Ex parte Rice
| Decision Date | 22 June 1990 |
| Citation | 565 So.2d 606 |
| Parties | Ex parte Cornelius RICE. (Re Cornelius Rice v. State). 89-794. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Elizabeth H. Shaw, Mobile, for petitioner.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Sandra Lewis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
This Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the denial of Cornelius Rice's Temp. Rule 20, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition. 1 The denial of that petition was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, without opinion. Rice v. State, 555 So.2d 1205 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). The questions presented are whether that denial violated Rice's due process rights and whether the State satisfied its burden of pleading under Rule 20.3.
Rice had been convicted of first degree robbery and had been sentenced to 20 years in the penitentiary. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, without opinion. Rice v. State, 502 So.2d 405 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), cert. denied, 514 So.2d 345 (Ala.1987). Rice later filed this pro se Rule 20 petition, arguing that his conviction was due to be reversed because of a number of alleged violations of his constitutional rights that he claims occurred during his arrest and prosecution. In its response the State argued that Rice's petition should be dismissed because he had allegedly failed to state his grounds for relief with the specificity required by Rule 20.6(b). The State also made a general allegation that the petition should be denied "on grounds of preclusion as provided by Rule 20.2." It did not specify which one of the seven separate grounds of preclusion contained in Rule 20.2 it was arguing warranted a denial of Rice's petition. 2
Rice filed a reply to the State's response, wherein he argued that his petition satisfied the specificity requirement of Rule 20.6(b) and repeated his request for relief. Rice also requested appointed counsel to assist him in the prosecution of his petition. However, no counsel was appointed for Rice, and the trial court issued an order denying his petition. The court apparently rejected the State's Rule 20.6(b) specificity argument, holding:
"[Rice] is precluded from seeking relief under Rule 20, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, based on the preclusion provisions of Rule 20.2; ... the preclusion provisions are the sole basis for the denial of the [p]etition."
Rice contends that the denial of his petition on the basis of the State's broad Rule 20.2 allegation constitutes a denial of his right to due process. He maintains that the State's failure to allege a specific ground of preclusion deprived him of the notice to which he was entitled, thus making it impossible for him to disprove the existence of a ground of preclusion. In addition, he argues that the State's blanket allegation did not satisfy the burden of pleading assigned to the State by Rule 20.3, reproduced below:
(Emphasis added.)
The State argues that Rice was not entitled to notice of the specific grounds of preclusion that it planned to rely on when it challenged his petition. The basis of that argument appears to be that the guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that operate to protect defendants before their conviction do not also serve to protect individuals once a judgment of conviction has been entered. However, as Justice White stated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974):
"If the position implies that prisoners in state institutions are without the protections of the Constitution and the Due Process Clause, it is plainly untenable....
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-75 (citations omitted).
In accordance with that principle, the appellate courts of Alabama have extended the rights inherent in our concept of due process to prisoners filing Rule 20 petitions. See Peoples v. State, 531 So.2d 323, 326 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) (); Johnson v. State, 526 So.2d 34 (Ala.Crim.App.1987) ().
The State also argues that Rule 20.3 does not require it to plead a specific Rule 20.2 ground of preclusion. However, that argument ignores the obvious purpose behind the assignment of the burdens of pleading and...
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