September 1997, in the Shelby Circuit Court, Marcus Pressley was convicted by a jury of the capital murder of John Burleson and Janice Littleton, murders committed during the course of a robbery. See § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. He was sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. See Pressley v. State, 770 So.2d 115 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), for a detailed statement of the pertinent facts. We granted certiorari review pursuant to Rule 39(c), Ala.R.App.P.

Pressley presents 25 issues for review; all of them were argued in the Court of Criminal Appeals and were thoroughly addressed by that court. We have carefully reviewed all the issues raised by Pressley. However, we will further address two issues—both of which Pressley's counsel specifically addressed at oral argument: (1) Whether the trial court erred in denying Pressley's motions challenging the State's peremptory strikes against African-American and female veniremembers and (2) Whether international law prohibits the execution of offenders who committed their crimes before attaining the age of 18 years.

Pressley contends that the State engaged in purposeful racial and gender discrimination by removing 4 of 6 African-Americans from the venire and in using 18 of its 23 peremptory strikes to remove females from the venire. He argued the State's action violated the principles of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994).

A trial court's ruling on a Batson objection is entitled to great deference, and we will not reverse the trial court's Batson ruling unless it is clearly erroneous. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala. 1987). In Batson, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the prosecution from exercising its peremptory strikes to remove African-Americans from an African-American defendant's jury solely on the basis of their race. 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held:

"Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges `for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome' of the case to be tried, ... the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant."

476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citations omitted).

The Court went on to outline the components of a defendant's prima facie case of racial discrimination:

"To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits `those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the [veniremembers] from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination."

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citations omitted).

In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991), the Batson principles were extended to apply to civil cases. The Batson principles were further extended in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), when the United States Supreme Court held that they were also applicable to defense counsel in criminal trials. In White Consolidated Industries, Inc. v. American Liberty Insurance Co., 617 So.2d 657 (Ala.1993), we extended the Batson principles to the striking of white veniremembers. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the United States Supreme Court extended the Batson principles to prohibit gender-based strikes. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880), the Court held that racial discrimination in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause; however, it recognized that a defendant has no right to a jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race.

A defendant making a Batson challenge bears the burden of proving a prima facie case of purposeful or intentional discrimination and, in the absence of such proof, the prosecution is not required to state its reasons for its peremptory challenges. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala.1987). Only when the defendant establishes facts and circumstances that raise an inference of discrimination must the State give its reasons for its peremptory strikes. Stokes v. State, 648 So.2d 1179, 1180 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).

The jury in Pressley's case consisted of nine women and three men, with one male alternate juror and one female alternate juror. There was one African-American on the jury and one African-American alternate juror. While the prosecution was exercising its peremptory strikes, the prosecutor pointed out that Pressley had used 7 of his 10 strikes to remove white males from the venire. Pressley replied by pointing out that the State had used 7 of its first 10 strikes to remove women. After the jury was struck, the State made a cross-Batson motion, arguing that Pressley had used 14 of his 22 strikes to remove white males from the jury, and in doing so, had unconstitutionally discriminated against white males. The State pointed out that only three males (25%) sat on the jury out of the 40% on the venire. Next, Pressley made a Batson motion, pointing out that the State had struck four African-Americans from the jury, with only one African-American actually sitting on the jury. Pressley made a second Batson motion, arguing that the State had used 18 of its 23 strikes to remove females from the jury. The trial court denied all motions, without finding that either party had made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination.

This Court has held that where the trial court has made no express finding of a prima facie case of intentional discrimination but the prosecution nonetheless explains its peremptory challenges, we will infer that the court made such a finding and will proceed directly to evaluate the prosecutor's explanations. See Hart v. State, 612 So.2d 520, 523-24 (Ala.Crim. App.1992); see Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 501 (Ala.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1028, 109 S.Ct. 1159, 103 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989); Currin v. State, 535 So.2d 221 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 535 So.2d 225 (Ala.1988). However, in this case we do not find that the prosecutor explained the reasons for the State's peremptory strikes; therefore, we will consider the question whether Pressley made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination.

In Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609 (Ala. 1987), we stated that the following terms illustrate the kinds of evidence a party can use to raise an inference of racial or gender discrimination when seeking to establish a prima facie case:

"1. Evidence that the `jurors in question share[d] only this one characteristic—their membership in the group [alleged to have been discriminated against]—and that in all other respects they [were] as heterogenous as the community as a whole.'"

"2. A pattern of strikes against [members of one race or gender] on the particular venire."

"3. The past conduct of the state's attorney in using peremptory challenges to strike all members of [one race or gender] from the jury venire."

"4. The type and manner of the [prosecutor's] questions and statements during voir dire...."

"5. The type and manner of questions directed to the challenged juror, including a lack of questions or a lack of meaningful questions."

"6. Disparate treatment of members of the jury venire with the same characteristics, or who answer a question in the same or [a] similar manner...."

"7. Disparate examination of members of the venire...."

"8. Circumstantial evidence of intent may be proven by disparate impact where all or most of the challenges were used to strike [members of one race or gender] from the jury."

"9. The state used peremptory challenges to dismiss all or most [members of one race or gender]."

526 So.2d at 622-23.

Pressley supported his Batson objections by arguing that the State's use of its peremptory strikes "in itself" establishes a pattern of discriminatory striking of jurors and constitutes a prima facie case of discrimination; this prima facie case, he argues, shifted the burden to the State to offer reasons for the strikes. However, we do not find that Pressley supplied the trial court with any additional information indicating that the State engaged in a "pattern" of discriminatory striking of jurors. The following colloquy occurred:

"THE COURT: Well, let me ask this from the defendant's standpoint: Does the defendant have anything else to offer?

"MR. ROBBINS [defense counsel]: In support of our motion, Judge?

"THE COURT: Yes.

"MR. ROBBINS: Judge, we would need time, I guess, to sit down and look more closely at the information that we got from the questionnaire to offer as evidence to

...