Ex parte Self

• Decision Date: 10 September 2021
• Docket Number: 1200431
• Parties: Ex parte Johnny Lee Self v. State of Alabama In re: Johnny Lee Self
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Ex parte Johnny Lee Self

In re: Johnny Lee Self v. State of Alabama

No. 1200431

Supreme Court of Alabama

September 10, 2021

Jefferson Circuit Court, CC-03-1269.60 and CC-03-1270.60 Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-19-0978

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

MENDHEIM, JUSTICE

Johnny Lee Self petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Self v. State (No. CR-19-0978, Jan. 29, 2021), ___ So.3d ___ (Ala.Crim.App.2021) (table), a 3-2 decision affirming the Jefferson Circuit Court's summary dismissal of Self's Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief. We granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision is in conflict with Barnes v. State, 708 So.2d 217 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). We conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision is in conflict with Barnes and we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

In September 2003, Self pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, violations of § 13A-6-66, Ala. Code 1975, and was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment; the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree is a Class C felony. Self did not appeal his guilty-plea convictions or sentences.

On November 7, 2019, Self filed a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition challenging his convictions and sentences. In his petition, Self alleged that he had been improperly sentenced to serve 25 years in prison because the maximum sentence authorized for a Class C felony is 10 years, see § 13A-5-6(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, and, Self asserted, he "was not sentenced as a [h]abitual [o]ffender." Self also alleged "that nothing in the record shows that his sentence was properly enhanced." Self argued that the trial court had lacked "jurisdiction to sentence [him] or render his sentence because [the sentence] exceeds the maximum required by law." On April 3, 2020, the State filed a response, arguing that Self's claim is not a jurisdictional claim and is barred by the limitations period set forth in Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.

On June 9, 2020, the circuit court summarily dismissed Self's Rule 32 petition. The circuit court interpreted Self's claims in his Rule 32 petition as (1) a claim "that the State failed to adequately prove [Self's] prior felony convictions that were used to enhance his sentence" and (2) a claim "that the record does not reflect application of the Habitual Felony Offender Act." Based on that interpretation of Self's claims, the circuit court determined that Self's claims are not jurisdictional and, thus, are barred by the limitations period set forth in Rule 32.2(c). On June 25, 2020, Self filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the circuit court's judgment, which the circuit court denied. Self appealed.

Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Self argued that the circuit court had erred when it summarily dismissed his illegal-sentence claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in its unpublished memorandum decision, stated:

"Self's claim, as pleaded, is a nonjurisdictional claim that is subject to the grounds of preclusion set out in Rule 32.2, Ala. R. Crim. P. To be sure, an allegation that a sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law is a jurisdictional claim. See, e.g., Brand v. State, 93 So.3d 985, 987-88 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (holding that a claim that a sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law is jurisdictional and, thus, not subject to the grounds of preclusion set out in Rule 32.2, Ala. R. Crim. P.). Similarly, a claim that a defendant is not subject to the Habitual Felony Offender Act ('HFOA') and a claim that the HFOA was never invoked and applied are jurisdictional claims. See, e.g., Mosley v. State, 986 So.2d 476, 477 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (holding that a claim that a conviction for child abuse is not subject to the HFOA is a jurisdictional claim); and Horn v. State, 912 So.2d 539, 543 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (Shaw, J., concurring specially) ('The jurisdictional issue in Martin[ v. State, 687 So.2d 1253 (Ala.Crim.App.1996)], as in this case, was whether the HFOA had been invoked and applied to enhance the appellant's sentence.').

"But Self did not allege that he is not subject to the HFOA or that the HFOA was not invoked and applied in his case. Rather, Self alleged that he was not sentenced as a habitual felony offender because 'nothing in the record shows that his sentence was properly enhanced.' (C. 43.) Self's claim, as properly characterized by the circuit court in its order summarily dismissing Self's petition, is nothing more than a claim that his sentence is 'unlawful' because the record does not affirmatively show that he was sentenced under the HFOA. (See C. 13.) It is well settled that such claims are nonjurisdictional. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 922 So.2d 961, 963 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) ('[T]o the extent that Murray is arguing that the record does not affirmatively reflect that he was sentenced under the HFOA, that claim also does not have jurisdictional implications and, thus, is also procedurally barred by Rule 32.2(a)(5).').

"Because Self's HFOA claim is nonjurisdictional and subject to the grounds of preclusion set out in Rule 32.2, Ala. R. Crim. P., and because he filed his Rule 32 petition well outside the limitations period set out in Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., the circuit court did not err when it found Self's claim to be time-barred."

Standard of Review

This Court has stated that, "when the facts are undisputed and an appellate court is presented with pure questions of law, that court's review in a Rule 32[, Ala. R. Crim. P., ] proceeding is de novo." Ex parte White, 792 So.2d 1097, 1098 (Ala. 2001).

Discussion

As noted above, this Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the above-quoted portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum decision is in conflict with Barnes, supra. In Barnes, a Rule 32 petitioner alleged "that he was improperly sentenced to serve fifteen years in prison, because the maximum sentence authorized [under the applicable statute] is 10 years ... and he was not sentenced as a habitual offender." Barnes, 708 So.2d at 218. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that it was precluded by operation of Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P. On appeal, the Rule 32 petitioner argued "that his sentences exceed the maximum authorized by law because he was not sentenced as a habitual felony offender." Barnes, 708 So.2d at 218. The State argued that the Rule 32 petitioner's sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum because, it said, the Rule 32 petitioner had been sentenced as a habitual felony offender. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted however, that there was "no indication in the record that the provisions of the Habitual Felony Offender Act applied in th[at] case" or that the Rule 32 petitioner had been "sentenced as a habitual offender." Id. at 218 and 219. In addressing the Rule 32 petitioner's argument on appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the Rule 32 petitioner "essentially challenge[d] the legality of his sentence." Id. at 219. Noting that an illegal sentence may be challenged at any time, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the Rule 32 petitioner "ha[d] alleged facts that, if true, entitle[d] him to relief." Id. The only fact that was in question in Barnes was whether the Rule 32 petitioner had been sentenced pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Act ("HFOA"), § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that, "[i]f the [Rule 32 petitioner's] allegations [were] true, the sentences exceeded the jurisdiction of the court and [were] therefore void." Id.

The present case appears to be identical to Barnes. Self argued in his Rule 32 petition that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to render judgment or to impose the 25-year sentence on him because, he said, he "was not sentenced as an [h]abitual [o]ffender under the [HFOA]." Self specifically alleged, as did the Rule 32 petitioner in Barnes, that "nothing in the record shows that his sentence was properly enhanced." The Court of Criminal Appeals appears to have isolated that last portion of Self's argument -- that the record does not include any indication that he was sentenced as a habitual felony offender -- to characterize his entire argument as "nothing more than a claim that his sentence is 'unlawful' because the record does not affirmatively show that he was sentenced under the HFOA." In so characterizing his argument, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Murray v. State, 922 So.2d 961 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), to conclude that such an argument does not raise a jurisdictional issue. However, Murray is distinguishable from the present case.

In Murray, a Rule 32 petitioner argued that "his sentence of life imprisonment for [his] trafficking conviction was illegal because, he [said], the sentencing order and the case action summary [did] not show that he was sentenced under the Habitual Felony Offender Act ... and the State did not present 'certified court documents' to prove his prior convictions." Murray, 922 So.2d at 963. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that, "to the extent that [the Rule 32 petitioner was] arguing that the record does not affirmatively reflect that he was sentenced under the HFOA, that claim ... [did] not have jurisdictional implications and, thus, [was] ... procedurally barred by Rule 32.2(a)(5)." Murray, 922 So.2d at 963. The argument raised by the Rule 32 petitioner in Murray was related solely to whether the record indicated that the Rule 32 petitioner had been sentenced as a habitual felony offender; the Rule 32 petitioner in Murray did not specifically allege that he had not been sentenced as a...